

**ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME**

**ASSESSING INTRA-REGIONAL STATE-LED
INTERVENTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ETHIOPIAN
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 2006 – 2009**

Master Thesis

Abdulaziz Abdirahman Hasan

Ankara-2019

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Ankara -2019

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis/dissertation/report titled “Assessing Intra-Regional State-Led Interventions: A Case Study of the Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia” and prepared by Abdulaziz Abdirahman HASAN meets with the committee’s approval by a majority vote as Master’s Thesis in the Field of International Relations following the successful defends of the thesis conducted in 18.01.2019.

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ETHICS DECLARATION

I hereby declare that;

- I prepared this dissertation in accordance with Atilim University Graduate School of Social Sciences Dissertation Writing Directive,
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01/02/2019

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ÖZ

[Abdulaziz, Abdirahman Hasan]. [Bölge İçindeki Devlet Liderliğindeki Müdahalelerin Değerlendirilmesi: Somali'deki Etiyopyalı Müdahale Örneği 2006-2009], [Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, [2018].

1991'de devletin çöküşünün ardından, Somali'de çatışma sonrası istikrarı getirmeye yönelik önemli müdahaleler meydana geldi. Bu müdahaleler hem insani hem de askeri müdahaleler şeklinde olmuştur; BM (UNOSOM I ve II misyonları) şemsiyesi altındaki ABD önderliğindeki müdahale, AMISOM müdahalesi ve Etiyopya müdahalesi en önemli müdahaleleri oluşturmaktadır. Etiyopya'nın gerçekleştirdiği müdahale, son on yıl boyunca bilim adamları arasında, Afrika Birliği ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin bakış açısıyla analiz edilen müdahaleler arasında büyük ilgi gördü. Bununla birlikte, Etiyopya'nın Somali'ye müdahalesinin bütünsel bir incelemesi hala mevcut değildir. Bu çalışmanın hedefleri: müdahaleye neden olan meseleleri incelemeyi, bu devlet destekli müdahalenin temelini oluşturan yasal zemin ve bunun Somali üzerindeki sonuçları yerel, bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde desteklemeyi içermektedir.

Çalışma, çalışma hedeflerini test etmek için nitel araştırma metodolojisi ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Araştırmanın verileri; gazeteler, dergiler, Etiyopya ve Somali'nin Anayasası gibi yasal hükümet belgeleri, Birleşmiş Milletler kararları, yayınlanmış kitaplar ve bu konuda yayımlanmamış akademik çalışmaları içeren ikincil veri kaynaklarından toplanmıştır.

Çalışma bulgularına dayanarak yapılan araştırma, Somali'deki Etiyopya hükümetinin işgalinin TFG hükümetinin kapasitesini güçlendirmek ve İslamcı ideolojik etkinin Etiyopya ve dünyadaki yayılmasını durdurmak olduğunu ortaya koydu. Etiyopya misyonunun yasallığı üzerine, bulgular bu istila ile aynı çizgide sayılmayacağını; BM Tüzüğü'nün 2 (4) ve 51 inci Maddelerinin ruhu, önemli etki ve ölçek gerekliliğini yerine getirme konusunda başarısız olur. Ayrıca, Etiyopyalı istilasının sonuçlarının da ortaya çıktığını ortaya koydu: Orta ve Güney Somali'de güçlendirilmiş terörizm, klan davalarına katılmış, genel nüfus için ekonomik erime, genç işsizliği ve çok bölünmüş bir siyasi devlet habercisi. Bu bağlamda, çalışma Etiyopya işgalinin bölgesel bir hegemon olarak hareket ederek motive olduğu ve BM tüzüğü uyarınca sınırlı bir meşruiyetle Somali halkına önemli sosyo-ekonomik maliyetlerle sonuçlandığı sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Etiyopya müdahalesi, AMISOM, Intrastate önderliğinde müdahale, Somali çatışması.

ABSTRACT

[Abdulaziz, Abdirahman Hasan]. [Assessing Intra-Regional State-Led Interventions: a Case Study of The Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia 2006-2009], [master Thesis, Ankara, [2018].

Following the state collapse in 1991, significant process of interventions have occurred in Somalia all geared at bringing post-conflict stability. These interventions have been both humanitarian and military intervention; USA led intervention under the umbrella of the UN (UNOSOM I and II missions), AMISOM intervention and Ethiopian intervention forming the most significant interventions. The Ethiopian intervention has attracted great interest over the past decade among scholars, with intervention analyzed from the perspective of African union as well as United Nations. However, a holistic analysis of the Ethiopian intervention into Somalia still lacks necessitating the current study whose objectives involve: seeking to examine and delve into the issues prodding the intervention, the legal grounds underpinning this state-led intervention and the consequences this had on Somalia domestically, regionally and internationally.

The study was conducted through qualitative research methodology in order to test the study objectives. The data of the research was collected from Secondary data sources that included newspapers, Magazine, Journals, government legal documents such as constitutions of Ethiopia and Somali, United Nations resolutions, published books and unpublished academic works on this issue.

Based on the study findings the study revealed that the Ethiopian government invasion of Somalia was to reinforce the capability of TFG government and stop the spread of Islamist ideological influence in Ethiopia and the world. On legality of Ethiopian mission, findings indicated that this invasion cannot be considered to be in line with; the spirit of Article 2 (4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter as it fails to meet the requirement of significant effect and scale. Further, the results indicated the Ethiopian invasion came with the consequences of: strengthened terrorism in central and Southern Somalia, entrenched clan-feuds, enhanced economic meltdown for general population, youth unemployment and heralded a much divided political state. In this regards the study concludes that the Ethiopian invasion was motivated by acting as a regional hegemon and with limited legitimacy in line with UN charter resulted to significant socio-economic costs to the Somali people.

Key words: Ethiopian intervention, AMISOM, Intra-regional led intervention, Somali conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Associate Proff. Dr. Gözde yılmaz, my research supervisors, for her patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. I would also like to thank Dr. Gözde yılmaz, for her advice and assistance in keeping my progress on schedule. I wish to thank my two examiners Dr. Kaan Renda and Nilgün Eliküçük Yıldırım for their contribution to this project by examining my work, giving their advice and critiques for improving my work.

My grateful thanks are also extended to my family for their support. My wife Anab Abdullahi Farah and two daughters Hanan and Hana for their support in giving me time and space to write my project. I would also like to extend my thanks to My two daughters Isra and Nadja for their help in critical analysis and proof reading my work.

Finally, I wish to thank all my friends for their encouragement throughout my study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL	Error! Bookmark not defined.
ETHICS DECLARATION.....	iii
OZ.....	i
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.....	1
CHAPTER TWO	17
ETHIOPIA’S 2006 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: MOTIVES AND CIRCUMSTANCES.....	17
2.1. Introduction	17
2.2. Somalia from Kingdom in the Past to Self-destruction and State Collapse	17
2.3. Somalia after the collapse of the State	27
2.4. The Ogaden Clout	33
2.5. Ethiopia’s Intervention in Somalia, 2006-2009: Substantial Circumstances	34
2.6. Summary of the Chapter	39

CHAPTER THREE

LEGALITY OF SELF –DEFENSE: THE 2006 ETHIOPIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA	41
3.1. Introduction	41
3.2. Ethiopia’s Right to Self Defence.....	42
3.3. The Legality of Self-Defence in Response to the Threat of Terrorism.....	48
3.4. Intervention by Invitation.....	49
3.5. Summary of the Chapter	56

CHAPTER FOUR

SOMALIA AND AFTERMATH OF THE 2006 ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS.....	59
4.1. Introduction	59
4.2. The Intra-Country Impact of the Ethiopian Intervention: Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political Impact of the Aftermath of the Ethiopian Intervention.....	60
4.2.1. The end of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) Reconciliation Process and the Entrenchment of Terrorism as a Source of Conflict in Southern and Central Somalia.....	60
4.3. Entrenchment of Clannism as a Driver of Conflict in Somalia.....	64
4.4. The Economic Impact of the 2006 Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia.....	65
4.5. Increase in Youth Unemployment and Disadvantaged Somalis regarding Employment Opportunities	67
4.6. The Political Impact of the 2006 Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia	68

4.7. Increased Foreign Engagement and Strengthened Foreign Relations in Somalia.....	70
4.8. Summary of the Chapter	73
CONCLUSION.....	75
REFERENCES.....	81

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	: African-Led International Support Mission to Mali
AIAI	: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	: African Peace and Security Council
ARPCT	: Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	: Alliance for the Deliberation of Somalia
ASWJ	: Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama
AU	: African Union
BBA	: Building Block Approach
BBC	: British Broadcasting Corporation
ECOMOG	: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West Africa States
ENDF	: Ethiopian National Defence Force
EPRDF	: Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
FGS	: Federal Government of Somalia
ICJ	: International Courts of Justice
ICU	: Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority for Development
KLA	: Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHS	: National Health Service
OAU	: Organization of African Union
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Courts

OLF	: Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	: Ogaden National Liberation Front
PM	: Prime Minister
PSC	: Peace Security Council
SNM	: Somalia National Movement
SPM	: Somalia Patriotic Movement
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TNG	: Transitional National Government
UIC	: Union of Islamic Courts
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNOSOM	: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USA	: United States of America
USC	: United Somalia Congress
USSR	: United of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA	: Voice of America
WMD	: Weapons for Mass Destruction

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Horn of Africa is one of the major geographical regions in the world, because of its importance in aspects of geopolitics, international trade, religion and culture. Its geographical significance is major link of the three continents: Africa, Europe and Asia, through the strategic Strait of Bab-almandab at the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean as well as the Nile River are fundamental geographical features that shape the livelihood of the inhabitants of this region, and simultaneously influences their relationship. The countries located in the Horn of Africa include Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda (Lewis, 2003).

According to Lewis (2003, p.24), the list of countries in Horn of Africa could be widened to include countries at the eastern border of the Red Sea and at the end of the river Nile delta namely the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt. But a strict definition in narrow geographical terms could only allow Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea to qualify for this title. The geographical significance made the region a key global conflict zone. A well-established fact about the region is the persistent rivalry between most of the countries. The region has –historically and recently- sustained fierce competitions and deadly conflicts fueled by culture, religion, imperialistic ambitions and border disputes.

Lewis (2017, p. 32) emphasizes that Somalia and Ethiopia have been at confrontation for centuries. The relationship between the two heavyweights at the horn broke down several times to the level of armed conflict that necessitates an international intervention in the region. The rivalry between the Muslim inhabitation of the horn valley spearheaded by ethnic Somalis and the plateaus Christian inhabitants' spearheads by ethnic Amhara exposed the region to foreign intervention after a prolonged warfare in the 16 century. The then rising Portuguese power intervened in favour of the plateaus to rescue them from what was perceived as an

Islamic threat. The Ottoman Empire responded quickly to establish its relationship with the valley.

At the end of 19th century, the world witnessed a ruthless competition between imperialistic western colonial powers for colonizing Africa. The western powers held a conference in Berlin in 1885 whereby Ethiopia was considered part of the Christian club as she was an active participant in that meeting sitting side by side with Western colonial powers. The outcome of the conference for the Muslim valley inhabitants was devastating as Ethiopian forces marched to the Muslim capital city of Harer and captured it on 15 May 1887 (Abdi, 1997).

The Somalis were later divided into five parties, thus each of it becoming an easy prey for either regional (Kenya and Ethiopia) or international (Britain, Italy and France) colonial powers. Since then, a tension-laden relationship full of hostility, low level conflicts and- or all-out wars became a norm between Somali and Ethiopia. The major memorable conflicts are the Ogaden war in 1977 and the dual proxy wars of 1978-1991 that led to the fall of the military rules of both countries in 1991 (Lewis, 2017).

According to Markakis (2012, p.38) the fall of the military regimes was a blessing for Ethiopia but a curse for Somalia. A constructive dialogue was quickly organized in Germany between the ethnic-based rebel factions to conduct power transition smoothly. By contrast, Somalia's clan-based factions were left to pour into the capital city to oust the regime. With the fall of the capital city of Mogadishu in 1991, the central government melted, and the chain of command broke down. From then on, the country falls into a deep ditch of anarchy, lawlessness and civil war as rebels turned on each other for the control of resources. As a consequence, the international community saw Somalia within the prism of a failed state.

At this stage of power vacuum and disintegration, Somalia became a breeding ground for all sorts of criminal groups such as merciless warlords, drug dealers and terrorist groups that controlled most of the southern and the central regions of Somalia. The international community, the African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have all made same efforts

for peace, reconciliation and state recovery in Somalia for over a decade but little progress was made (Besteman, 1999).

Abdullahi (2011, p. 7) asserts that the merge of an Islamic group under the name of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 was perceived by local civilians as saviours from the anarchy. During their short reign period, they stabilized Mogadishu and brought the much needed peace to its people. However, the Islamist group soon contended the weak transitional federal government that was backed by the international community. As the country was fragmented into regions and the Islamist groups were taking control bit by bit, while unwilling to compromise or negotiate with the weak government, they were perceived as a real threat by most stakeholders in the security dilemma of Somalia and to many of them, an intervention was inevitable.

Ethiopia is considered one the most intruders that intervene politically and militarily in neighbouring Somalia. She carried out several political initiatives (though considered by some Somali nationals as interference) and military incursions between 1991-2006. But the intervention of 2006-2009 singles out itself as the most significant of all due to its nature, scale, the attention it captured internationally and the resistance it sparked among the Somali nationals worldwide (Alebachew, 2017). That is why this intervention deserves to be studied.

Interventions in foreign armed conflicts by individual countries are usually carried out by the allure of promising incentives attached to them. These incentives may range from political to economic as well as social-cultural ones. In many cases, the incentives are usually well articulated in the intervening country's foreign policy (Blechman, 1995).

The literature on interventions reveals some factors that may cause or encourage the interference of a country into other affairs. Most scholars mention geographical, political, security and economic interests as likely facts that contribute to interventions. Nation states usually assert themselves and flex their military might when the national interest is at stake. Some researchers also indicate

that internal conflicts have spillover effects if not contained quickly. It may lead to the use of a warring faction in a troubled country as a proxy.

According to Crocker (1995, pp. 2-4), a given intervention may be militarized or non-militarized (diplomatic). Diplomatic intervention, on the one hand, maybe unrelenting and strategic or it may be episodic on an ad hoc basis. He uses the example of the United States to extrapolate on interventions in foreign armed conflicts at the global level of which he postulates that America has pursued long-term interventions in the various conflicts within and between polities in the Middle East.

According to Marangio (2012, p. 7), many foreign armed conflicts have impelled diplomatic, pecuniary or military interventions by foreign actors. Interventions during foreign armed conflicts can be categorized into two distinct groupings. The first group includes neutral interventions which are generally multilateral interventions, and which are described as collective conflict resolution efforts prearranged by the global community to bring an end to civil war and thus usher peace and stability to the embattled region. The overriding motive of neutral multilateral interventions under the umbrella of the international community, such as the United Nations peacekeeping forces, is to restore peace in the country in question.

The other category consists of unilateral interventions in support of one of the warring sides to promote the intervener's interest by seeking to influence the dynamics of civil war through the opposition or government side. When states intervene unilaterally in foreign armed strife, to support one of the domestic party/parties, they usually have a leeway to do so militarily or by non-military means (Regan, 2002). Conteh-Morgan (2001, p. 12) asserts that violent ethnopolitical strife's, secessionist movements, political power rivalry, rivalry for territorial control, and disfranchisement of developing states economically has necessitated foreign intervention whose purpose is to promote the sovereignty of states in conflict and human rights practices in developing countries.

Scholars such as Aydin (2013, p. 12) posit that domestic politics and economic concerns dominate intervention decisions. In her dissertation on foreign powers and intervention in armed strife's, she expounds upon a framework that places an emphasis on the role of domestic economic interests in international affairs. She further argues that state interventionist policies especially undertaken in foreign armed strife's are not altruistic initiatives as opposed to media assertions but rather are selfish acts of defending economic interests abroad as articulated within a country's domestic policy

Aydin's (2013, p.12) argument is supported by Charles Lewis (2013, p.6) opines domestic politics and economic considerations are among the chief reasons that underpin state interventions in foreign armed strife's. However, Aydin (2013, p.13) does not address emergent rationales for interventions. These include international humanitarian obligations whereby the states in the international arena are obliged to intervene to resolve humanitarian issues afflicting the embattled population; security, whereby strife in other countries leads to insecurity or a threat to security in other countries; to solve a pending refugee crisis; a quest for hegemonic power at the regional level as well as the need for prestige.

According to Regan (1998, p. 11), there is a long and distorted history in the study of foreign interventions into internal strifes. He argues that the challenges with the study of interventions are, first, in the traditional setting. Therefore, only military means are deemed insufficient even when they were conceived for military purpose in the age of diplomacy. Secondly, he posits, most of the existing research has focused on inter civil strife at the expense of intrastate strife's and finally, existing studies offer little support for the prescriptive arguments put forth. To Regan (1998, p.12), Rosenau's conceptualization of the conceptual issues related to interventions ought to be based on based on promoting intervention policies and breaking existing conventions

Regan (1998, p.6) posits that historically, the logic underpinning interventionism remained rooted in realism. The four factors, he argues, that influence interventions relate to features in a country with strife, intervener features, an association between the intervener and target group and international system

features. Level of strife, geopolitics and geography are the dominant determinant linked with external military interventions. However, in most cases, interventions are usually dictated by the capability and the motives of the intervener.

Regan (1998, p.10) argues that the decision to intervene in foreign armed strife's can also be greatly influenced by ethnic affiliation between countries in conflict and third-party military interventionist countries and is more pronounced in cases where such countries share a common border and ethnic communities. This argument, Regan advances, is in line with the "effective linkages" propositions which have been articulated by Mitchell, 1970. In addition, he the decision to intervene may be linked to policies and organizational infighting occasioned by bureaucracy, a case in point being the interventionist policies propounded at the height of the Cold War largely driven by the Cold War politics between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Regan also draws heavily from the work of Blechman (1995, p.6) to advance that moral reason also explains the motivation behind some of the military interventions, more so in cases where humanitarian catastrophes necessitate the need of the international community to intervene to resolve these humanitarian crises that may mean a matter of life and death to the embattled population (s). Regan also draws from Dowty and Louscher (1996, p.8) who propound the concept of refugee flows and argued that they can impose a financial strain on the host country. Therefore, an intervention is justified under international convention as the associated costs of a large refugee population affect the national interests.

According to Seybolt (2008, p.14), humanitarian intervention in a foreign strife may take two shapes; non-militarized humanitarian intervention and militarized humanitarian intervention. Even though the foundations of the modern international system are found on the understanding that a state's right to self-determination and freedom from any foreign interventions pertaining to the internal affairs of a given state, controversy has emerged on the extent to which the world can watch as atrocities are visited upon a people inside a sovereign state. Proponents of humanitarian interventionism mainly decry the loss of human life.

Seybolt (2008, p.17) further asserts that the concept of sovereign immunity has been shattered by a number of humanitarian interventions since 1991 in light of protecting civilians from harm. This human security notion on the use of force for a moral end is hinged upon the belief that the rights of people are the foundations for a just and secure world, not states, a perspective that is premised on a responsibility to protect of the international community.

This responsibility, Seybolt (2008, p.18) further argues, is one of the emergent ventures of the international politics and is conceptualized in the doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' which requires non-combatants (civilians) to be protected from harm and violence during violent strife's. This idea, enshrined in a document adopted by the United Nations Summit of September 2005, puts the onus on the United Nations members with a mandate to protect if states fail.

Seybolt's (2008, p.22) book on the nexus between militarized interventions within the prism of the human security perspective provides a sneak preview of a Post-Cold War era international arena dotted by a decline in inter-state strifes with a corresponding rise in intrastate strife's. To this effect, therefore, an analysis of humanitarian interventions within the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect' holds water especially in an era where innumerable horrors are visited upon populations within sovereign territories through acts of the state commission and/or omission.

However Seybolt (2008, p.21) does not aptly delineate humanitarian interventions from ulterior motives that are enshrined in the foreign policy of the intervening powers such as the quest for prestige; securing markets abroad; looting, controlling and/or exploiting resources; and/or, the quest for hegemonic powers either at the global, regional or sub-regional level in the many instances where these ulterior motives are actualized under the guise of militarized humanitarian intervention within the human security perspective.

In contrast to Seybolt, for example, there is Friesendorf (2012, pp. 27-28) who is of the view that in other given instances, the intervening powers are not solely guided by the quest for humanitarian interventionism. Rather, Friesendorf

(2012, p. 28) argues, these militarized humanitarian interventions are as a consequence of domestic politics especially in the cases of the governments of democracies, which are usually under pressure from their home populations as well as domestic policy machinations to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations in foreign armed strife's.

At the global level, the interventions in East Timor and in Kosovo are textbook examples. The Kosovo intervention by NATO was carried out in the wake of the humanitarian crisis that ensued following the atrocious civil wars in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. In the last months of 1998 and the first months of 1999, Adam Roberts (1999) argues, the bitter war between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav army spiraled into ethnic cleansing necessitating military intervention by NATO to avert the ensuing humanitarian crisis (Roberts, 1999).

Codenamed *Operation Allied Force*, NATO's military intervention in the Kosovo Province of the former Yugoslavia was launched. The operation was pegged on the rationale "that there are some crimes so extreme that a state responsible for them, despite the principle of sovereignty, may properly be the subject of military intervention" (Roberts, 1999).

According to Francis (2013, p.3) at the regional level, interventions have also been carried out either unilaterally as well as those carried out under UN sanctioned mandates. A good case in point is the French military intervention in Mali to help the Malian civilian regime fight secessionists and Islamic fundamentalists predominantly from the Northern ethnic Tuaregs. The Tuaregs rebels in their insurrection were able to strengthen and increase their control over Northern Mali.

Francis (2013, p. 4) states that in April 2012, Tuareg separatist rebels seized control of large parts of Northern Mali and latter declaring the independent Tuareg State of Azawad. By September 2012, they advanced on Southwestern part of the country, an area dominated by non-Muslims. This led to fear among the

international community on the likelihood of Massacre forcing the international community into action.

Francis (2013, p. 5) further states that in January 2013; French military, Malian troops, the ECOWAS International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces and other neighbouring countries led an intervention in Mali to prevent the imminent attack and possible capture of Bamako. In less than three weeks, the Tuareg separatist rebellion was crushed in major areas of Northern Mali leading to achievement of short-term objectives namely; prevented the full takeover of Bamako limiting the emergence of Islamic terrorist state, ended the secessionist movement in Northern Mali; and allowed the government to regain sovereignty over Malian territories.

At the sub-regional level, interventions have been undertaken given the war-torn nature of the IGAD region. The Darfur in Sudan and Somalia are two case examples. Somalia serves as a good example of neutral interventionism, which was characterized by a United Nations' sanctioned international response to the Somali Civil War ensued in 1991 following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime (Ofcansky, 1992).

Marangio (2012, p.14) contends that intervention by the international community in Somali has been based on addressing the following issues, namely; internal strife, piracy off the expansive Horn of Africa's coast, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and, development. He states that efforts targeted towards Somali crisis have varied in terms of actors and actions, with the first action addressing security condition and later action focused on piracy and Islamic fundamentalism as they arose.

Foreign intervention in Somalia which took the shape of direct interventions initially attempted to restore peace and mediate between warring parties. Through the auspices of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II missions, the United Nations was active between 1992 and 1995 in Somalia. In addition to this, UN presence in Somalia was felt through various mediation efforts and development programmes. Despite these attempts, civil war has continued.

Besides, United Nation military intervention has been faced scandals concerning the conduct of military personnel (Marangio, 2012, p. 26).

The case of the Darfur region is another example whereby in 2003, a government-backed militia, the Janjaweed, killed tens of thousands of people while displacing hundreds of thousands. The Darfurian massacre prompted the levelling of genocide accusation against Sudan government by the United States; markedly the first time in history that one government has accused another of on-going genocide. Another case in point is the massacre of close to a million people predominantly ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda in 1994 as the international community watched (Seybolt, 2008).

At the local level, a good example of a unilateral military intervention in the case of Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. To understand this intervention, the motives as well as the triggers, one must dichotomize the nexus of Kenya and Somalia. Limo and Muna (2015, p.10) postulates that to understand Kenya's deep embroilment in Somalia's politics, it is critical for one to look at their historical engagements. Accordingly, they asserts that even in light of the military engagement in Somalia, the Kenya-Somalia intervention has been characterized by different dimensions, Kenya among them the existence of a shared border between the two countries and the fact that Kenya hosts a number of refugees from Somalia. This link, he further asserts has led to the intertwined issue including both 'Kenyan factor' and Somali factor between the two countries. In this regard, Kenya has maintained relative passivity in the Somalia civil war.

However, in recent years there has been a change in the Kenyan part with increased activity on Somalia matters. Olsen (2018, p.12) study provides a number of reasons for Kenya active involvement in Somalia. These reasons include: minimizing Al-Shabaab influence in Somalia and horn of Africa, provide support to AMISOM intervention by promoting stability and taking an active leader within the IGAD on matters geopolitics. In furthering the above objective, Kenya has created the 'Jubbland Initiative', a buffer zone created in Somalia with the sole purpose of protecting Kenya from security threats (Chonka, 2017).

According to Hesse (2010, pp 6-8), the Somali clan system plays a key role in Somali politics in general, with most Somalis are born into one of six largest clans and four of these largest clans include: the Darod, the Dir, the Hawiye and the Isaaq share the closest linguistic and cultural ties. The four clans are historically nomadic pastoralists in terms of their economic occupation and together constitute 75% of all ethnic Somalis. The other two clans; the Digital and the Rahanweyn of Southern Somalia, together comprise about 20% of all ethnic Somalis (Hesse, 2010).

To scholars, clannism as a source of strife in the Southern and central regions of Somalia region has a long history. According to Ingiriis (2018, p.4), prior to the 1977-1981 Ogaden War when Somali became a scene of civil strife followed by ethnic clashes, Somalia had a cohesive and homogenous state with a majority of the inhabitants speaking the same language and leading a similar nomadic lifestyle. However, Ingiriis (2018, p.6), argues, underlying these common themes was deep-seated rivalry since 1972 stoked by the presence of modern weaponry, which were used in clan-based feuds.

According to a World Bank Report on strife in the Southern and central regions of Somalia region of Somalia, the nation's turbulent history of strife is one engulfed with intriguing paradoxes. Many of the contributing factors also play a role in sustaining the strife (World Bank, 2005). The report cites clannism and clan cleavages as an endemic source of strife in the region arguing that clannism and clan cleavages divide Somalis, fuels endemic clashes over resources and power, is used to mobilize militia, as well as to make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the Report emphasizes that since 1991 most of the armed clashes in Somalia have been linked to clan politics and political leaders pursuing own interest under the cover of clannism (World Bank, 2005).

Ingiriis (2018, p. 55) argues that when the Cold War ended with the fragmentation of the USSR and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the then Somali strongman, Siad Barre, found himself deserted. Viewed as a country of geo-strategic importance as the gateway to the African Horn and one in strategically positioned to control key shipping lanes. Following the collapse of USSR,

indifference towards Barre's government grew with the regime teetering in 1990 under pressures from clans resulting to overthrown in January 1990, led by the Hawiye clan, a major clan in Somalia.

Ingiriis (2018, p. 55) article on clan rivalry attempts to trace the clan issue from the very mosaic that curved the Somali nation at the onset of her independence in 1960. Ingriis argues that the motivation for the Hawiye Clan was to gain power that was reserved for Siad Barre's Darod Clan. However, he points out that the Hawiye clan was only able to maintain control for about one year before two Hawiye sub-clan declared war on each other the Habir Gidir led by Mohammed Farah Aideed, and the Abgals, headed by Mohammed Ali Mahdi. For five months, the two Hawiye Sub-Clans fought each other in Mogadishu leading to looting and destruction of Somal society further.

The World Bank report, on the other hand, traces the nexus of clannism and strife in Southern and central regions of Somalia to the Ogaden War. According to the report, the clan-based strife can be traced to the intervention of Somali forces into Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78, with the sole aim of supporting Somali rebels fighting to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden. According to the report, several Somali liberation movements rose after the war, with these movements blaming Said Barre's for the loss and therefore focused on ousting his regime (World Bank, 2005). Most of these movements were clan-based. For instance, the first rebellious movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf and the Marjetan clan swelled its ranks (World Bank, 2005).

The second major intra-state Somali strife was the strife between Somalia's military forces and the Somali National Movement (SNM) of which the Isaaq Clan largely swelled the movement's rank. This strife was largely over the control of the north-western region of Somalia. According to the World Bank Report, the rise of the Isaaq clan against Said Barre's regime was linked the crackdown carried by regime and loss of the region's autonomy under the regime (World Bank, 2005).

According to the World Bank (2005, p. 6), the civil war mounted by the SNM beginning in May 1988 resulted in a catastrophe. In reacting to the civil war started by the SNM, the Said Barre's regime killed approximately 60,000 Somalis, with most of the members belonging to the Isaaq clan. Furthermore, aerial bombardments carried by the regime resulted in more than 500,000 Somalis fleeing to Ethiopia, while over 400,000 Somalis were internally displaced. As a result of the atrocities committed by the regime against, the demands for secession grew from the Isaaq clans in 1991.

The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back was the third armed strife prior to 1991, which involved the embattled government forces and the many rising clan-based liberation movements in the course of 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements was largely a coalition of clan-based rebel movements composed of three major Somali clans; the United Somali Congress (USC), a Hawiye Clan militia, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogadeni Clan militia, and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement, a largely Majerten Clan militia (Yussuf, 2014).

This multi-front war, coupled by many other legacies of the Barre regime fueled clan-based strife in contemporary Somalia largely due to the dictatorial practices of the regime, divide and rule tactics and marginalization of some clans over time. This factor has had a negative effect on promoting reconciliation among the warring clans as distrust towards other clans has increased. In addition, prior to the Somali state collapse, the upper echelons of the Somali leadership, especially under the leadership of military strongman Siad Barre, had over time manipulated clan further endearing divisions in Somali State (World Bank, 2005).

Mbugua (2013, p.14) also cites the clan issue as the predominant cause of strife in Southern and central regions of Somalia. Mbugua argues that this is due to the fact that there is a lack of a national Somali vision and identity thus stifling the identification of clans with the national government. According to Mbugua, there is no shared common vision of Somalia beyond the clan.

Since the state collapse, Mbugua (2013, p. 14) argues, that apart of fighting championed by Al-Shabaab other fighting have occurred along the clan lines. A case example of the clan issue in recent times is in June 2013 when the government authorities incited clannism in the strife in Southern and central regions of Somalia as well as the lower Shabelle regions whereby pro-government militias, of which the President's clan swelled the ranks of these militias, were involved in the strife.

Somalia conflict has thrived under the banner of clannism, parochial interest and self-interests. As a way of addressing the conflict in Somalia, military intervention in the form of foreign intervention and unilateral intervention. Foreign intervention in Somalia has occurred through AMISOM while unilateral intervention in Somalia has been experienced through US operation restore hope in 1995 and Ethiopia's intervention in 2006. In spite of the military interventions carried out in Somalia, conflict has still persisted.

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006 has been analyzed within the context of the wider African Union (AU) as well as the United Nations (UN) peace processes in Somalia ever since the thrusting of Somalia into a state of anarchy following the end of the autocratic regime of Siad Barre in 1991. However, a holistic analysis of the Ethiopian intervention into Somalia seeking to examine and delve into the issues prodding the intervention, the legal grounds underpinning this state-led intervention and the consequences this had in Somalia's relations with other units in the international milieu remain understudied (Bruton, 2010).

It is against this background that this study seeks to assess the underlying factors that caused the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. In addition, the study seeks to investigate the legal ground for it and capture the consequences it had on Somalia domestically, regionally and internationally. Research Question

The study is guided by the following research questions;

- i. What are the major factors that motivated Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia in 2006?
- ii. What was the legal ground for the military intervention?

- iii. What was the impact of the intervention on Somalia's relationship domestically, regionally and internationally?

The general objective of the study is to understand the underlying factors that caused the intervention to investigate the legal ground for it and capture the consequences it had on Somalia domestically, regionally and internationally.

The research seeks to achieve the following objectives;

- i. To assess the major factors that motivated Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia in 2006
- ii. To examine the legal ground for the military intervention
- iii. To analyze the impact of the intervention on Somalia's relationship domestically, regionally and internationally

The study relies on qualitative research methodology in order to understand the motives underlying behind the behavior of the warring parties. The data of the research will be collected from secondary resources which includes newspapers, Magazine, Journals, government legal documents such as constitutions of Ethiopia and Somali, United Nations resolutions, published books and unpublished academic works on this issue.

This study will help bridge the gaps in the literature on interventions by establishing the reasons, motives and interests underpinning state-led interventions in other countries. In addition, the study will help shed light on the legal grounds for military interventions in state-led interventions in other countries. Finally, the study will provide a framework for investigating the impact of the intervention on Somalia's relationship with domestically, regionally and internationally. In addition, the study is of utmost importance to scholars since it offers a seminal analysis of the country's foreign policy and will be very useful in analysing the country's foreign policy as well as offering a scholarly glimpse to the same.

The first chapter of the study provides a background to the conflict in Somalia within the broader horn of Africa context. The section provides

justification and significance of the study. In addition, the section provides a brief overview of literature on military intervention, with special focus on case studies including Somalia.

The second chapter provides a contextual understanding to the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.

The third chapter examines the legality of Ethiopian intervention. Specifically the chapter focused on discussing legality along the following line: Ethiopia right to self-defence according to UN convention, Self defence in response to terrorism and intervention by invitation.

The fourth chapter examines the effect of Ethiopian intervention both at domestic and international level. Specifically, the chapter focused on aftermath of Ethiopian intervention on social-economic and political aspects of Somali state. In addition, the chapter discusses the effect of intervention on Somalia foreign policy and international diplomatic engagements.

The fifth chapter delves on study conclusions. Specifically, the chapter highlights the findings of the study and also brings out conclusion based on the study objectives.

CHAPTER TWO

ETHIOPIA'S 2006 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: MOTIVES AND CIRCUMSTANCES

2.1. Introduction

According to Foreign Dias (2013, p. 92), involvement in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, society or people by external entities is not a new phenomenon in the history of human civilization. Considering Ethiopia, a victim of unprovoked invasion by Italy, he argues for and against incautious as well as circumspect activities leading to the country's involvement in the Horn of Africa states. Somalia, a nation that has since 1991 been the site of globally underwritten political engineering, best exemplifies unilateral intervention in addressing conflict.

Ethiopia has always been concerned about what happens across the border in Somalia. However, the controversy is that Ethiopian troops have recurrently crossed the frontier separating it from Somalia during peacetime to police the border area. Exemplar is the conviction that since 1997, although denying it, Ethiopia has been making incursions into Somalia. Consequently, to better our understanding of Ethiopia's smokescreen to cover its military operation in Somalia is an analysis of the 2006 intervention (Aime, 2013). On that account, this section is not so much about the Ethiopia-Somalia war as one of the extensive determinants that have been caused by Ethiopia's military involvement in Somalia, 2006-2009.

2.2. Somalia from Kingdom in the Past to Self-destruction and State Collapse

Somali people's history dates to prehistoric times, with archeological evidence supporting the presence of Somalis in the Horn of Africa as among the first communities to live therein. Somalia inhabitation by mankind dates back to as

far as 9000BC. Somalia in prehistoric period was dominated by Empires, which controlled and prospered in trade. Somalia Kingdom before the 13th century was commonly referred as the land of Punt (Ali, 2014).

Mukhtar (1987, p.10) maintains that the Somali peninsula is viewed as source of human race and ancient civilization. It is also a strategic trade route linking three continents together: Africa, Asia and Europe. The Somalia peninsula has been inhabited by Cushites, of which Somalis are part of and they are believed to have inhabited the region for over 7000 years. Historical evidence indicates the Peninsula was the link that made global trade possible through facilitating trade among the Babylonians, Egyptians, Phoenicians and Mycenaeans who traded in frankincense, myrrh, and spices. Somalia acted as a source for these trading commodities which were exported from the Land of Punt, located in North-eastern Somalia (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

In Somalia history, the medieval Islamic period begins in the seventh century, with the introduction of Islam in Somalia. Islam introduction in Somalia can be traced to Muslim migration that made Muslims move from Mecca to Abyssinia who extended protection to Muslim migrants. The early introduction of Islam in Somalia usually occurred through commercial routes, particularly in Zayla, Berbera in northern Somalia and Mogadishu in southern Somalia. The city of Zayla, the Somali gateway to the Arabian Peninsula later became first capital of Adal sultanate that ruled Somalia from 1415 to 1577 AD. Besides other Sultanates in Somalia included: Sultanate of Ifat (1285-1415AD) and Makhzumi dynasty (896-1285) in Shewa (Abdullahi, 2011).

Although the Sultanates had cordial relationships with Ethiopian leaders, sometimes their relationship soured due to economic interests and conflicts, and religious differences; Islam versus Christianity. However, for the greater part there was peaceful co-existence until the period of Imam Ahmed Ibrahim's later Jihad and the Abyssinian king Negus Yakuno Amlak (1270-1285) when the Sultanates were conquered and survivors converted forcibly to Christianity and Mosques turned to churches. Nonetheless, this was later to subside and peaceful co-existence prevailed again (Abdullahi, 2017).

Abdullahi (2017, p. 13) identifies another episode of wars between the Muslim Sultanate and Abyssinian Empire took place during the reign of Imam Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Gazi (1506–1543), Emperor Gelawdewos (1521 –1559) and the Ethiopian Emperor Lebna Dangal “Dawit II” (1501–1540). Such confrontation he asserts emanated from Somalia’s search for liberation from the Abyssinia Empire who they felt were controlling them. During the confrontation, slogans was inspired by Islamic jihad against Christians. This indicates a possible change of power relations between Somalia Muslims and Abyssinia Christians

Njoku (2013, p.3) proposes that the magnitude of the confrontation was so huge that they necessitated the intervention of two superpowers: the Portuguese and Ottoman Empires. These two superpower empires had intervened the conflict by allying the Abyssinian Christians and the Adal Muslim Sultanate respectively. This points out that intervention in Somalia conflict dates far back to pre-colonial times and in Somalia kingdom past. An indication that Somalia geographical position has attracted intervention in the times past

The existence of clan states in modern Somalia is not a new as it has been part of its history. In light of the western view of nation state it has been assumed that pre-colonial Somalis was characterized by stateless society. However, the pre-colonial was established on clan republic. From the perspective of the early explorers, Somali state had no known formal institutions but institutions based on Kinship and clan ties (Markakis, 1987).

According to Ali (1997, p. 9) during the pre-colonial and most of the colonial period, the Somali lands were called “Guban” that meant burned land. He claims that before colonial intrusion, clan zones formed the basis of division for, with each clan recognizing others clans even if there existed contestation over resources. Although clan zones have been dominant feature of the Somali society, its existence was not exemplified with strife and conflict over resources.

The coming of colonialists in the early 1880s, led to the partitioning of the great Somaliland into different territories by colonial regimes. The five demarcated territories carved out included: British Somaliland in the North, Somalia Italiana in

the South, a Somalia occupied north-eastern province of Kenya (the Northern Frontier District [NFD]), La Côte Française des Somalis (later became Djibouti), and the Somali-populated eastern Ethiopia (Ali, 1997).

Hussein (1994, p. 4) points out that two out of the five became independent in July 1960. No one expected then that the formation of the new republic formed out of the merger between British Somaliland and the UN Trust Territory of Somalia (the former Somalia Italiana) would end up a failed post-colonial state-building experiment.

Where the colonial regimes portioned the great Somali land into five zones, Somaliland is currently partitioned into five zones: Galmudug State, the Hirshabelle State, the Jubbaland State, the Puntland State, and the Southwest State. The curving out of States as initiated during the colonial regime has continued actively within Somaliland, albeit violently at different levels: the Awdal State, the Khaatumo State, the Zeila/Lughaya State, the Maakhir State, and the Beesha Dhexe (Central Clan) State. This trend was reconfigured along the pre-colonial period further highlighting the continuation of clan boundary in modern Somalia (Ingiriis, 2018).

State collapse in Somali has been unique in that the curving out of clan fiefdoms and composition is evidenced with different clan fighting for supremacy in Somalia. Every clan- fiefdoms in Somali has its own presidents with its sycophants not any different from the nineteenth-century Somali land clan chiefs having sycophants. In a similar manner is creating a one-state-system through selection of its own president. The proliferation of clan-states was not an exception for Somaliland only but also in the former Somalia Italiana where conditions created in pre-colonial Somalia legitimized clan “fiefdoms” Somalia Italia, Puntland; advancing Majeerteen clan interests (Hussein, 1994).

Somalia was partitioned into five political entities with different colonial interests. In the late nineteenth century, Britain was the first colonial power and latter to be followed by the Italians and the French. The colonization of Somalia attracted opposition from Somalis, with the first resistance carried out by the Dervishes, who pursued military resistance for the greater public good of Somalia.

This militant public pursuit was launched under the leadership of charismatic Sheikh, Sayyid Mohamed with Islam as a unifying factor (Lewis, 1981). This demonstrates that the quest for public profit, unification of Somalia started in colonial times Andrzejewski (1974, p. 6) identifies a number of reasons that led to rise against the colonial masters, these included: the establishment of centralized government was opposed to the decentralized governance structure of Somalis, the colonizers were of another faith and their motives were questioned and finally the Somalis felt that the colonizers gave considerable say to Ethiopia emperor over their land.

In 1900, Ismail (2016, p. 12-14) points out that Sayyid engaged in first military engagement against Ethiopia forces in Somalia and this was to be followed by a spat with the British colonial administration by declaring war on British. However, The British reacted by crushing the rebellion several times leading the rebellion to acquire the form of guerrilla warfare. As a result of the terrible defeat experience by militants in their pursuits for independence, he argues that the Somali public pursuit waned only to surface during the Second World War.

The political outcome of the Second World War gave new aspiration to the Somalis to fight against foreign domination, albeit passively. After the end of World War 2, both Northern and Southern Somali land came under the control of Britain, where for the first time the Somalis started organizing themselves under political parties for the first time. Political parties were allowed to campaign and champion Somali unification and political freedom. Different parties emerged across Somalia, Somali national league was formed in 1947 in northern Somalia, and Somali youth league was formed in Mogadishu in 1943 (Ismail, 2016).

Unlike the dervish movement that were militant and active, the political parties were passive in their approach, with most of these party leader's nurtured under British local administration. Dervish movement in its earlier pursuit was concerned with championing the unification of greater Somalia, for example they were not happy with the administration of Southern Somalia by Italy. Although political parties in Somalia were formed to pursue public interest (unification) over private interest, it soon became apparent that most the parties formed were in

pursuant of private and narrow interest; clan and lineage dominated interests. The aspirations to unify all the Somali-inhabited territories was thus frustrated by the narrow and parochial interests of the political parties who in addition were also pre-occupied with private gain and fighting over official language selection (Ingiriis, 2018).

Lewis (2008, p. 13) asserts that latter in 1950, the Somalia was divided again, northern Somalia remained under British administration while small southern Somalia reverted to the Italian administration. The decision to separate Somalia again only served to hinder the pan Somalia unity cause among Somalia by cooling the interest and loosened the cohesiveness in Somali state. Thus it is evidence that the pursuit to unification of one state was hindered by both parochial interest of the parties and the state division, a situation that has persisted to date.

The formation of Somali Republic in July 1960 through the merger of the northern and southern Somali territories had no evidence that several decades later the nation-state would be replaced with clan states competing interest. In early period of 1963 to 1968, Somalia republic strongly supported military campaigns in neighbouring countries that form greater Somali land: Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya; there was no expectation that similar campaign for secessionist would face Somalia in post-colonial period. The Somali saying, “waxbadso wax beel ayay leedahay” (“the consequence of collecting more earnings will be insolvency”) aptly describes the Somali disintegration and secessionist challenges (Abdullahi, 2017).

In an attempt to reorder the Pre-Colonial Order, Marchal (2013) claims that the Isaaq clan in partnership with other clan representatives declared the Somaliland state in Bur’o, second largest town in northern Somalia in 1991. However, he states that many non-Isaaq clans latter withdrew from the declaration asserting that they were forced by Isaaq to be part of the secession. From this experience, the role of large clan in asserting their authority over smaller clans is showcased as the case is in the current contemporary Somalia.

Omar (2006, p.10) noted this was an attempt to form separate state from Somalia. He concludes that in 1995, similar move was made by the Digil/Mirifle

(mainly the Rahanweyn) clans to form an autonomous federal state in the Bay and Bakool regions. However this he maintained failed when General Farah Aideed intervened and seized the town. Further disintegration was fomented in 1998, through the declaration of Puntland state in Garowe, although the purpose was to have a strong bargaining power in negotiating future of Somali state.

In 2013, Jubbaland State came into being following the rejection of the federal government in Mogadishu, latter the Galmudug state and Hirshabelle State were formed in the Mogadishu representing Adaado and Jowhar respectively. The push for a new clan-state for the Benaadir State has recently accelerated with the emergence of a new president on February 8, 2017, who was considered an outsider in Banaadir. Besides the calls to set up a Benaadir State for Mogadishu, the clanization of the Somali State is now largely complete (Menkhaus, 2011).

The formation of clan based fiefdoms in Somalia has been to a greater extent been facilitated by neighbouring countries. For instance, clan fiefdom from Puntland to Hirshabelle, has been championed directly or indirectly through the Somalia historical nemesis. The formation of clan-based fiefdoms has been facilitated by Ethiopia, Somalia's historical nemesis. In cases where the federal government has attempted to block the creation of some states such as Jubbaland, Ethiopia has called for Mediation to pacify such attempts (Abdullahi, 2006).

Abdullahi (2006, p. 13) points out that the nurturing of divisive clan system in Somali both in pre-colonial era and post-colonial era bear significant responsibility for the post state collapse in Somalia. For instance the states the legacy of Said Barre's regime was a manifest of clan system at its best through creation of fiefdoms controlled by clan sultan's further creating fissures in Somali state. The culmination of fiefdoms in Said Barre's era was the emergence of current federal structure leading to spread of what has been labelled "virus of federalism" in southern Somalia.

Contemporary Somali state has strengthened the clan state system even at the expense of Somali culture and religion. This has been evidenced where strong and dominant clans such as the Puntland treat others from smaller clans as

“foreigners”, such as treatment of the Rahanweyn communities in Boosaaso and Garoowe. This shows that federalism as it is manifested in Somalia bear all the semblance of centralized governance with close knit political structures (Omar, 2006).

Menkhaus (2007) suggest that the rebuilding of collapse Somali state by the international community has also continued on the foundations of the clan-states, with international community advocating both clan states and supporting the federal government. This he concludes present’s international community with the choice of either pursue strategy with Mogadishu government or clan states. If they, for example, were to publicly declare that all negotiation would be done through Mogadishu. A clear message will be sent strengthening the formation of unitary Somalia.

On the contrary, the decentralization structures based on clan-states which are being implemented in southern Somalia, and praised by the international community, have only served to further strife and conflicts as witnessed in the recent armed confrontations between Galmudug and Puntland. Even after the conflict, dire predictions were not witnesses in the states where Ethiopia and Kenya have considerable influence. Thus the external forces have pushed for federalism and this has created space where clan-state has continued to take root promoting fragmentation (Møller, 2009).

At independence in 1960, only the two parts of British Somali land and Italian Somali land merged to become the new Republic of Somalia, with areas inhabited by Somalis; Northern Kenya, Ogaden in Ethiopia and Djibouti not forming part of the new republic. Djibouti was latter to achieve independence from France in 1977 but refused to merge with the Republic of Somalia. Immediately after independence, the overriding political agenda of the new Somali was on how they could possible gain the missing areas to the republic of Somalia. This became the sole issue that the national government was pursuing until end of 1970, with Somali public in support of the project. As a result, the republic of Somalia became entangled in border spats with Kenya and Ethiopia presenting a threat to the region stability (Abdullah, 2007).

Abdullah (2007, p. 8) mentioned that Somalis campaign for unification was witnessed at OAU (now AU) where they rejected the boundaries as colonial based and violating Somalia. As a result the quest affected the diplomatic relations with OAU and Britain thereby depriving Somalia of financial aid. Accordingly, he concludes that the foreign policy of unification was justified by the political elite as the only way to restore Somali national identity, with politics of Pan-Somali used as a strategy for the political elite to maintain power and legitimacy.

The birth of the Somali Republic also coincided with the peak of Cold War between the US and USSR; Somalia republic became a pawn in geopolitics due to its strategic position and conflicts with its neighbours frequently attracting the involvement of super power. Ethiopia and Somalia emerged as countries where proxy wars were fought. In 1963, a border war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia following the government of Haile Selassie rejecting the demand for self-government by Somalis in the Ogaden (Ali, 1997).

Ali (1997, p. 7) further points out that as disturbance escalated the Ethiopian government dared to quell it with a heavy hand stirring Somali government to aid Somalis in Ogaden, leading to a military confrontation between the two countries which exposed Somalia's military weakness. In the same year, the Somali government was furious at the decision of the British to let northern frontier district remain in Kenya leading to diplomatic spats with Britain and loss of development aid of totalling £1.3 million per year.

Ingiriis (2018, p. 59) maintains the pre-occupation of Somalia with Pan-Somalia made the government to pursue a heavy armament policy; through formation of a strong army of twenty thousand personnel. However, their request for support from the USA to form strong army was turned down leading the government to turn to USSR who supported the request with considerable military and economic aid further exposing Somalia to proxy wars between US and USSR.

In 1967, the civilian government decided to have a change in foreign policy by moderating it pursuit for Pan-Somalia; in recognition that their pre-occupation with Pan-Somalia foreign policy had drained the country of its meagre resources.

As a result, Premier Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal signed a peace treaty with Ethiopia, Kenya and the French in Djibouti leading to public condemnation and subsequent collapse of civilian government in 1969, and establishment of military rule in December 1969 (Omar, 2006, p. 13).

Omar (2006, p. 16) points out that the military takeover restored the politics of the Pan-Somali unity and a further tilt towards USSR, against the foreign policy of the deposed civilian government; neutrality between the west and east. The incessant pursuit of the irredentist politics of public pursuit led to the Ogaden war in 1980; resulting to refugee influx in Somalia and a burdening of the Somali economy, with 40% of the Somalia population being refugees. The defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden war of 1977 to 1978 led to collapse of Pan-Somali cause and leading to the birth of a more autocratic ruler, Siad Barre who only preoccupation was how to maintain his control over the republic of Somalia. As a result, power was concentrated to his kin and clan with a view to ensuring the survival of his regime (Chonka, 2017).

Another strategy used by the regime to ensure its survival was through exploitation of the latent tension between clans and various groupings. Divide and rule politics perpetuated by the regime not only brought to the fore the core of Somali structure, clannism but destroyed damaged the cohesion of the Somali state. As a result increased economic inequality increasing leading to more tension and clan conflicts (Elmi & Barise, 2006). According to Lewis (1981, p. 12), Said Barre was the one who further orchestrated the fragmentation of Somali state. For instance, he cites that the appointment of most officials from the sub-clans of Darod clan sowed seeds of hatred by the marginalized clans. Consequently, he concludes that the extreme militarization that took root in Somali through militarized state institutions led to formation of militants groups to depose the military rule.

The first organised group formed for such as cause was from Majeerteen clan, which inhabit mainly the central and north-east parts of the country. In 1981, disgruntled clan of Isaaq also formed an armed opposition and political organization called the Somali National Movement with operational base in Ethiopia. In April 1989, a third and fourth based clan-organised armed opposition emerged in the

southern port of Kismayo and in Mogadishu and central areas finally bringing an end of Military rule in 1991. However, even after the end of Military rule, establishment of national government for republic of Somalia has been a mirage with the same old, parochial and clan interest dominating (Lewis, 2013).

The period between 1978-1991 is of great significance to the Somalia conflict in situating the military intervention. Both the Ethiopian leader, Mengistu Haile Mirriam and Somali leader, Said Barre used proxy war after the end of Ogaden war in 1997. The Somali leader supported rebel groups fighting the Ethiopian government both military and through provision of operational bases. Ethiopian on the other hand backed many rebel factions to topple the regime of Said Barre, key among them Somali Salvation democratic front (SSDF), Somalia national movement (SNM) and Somalia Patriotic movement (SPM) (Abdurahman, 2017)

In the run-up to Ogaden conflict, Said Barre enlisted the support of USSR. However, this was short-lived as the USSR withdrew its support for Somalia government leaving Somalia vulnerable without support of international community. On the contrary Ethiopia on the other hand had the support of USA and EU albeit indirectly, a scenario that continue after the Ogaden war and collapse of Somalia in 1991 while Somalia was destitute of any international support even after the collapse of the state in 1991. This greatly impacted the Somalia after the collapse as it lacked international community who could bring stability in the country and as they were left on their own (Abdurahman, 2017).

2.3. Somalia after the collapse of the State

Mark (1999, p. 4) points out that the central government of Somalia was overthrown in 1991 by various factions, with tribal as well as other allegiances. A number of clan militias attempted to benefit from the power vacuum as a result of Barre's downfall. The different militias were initially united to bring down the government but turned on each other after its fall. The international community attempted to get the situation under control. However, none of the initiatives was

successful. One of the most well-known attempts he states was Operation Restore Hope by the United States, which ended in a disaster with the death of 18 US soldiers and over 1000 Somalis.

According to Lewis (1981, p.11), Barre claimed that he was not tied to clan-based allegiances. However, he asserts was greatly influenced by those around him to alienate other clans. He ensured that the most vital posts were held by figures close to him and the most critical factions were overseen by those most loyal to him. He executed those who opposed his judgment in order to leave no room for an opposition and possible revolt. As a consequence, Ismail (2016) suggests the bulk of the Somali population felt compelled to resort to clan-based allegiances as the only option to ensure prosperity, with the civil war that followed Barre's fall destroying the infrastructure of the country, disbanded the main organs of the government and led to financial ruin and resulted to human catastrophe through loss of life and displacement of persons.

From 1991 to early 2000s, Somalia had no functioning government. In fact, Somalia was repeatedly declared as the world's only failed state until the recent unrests in the Middle East and other parts of the world following the Arab Spring. In the early 2000s, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in Arta city, Djibouti. However, the TNG remained immobilized in the face of fierce tribal resistance and emerging Islamist movements apprehensive of those behind the TNG (Business Insider, 2013).

The northern Somali region previously colonized by Britain declared independence in 1991. They claimed they were particularly targeted by the Barre regime. They also claimed that they were previously independent before the unification of British Somaliland (north) and Italian Somaliland (south). The central zone of Somalia declared that it was self-governing and named itself Puntland complete with a new flag and state house. Many Somali nationals held the belief that these two regions were under the helm of Ethiopia. Therefore, the TNG faced considerable challenges (Chonka, 2017).

The TNG was followed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which came into existence in 2004 after negotiations lasting for two years at Embakasi in Kenya. The TFG was led by President Abdullahi Yusuf. Abdullahi was initially unsuccessful at laying a foot in the capital which was in the hands of a rival clan to the one he was from. Abdullahi Yusuf was nevertheless stopped by the militias as he soon secured the support of every dimension by regional and international powers militarily and financially (Menkhaus, 2007).

Chonka (2017, p. 15) concludes that the date of the official establishment of the Islamic Courts Union is not clear. In trying to trace the history of Islamic courts union, he states after the fall of the government in 1991, a number of courts started appearing with various allegiances and doctrine to follow. Although the government was officially secular, the majority of Somali's adhered to Sunni Islam. Therefore, some of the courts were inspired by the Islamic faith and Sharia orientated. Accordingly he cites two main justifications for this. The first is that some of the population were already upset with the secular standing of the now defunct government and that the fall was inevitable due to its lack of adherence to Islam. The other was as a response to the anarchy and chaos that followed soon after the collapse of the Barre regime.

The first Islamic court was founded by Sheikh Ali Dheere in 1993 in the capital, Mogadishu. Other individuals and factions were inspired to open their own courts after initial success in solving crime by the Dheere courts. The courts originally flourished in Northern Mogadishu and were not officially associated but rather were part of one informal movement. Southern Mogadishu saw courts open soon after. Former members of Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) greatly influenced the courts in the south. AIAI was a Somali militant group that disbanded in the early 1997 and was against the Barre government. Hassan Dahir Aweys who was a former member of AIAI and others who would join the leadership of ICU was a lot more driven to resort to violence than other members of the newly established courts (Samatar, 2007).

Barnes and Hassan (2007, p. 3) proposed that the various courts scattered around the city started coming together in southern Mogadishu, roughly in 2000.

Prior to 2000, the courts did not have their own armed militia to enforce their rulings and instead relied on local clan mercenaries. They did not control much territory or possess significant political influence either. As the courts joined forces so did the militia under their control and influence. As a result, the first potent Somali armed group after the fall of the central government not under the helm or restricted to a single clan appeared. They further asserts that the ICU took over control of schools and hospitals in Mogadishu after their unification using their newly found strength to provide services and security for the estranged public and territories controlled by ICU were regarded as safer than those controlled by warlords.

Bruton (2010, p. 8) offers that the formation of Transitional National Government in the last months of 2000 greatly reduced the influence of the ICU. However, with time he asserts the TNG turned out to be ineffective at providing security or public support, a situation that led to resurfacing of the Islamic courts resurfaced; a teacher named Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected as the leader of the Islamic courts after its revival in the capital, Mogadishu. Soon after, there were eleven Islamic courts in the capital by 2005.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was interested in apprehending Al Qaeda-linked Terrorists and Islamists within Somalia as the CIA was beginning to believe that Somalia was starting to become a hub for extremism. As a result, a number of court members vanished, while others were assassinated. Consequently, these actions were blamed on the CIA. A group called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) was formed at the beginning of 2006 by the United States in an initiative to thwart various militants plans to use Somalia as a safe haven, as the US believed (Begashaw & Ababa, 2016).

The ARPCT consisted of various warlords from Mogadishu. The death of over 1000 Somali's in the previous decade and the hasty withdrawal of US forces was very fresh in the minds of many Somali nationals. As one might expect, the US support for the ARPCT refueled nationalism and revived pain for some. This was further complicated with the intention of capturing individuals within Somalia. The ICU gained full control of Mogadishu after frictions between it and the ARPCT abruptly turned violent in June 2006. This shed light on the ICU's armed wing (Al

Shabaab) due to its key role in taking over the capital. The ICU started urban development schemes after their victory in a bid to distance itself from the warlords who heretofore ruled the city. The airports and seaport, which were closed for the last decade, were reopened after several months. This was a potent dispatch to the rest of the warlords ruling south and central Somalia as well as the population under their control. The ICU attacked the various warlords soon after and emerged victorious once again (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

The international community was alarmed by the rise of the ICU and were alerted to the state of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was formed in neighbouring Kenya in 2004 to replace the transnational government. TFG had no option but to set up bases outside of the capital given that it was not under their control. The TFG tried to ascertain itself in the country to no avail. The TFG resorted to non-military means by attempting to negotiate with the ICU who were frankly in control of the capital and the majority of southern and central Somalia. The negotiations took place between June and September 2006 and were focused on power-sharing governance system. Nevertheless, this was not well received by the Ethiopian government which was not historically fond of peace and prosperity in Somalia (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

The Ethiopian Government geared for military action against the ICU in case the additional support it was offering the TFG was not enough. The ICU was not intimidated by the actions of the Ethiopian Government and continued to bolster its armed forces as well as seizing new territory as negotiations continued with the TFG. To add fuel to the fire that is about to turn into a serious of literal explosions that will result in the deaths of thousands of civilians, president of the TFG (Abdullahi Yusuf) survived an attempted assassination on the 18th of September 2006. Negotiations came to an end in October 2006, although the ICU insisted it was not behind the attack (World Factbook, 2018).

Military preparations were undertaken by the ICU, TFG and Ethiopian Government supporting the TFG in the next two months (November and December). The United Nations expressed support for the imminent Ethiopian offensive by passing a resolution on the 6th of December approving a military

intervention in Somalia. This was to be implemented in the form of African Union peacekeepers. By the end of the month, fierce fighting erupted between the ICU and the sudden alliance of TFG and Ethiopian forces. ICU forces were overwhelmed and subsequently lost Mogadishu and other urban territories. ICU leaders fled Mogadishu on December 26th and formally handed their resignation the following day. As a result, the ICU disbanded and effectively ceased to exist as an organization. However, the military wing of the ICU which was catapulted to fame in the takeover of the capital a few years ago decided to pursue independence (McGregor, 2007).

Mwangi (2010, p. 6) mentioned that there were further clashes between the TFG and the ICU forces and aligned fighters of both sides in late 2006 as well as early 2007. The former leaders of the ICU launched another initiative to build resistance to the unpopular regional intervention. They established the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRMLTM), which did not last long. The ICU leaders did not give up, they launched another resistance group with other resistance leaders in September 2007 called the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) as another attempt to resist the Ethiopian intervention or occupation.

Besteman (1999, p. 6) claimed that Sheikh Ali Dheere alias Ali Mohamed Rage was the founder of the first Islamic court in Somalia based in the capital Mogadishu in 1993. Dheere according to him was responsible for many posts in the ICU as chairmen of the Islamic courts in the northern part of Mogadishu, spokesman and chairman of the Shariah Implementation Council of the ICU. Dheere used his former credentials to become a spokesman for Al Shabaab after the downfall of the ICU.

Another key ICU leader was Yusuf Mohamed Siad alias Indagat: Siad who was the defence minister of the ICU. Like many other ICU leaders, Siad fled Somalia following the Ethiopian intervention. Siad became defence minister in the Somali government after a few years in 2009 although he previously asserted to resist the government and the Ethiopian forces. He resigned after coming to the conclusion that the government did not reinstate order (BBC, 2010). Sheikh Sharif

Sheikh Ahmed was a former school teacher, who was credited for reviving the Islamic courts' movement in Mogadishu (BBC, 2010).

The Transitional National Government of Somalia expansion briefly in the early years of the 2000s resulting in the decline of the influence of the courts. Ahmed became the ICU's leader when he was chosen as the chairman for the courts in the capital. Ahmed fled Somalia after the Ethiopian intervention. He was later elected as president of the Transitional Federal Government that was formed in neighbouring Djibouti (Barnes & Hassan, 2007).

2.4. The Ogaden Clout

A revisit of the Ogaden War and its aftermath is crucial if one is to seek answers whether Ethiopia invaded Somalia to guarantee its own security. It is fair to state that leaders of the two countries have since time immemorial kept a topsy-turvy liaison marked by scuffles and hostilities. Ogaden, the eastern portion of Ethiopia, is home to a sizeable group of ethnic Somalis. If for no other reason than the Ethiopian occupation, these Hamitic people with a Cushitic culture have historically struggled against what they see as an illegitimate seizure of their land (Hagmann & Korf, 2012).

Hagmann & Korf (2012, p. 209) states that presence of Somalis in Ethiopia led to increased desire of Somalia to control Ogaden region. As a result, Somalia provided both direct and indirect support to any efforts that sought to liberate the region. Nonetheless, a historically accurate picture manifests such support as leading to a very destructive Ethiopia-Somali war over the Ogaden (1977-1978).

According to Hagmann (2014, p. 6) the motivation for the government of Somalia to support insurgents in Somalia was necessitated with the collapse of Ethiopia government through the overthrow of Haile Sellassie and the altercation carried out by the Derg against revolution opponents. As opposed to the initial overt support provided by Barre government, the Somali government threw its support

behind the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which was a pro-Somali liberation group in the Ogaden.

Hagmann (2014, p. 8) points out that by September 1977, the Somali support was fully evident with the regular Somali troops' pressing inside Ethiopian territory by 700 kilometres and capturing 60% of Ogaden. Despite the Somali military support provided to the WSLF, the insurgency by the group in Ogaden was crushed in 1980 and in retaliation the Ethiopia government provide support to a rebellious movement, Somali National Movement (SNM) formed by Isaaq exiles with an aim to withdraw the Barre's government.

The Isaaq were discontented against the President for not representing their interests and thereby leading them to start and engage in guerrilla raids against the government of Somali from Dira Dawa, Ethiopia. Although the Ethiopian government provided support to the Isaaq movement they still credit the Ogaden War to Somalia's government attempt to annex Ogaden part of Ethiopia. Even after the fall of Said Barre's government fall in 1991, the Ethiopia government believed that attempts will still be made by a successive government to annex Ogaden. As a deduction, this thesis offers probable motives that might have prompted the Ethiopian state to invade Somalia (Aimé, 2013).

2.5. Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia, 2006-2009: Substantial Circumstances

On 24 December 2006, the deployment of troops by Ethiopia in Somalia assumed a two-phased formation: from December 2006 to January 2009, as well as from November 2011 until present. The Ethiopian armed forces simultaneously launched an attack in Central Somalia as well as in the Bay region near Bedoa (BBC, 2006). It has elsewhere been argued by Aime (2013, p. 26) that on one hand the war campaign was triggered by the necessity to police Ethiopia's Somali periphery, primarily to neutralize armed movement guaranteeing the security of Ethiopia. On the other, it was influenced by the support Ethiopia had secured from the international community.

Mwangi (2010, p. 8) proposes that hypothetically Ethiopia's action in Somalia was motivated by both geopolitics, security and economic interest. Ethiopia had been fretful about the extreme unruliness of Somalia, which did epitomise a major challenge to the law enforcement institutions of Ethiopia for the reason that of the long border between the two countries. What follows is an analysing account of the onslaught that divulges major factors that motivated Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia.

The military manifestation of Ethiopia in Somalia has come at a great economic cost to the government. Despite the economic aid the government has received for its engagement in Somalia, the cost of participation for its troops in Somalia far outweighs the economic aid. The longer Ethiopians remained in Somalia, the most economical costs the state has borne at its own expense.

Nations such as USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia view Ethiopia as an important ally in getting a stake in marine routes to the Middle East due to Somalia strategic position. As a result, they funded Ethiopia in its mission. Besides, the Ethiopian government saw an economic opportunity to use Somalia, with Ethiopia been a landlocked country. The coastline, mainly shared with the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, played a key role in Ethiopia's economic aspirations and problems. In this regard, the then Prime Minister Zenawi realized establishment of a friendlier government in Somalia only enhances its access of the Somalia ports (Begashaw & Ababa, 2016)

The fear that Ethiopia had against Islamic courts can possibly explain their military aggression in Somalia. Comprising militias, the Islamic courts were set up in early 1990 by rebels fighting Siad Barre in place of a national police force. They thrived on the foundation of Islamic doctrines as a unifying factor for all the clans in Somali (Besteman, 1999). In 2000, several of those courts came together to form Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) with an aim of amassing political power based on Islam doctrines (BBC, 2006).

Although the courts were not involved in politics their ascendancy in Mogadishu raised the fear that the Somalia government could be influenced by the

very courts. In reaction to this, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Trade and Development (IGAD) set up Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 to re-establish peace and order and this involved establishment of a transitional government and institutions. In October of the year under review, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was chosen the Transitional Federal President of Somalia (BBC, 2006).

Recalling the Ethiopian Economic Inducement, selecting Abdullahi Ahmed, who the Ethiopians considered an ally, served to vindicate the country's covert involvement in Somalia two years later. In addition, the backing by the AU and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) gave the TFG government international recognition the Islamic groups were lacking (Security Council Resolution, 2006). However, confinement of the TFG's support to southern Somalia vis-à-vis overtaking of much of the country by the Islamist insurgents ensued in the Islamic militants having the upper hand. They consequently repeatedly undermined Abdullahi Ahmed's presidential authority and with-it legitimacy of the TFG.

According to Samatar (2007, p. 5), after the establishment of TFG government, the Ethiopian parliament approved a resolution in 2006 to ward off any attacks and protect the TFG that was still trying to gain footing. As a result of the resolution, Ethiopia sent its troops to Somalia and under the disguise of warding off an attack against the TFG, Ethiopian forces attacked the Islamic courts union forces defeating them in 2008 and allowing the TFG to set foot in Mogadishu and govern the country.

Abdullahi (2011, p. 11) emphasized that Ethiopia had its strategy on how to form the government after the intervention. This was based on the realization that a government in Somalia with foundation on strong Islamic dogma was not good for Ethiopia. It was feared that this might lead to an awakening of Islamic revolution within Ethiopia and strengthening the cause of Eritrea against Ethiopia. There was also the fear that Somali would become a base for Ethiopian rebels.

Aime (2013, p. 22) points out that by July 2006, the UIC had consolidated to comprise clan militias and other insurgent groups. This act of re-branding stirred

a response from the Ethiopian government under the banner of securitization on Somalia conflict. Agitating to the Addis Ababa regime was the role played by UIC in challenging the TFG, Ethiopia and Eastern Africa, with particular reference to *The Ogaden Clout*. Appealing to the long history of animosity and distrust while simultaneously using strong religious rhetoric of a holy war against Ethiopia's posture toward subjugating Somalia again, the UIC mobilized Somalis to fight back (Weine, 2013).

The UIC's declaration of a jihad against would-be invading Ethiopian troops, claims over Somali inhabited territory in Ethiopia-Ogaden, as well as the UIC's appeals for internal rebellion in Ethiopia against Meles Zenawi government, working closely with Eritrea, Ethiopia's enemy, and provision of support to rebellious groups working to topple the Ethiopian government paradoxically helped Ethiopia's cause instead of the Islamist groups'. Two news items appeared in *The Ethiopian Herald*: "Lasting peace, stability in Somalia crucial for overall security of the Horn" (29 July 2006) and "Ethiopia committed to ensuring dependable peace, security in Somalia (MoFA, 2006).

These highlights that Ethiopia's securitization happened around the Somali conflict, with the securing the government identifying the security of TFG as fundamental to peace and stability in Somalia. This was further legitimized by the Ethiopian government as an act of self-defence under international law and contributing to the global fight against terrorism by limiting the influence of terrorists in Somalia (Ethiopian Herald, 2006).

Peace may yet return to Somalia, but the 2006-2009 Ethiopian intervention has further reduced the chances of this happening. In addition, the military intervention by Ethiopian government has taught the Ethiopian government that such actions come with consequences which must be borne by the state. For instance, the Ethiopian military suffered significantly in terms of injuries, destruction of military equipment and loss of lives. Although it was seen that the military intervention came at the great economic cost it's been argued that the intervention was motivated as a way of diverting attention from the poor human rights record in Ethiopia following the country's 2005 plebiscite (Begashaw, 2016).

Furthermore, there was fear that the country's election might have drawn the scrutiny of the global community and with the state pursuing military action from various fronts there emerged the need of reducing its intervention in Somalia. This was against the backdrop of no feasible military. This led to Ethiopia departure from Somalia, albeit discreetly, with stepping up their support for the Al-Shabaab both financial and through sending foreign fighters (Hansen, 2013)

Although it has been argued that the military foray of Addis Ababa into Ethiopia was meant to save Somalia from economic doldrums and political disorder, many were not appreciative of Addis Ababa's move, especially considering the history between the two countries. This was evident with the cheer of jubilant crowds following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from their positions in late 2008. On a number of occasions, the Ethiopian forces crossed the border to flex her military muscle but the withdrawal left Ethiopian government with egg on its face (Hussein, 2017).

Henderson (2008, p. 11) asserts that following the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the Salafist resisters in Somalia claimed victory. Although the motives for the intervention in Somalia is still unclear, the incursion was a case of meddling in the affairs of another country. The meddling of Ethiopia in Somalia and the hostility of Somalis towards Addis Ababa simply made it difficult for the establishment of a central government in Somalia, with Addis Ababa favouring collapse over having Salafist led government in Somalia (Guardian, 2006).

Somali resisters subscribing to Salafist Islamic ideologies went on to claim victory even as factionalism unrelentingly tearing their country apart unabatedly. The motive (s) that inspired Addis Ababa to decide to assault its neighbour seem befuddling. No matter what it was, however, the incursion was a needless meddling in the affairs of a troubled country. This presentation describes that the antipathy between Ethiopians and Somalis made the establishment of a central government in Mogadishu extremely difficult since Addis Ababa was reported to prefer ongoing state collapse rather than have an Arab-backed radical Salafist government in power in Somalia (BBC, 2006).

This position is further advanced Hussein (2017, p. 68) who offers that only way for Addis Ababa to keep Ethiopia from any threat is by Somalia remaining divided, weak and preoccupied with internal quarrels. Thus he suggested that Ethiopian government saw no benefit from a united and stable Somalia but feared that emergence of an Islamic state would result in more instability in Ethiopia. A position supported by Hesse (2016, p. 579) who states that the Ethiopian preference for the warlord-dominated TFG to the UIC, resulted to political and military liability with time. This he asserts made it difficult for the Ethiopian government to secure a pro-Ethiopian regime in Mogadishu as well as stabilize the country.

Today, years since Addis Ababa's withdrawal, the Somali politics remains fractious and the humanitarian situation dire. On the other hand, her western neighbour, Ethiopia continues to bear the brunt of the ensuing refugee crisis (Moller, 2009). And, while most Ethiopian residents are not in a better situation, though the Somalia refugees are worse off due to the fraught conditions further fueling hostility against Addis Ababa intervention in Somalia. Addis Ababa government has lived in the hope that future governments in Africa may learn from their example on military intervention (Euromonitor, 2003).

2.6. Summary of the Chapter

Addis Ababa's military intervention of Somalia in late 2006 is seen as one of the poor strategic decision made by an African state. This follows from historical patterns of conflict between the two countries that encompass territorial disputes, proxy rebel movements, and a fight to control the fate of Islamic political organizations in Somalia. The Ethiopian government invaded Somalia to affect its political project, that is, install a pro-Ethiopian regime in Mogadishu (BBC, 2006). However, a gathering of momentum by the UIC presented Ethiopia with characteristics going beyond the military sector.

The Islamist group represented a new ideological challenge to Addis Ababa by affecting the control it had over the TFG government control. Unlike the material or physical challenges that Islamic group posed to the stability, ideological

influence of Islamist group gave rise to the securitization process by Ethiopia in Somalia between 2006 and 2009.

The quest to reinforce the capability of the transitional federal government showcased Addis Ababa's ability to pursue a problem-solving approach in Somalia by going beyond the military approach. Nonetheless, the intervention in Somalia was a short-term measure because Ethiopia management to fulfil the agenda of international actors albeit for a short time and to its benefit. In the long run, the 2006-2009 Addis Ababa's intervention in Somalia can be summed as the adoption of an exceptional political measure.

CHAPTER THREE

LEGALITY OF SELF –DEFENSE: THE 2006 ETHIOPIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

3.1. Introduction

According to Muhyadin (2017, p. 5), the daunting task of assessing the legal ground (s) for the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia necessitates the application of both Ethiopia's and Somalia's perspectives. Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 with the aim of reclaiming the Ogaden but failed in its attempt. Given that both nations harbour deep military ambitions in the region their relationship has been one of perpetual conflict and mistrust to the extent that the two had been financing rebel groups in each other's countries until two consecutive events took place in 1991: the collapse of the Somali's Siad Barre's government and the ousting of the Derg regime in Addis Ababa.

Since then, Somalia has had one of the roughest periods in the history of any modern politics. Constantly plagued by repetitive cycles of conflict, which is partly blamed on Somalis themselves and also partially blamed on foreign interference and meddling. Consequently, in line with international humanitarian law, the strife in Somalia is not considered an international armed conflict (Watch, 2008). Of concern, however, is the question: what legal ground did Ethiopia have to invade Somalia—decades later? There are three main points of contention that surround the legality of Ethiopia's intervention from either standpoint. First is the issue of Ethiopia's right to self-defence, then the argument of an imminent terrorist threat and finally the controversial issue of intervention by invitation (Aime, 2013).

3.2. Ethiopia's Right to Self Defence

International relations are based on several norms key among them is the principle of sovereignty and the inherent right of a nation to protect itself from any internal or external aggression. A state can claim the right to self-defence when it is facing a clear and imminent threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Presenting the case of Ethiopia, for decades the country has been at war with the idea of *A Greater Somalia* that is, making certain that all Somali speaking regions in the Horn of Africa are under a single Somali polity (Mohammed, 2010).

Gegout (2012, p. 12) notes that Ethiopia did have legal grounds for adhering to the Organization of African Union (OAU), currently the African Union (AU), given that OAU members agreed to uphold colonial boundaries in order to avoid perpetual border disputes among member states. In addition, one of the fundamental values and standard expected from AU member was respect for rights, democratic governance and constitutional governments.

Further, according to Samatar (2007, p. 6), the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the Act) provides for the right of intervention by member states and this should be accompanied by request for intervention. Article 4 of the Act provides for the right of AU to intervene in a Member State only after the continental body agrees to such decision with an aim to restore peace and stability in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Addis Ababa argued that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized the use of force in Somalia and consequently, by resorting to the legal provisions stipulated by Article 4 of the Act, endorsed the 2006 incursion into Somalia.

Gegout (2012, p. 7) stipulates that under international law, the recourse to force is allowed only if it is for the repulsion of an act of aggression by another state. However, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can authorize the use of force only if it under self-defence. Self-defence, as the word explains itself, is regarded under international law as the right of a state to use force for its own defence. When states use force especially among other states, or as is the case in

the 21st Century against non-state actors such as terrorist groups, they usually use the argument or rationale of self-defence. The argument of self-defence, and in particular its application and interpretation, is found in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

It provides the legal argument for the use of force by stating that a nation is allowed to take recourse to force only under the condition that it is strictly for the defence of the state (United Nations, 2018). To implement this provision in the conflict in Somalia prior to the 2006 deployment of Ethiopian troops, the UNSC had given permission for a peacekeeping force to be arrayed in Somalia. However, Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was not interested in accepting this decision and went ahead to officially declare war against the state of Ethiopia and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Hussein, 2017). And, while for Ethiopia to have had the UNSC approval was proper it was not necessarily a must: thus, Ethiopian military action against the Islamist militants.

According to Muriithi (2009, p. 4), following the 2006 deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, Addis Ababa stated that it had resorted to using military force owing to UIC's declaration to resuscitate the idea of a Greater Somalia. The regime deemed the Islamist group to be a threat not only because the latter threatened to resuscitate the idea of a Greater Somalia; but, also, because the Islamist group constituted significant territorial problems to Ethiopia. That notwithstanding, Meles Zenawi's administration made a compelling argument that the core elements of the UIC in 2006, for instance, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys were former members of a designated terror group—Al-Itahad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) (Ibrahim, 2010).

Further, according to Howard (2010), Ethiopian authorities argued that they perceived the takeover of Somalia by the Islamist militants a threat to the territorial and social-political integrity of the Ethiopian state. Their call for self-defence was linked to UIC call for the liberation of Ogaden Somalia to forms the "Greater Somalia", a cause pursued by Ogaden National Liberation Front's (ONLF) in their quest for independence (Hagman, 2007). The hosting provided to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Somalia was viewed as a factor that could destabilize

Ethiopia. The fear of attacks launched by various rebellious movements from Ethiopia and the 1997 bombing in Addis by a group with Eritrean connection also motivated a desire for self-defence (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006).

This proclamation of the Islamist insurgent's intentions in the region, along with its depiction as an existential menace to Ethiopia's sovereignty, qualified the Ethiopian citizenry to rally behind their government against aggression by the UIC for the survival of the State of Ethiopia. In November 2006, the Ethiopian parliament invoked standards of international humanitarian law and declared war against the Islamist group. It authorized the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) to deal with UIC through any necessary measures until it posed no significant threat to Ethiopia (New African, 2015). The ENDF military action against the Islamist militants was marked by the 4th December 2006 entry into Somalia.

The authorization of military action against Islamist in Somalia was premised on Article 51 that allows states to defend itself against "attacks" by another state. Such attacks can be against its armed forces or embassies abroad, airspace, sea, private citizens, airlines and civil ships. Although economic damage can qualify as an attack, in most cases it does not fit. For example, on the 13th of May 2017, a computer virus affected the majority of the National Health Service (NHS) of the United Kingdom. This crippled the health service for a number of days, however, the UK government cannot and did not declare the cyber-attack as being an "armed attack" itself despite the damage it caused. Similarly, Ethiopia cannot claim that the economic drawbacks due to the domestic rebels or foreign terrorists constitute an "armed attack" however damaging they may be. Some of the justifications of the Ethiopian government included the economic damages by rebels in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Samatar, 2007).

Samatar (2007, p. 8) notes that the Ethiopian government awarded contracts to foreign corporations to explore and exploit the oil-rich region. Local rebels responded by attacking the oil exploration posts and kidnapped foreign workers. The Ethiopian government was infuriated by the embarrassment of the attacks as well as its failure to protect the foreign workers. The attacks significantly affected

any future tenders as foreign workers and corporations became wary of the ability of the Local and Federal Ethiopian authorities to secure their safety. Worth noting, the ICU was implicated in these attacks although there was no evidence to prove their involvement.

According to Allo (2010, p. 13), some argue for the invocation of Article 51 to be lawful, an “armed attack” must have taken place. The use of the term “occurs” is used to support this argument. However, there are no guidelines for specific attacks with respect to what type of weapons that are used or intensity, damage or scale of the attack. Therefore, any use of armed force can be regarded as an armed attack. There may be exemptions for honest mistakes or the absence of an intention to attack although this is open for interpretation by the perpetrator and the victim state.

Aime (2013, p. 37) highlights that the vast majority of the ICU leadership opposed any attacks against Ethiopia and only advocated for military action within the borders of Somalia weakening Ethiopia’s claim of a threat to its security significantly, if not eliminating it. The Ethiopian Government resorted to cherry picking the statements of some of the most extreme members of ICU to find whatever justification possible. The head of the ICU militant wing Al Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayro was undoubtedly one of those that the Ethiopian government would consider a treasure in the face of their intended military intervention of Somalia. Ayro was eager to ensure that the military struggle in Somalia he was heading becomes a part of a wider global jihad movement. Even in the case of Ayro’s views which were condemned by other more senior and established leaders of the ICU, the Ethiopian claim does not carry much weight. This is because Ayro was perhaps merely trying to increase his popularity and influence within the group. Also, his statements were not solely aimed at Ethiopia just like the Turkish government’s statement following the Russian jet incident. The only major differences between the jet incident and the Ayro case are that in the case of the jet incident an “armed attack” did “occur”, in the Ayro case, it did not. Also, the extreme statements by Ayro could be well within his right under Article 19 of the UN Charter. Part of Article 19 states “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion

and expression”, his statements were clearly his own opinion and not military or political orders to be followed by members (Allo, 2009). In addition, Ayro did not have much support or empathy from anyone prior to Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia which changed the latter reality drastically (Alebachew, 2017).

The necessity for an “armed attack” to” occur” was deemed as being extremely restraining by some entities as evident in the unlawful actions of the Ethiopian government. They proposed a broader interpretation of Article 51 which partly states that nothing in the Charter as present shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. The use of the terms “impairs” and “inherent” serve as powerful tools by those in support of a less restrictive approach. The argument is that if the State feels that it is subject to an imminent attack, not responding to the threat in question would be seen as impairing the “inherent” right to self-defence, collective or individual. Therefore, a pre-emptive strike could be justified as a result of these two words. However, a deceptive or incorrect intelligence could be fabricated in theory to falsely justify an imminent strike for which there is no evidence otherwise. On the other hand, even if a validation of the claim is to be pursued, the justification of a pre-emptive strike is usually very time sensitive and a closely guarded secret in most cases. The US invasion of Iraq is a famous example of such a case. George Bush, the President of the US, and his close aides vowed that Baghdad was in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, this was purely based on the word of the US which may have had a vested interest in occupying or decapitating Iraq despite the Iraqi denial. Ethiopia was making a very similar claim which cannot be proved otherwise. The Ethiopian government was stating that an emerging force within a neighbouring sovereign country was a threat to its national security. It is like stating that an unborn child will be a suicide bomber (Allo, 2010).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in Nicaragua "It cannot, therefore, be held that Article 51 is a provision which ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for the present dispute need hardly be stressed, customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the

two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content (Alebachew, 2017). The court highlighted the customary right to self-defence which is marginally different to Article 51 of the UN Charter. By stating that Article 51 does not subsume or supervene customary international law, the law clearly opened the window for a broader interpretation of the terms we discussed previously embedded in Article 51 of the UN Charter, “impair” and “inherent” (Allo. 2010).

The Ethiopian government also claimed that Ethiopian rebel forces were operating from within the confines of Somali territory under ICU control. However, the ICU was not an internationally recognized government. Therefore, how could it be held against the UN Charter? By convention, if the ICU can be held liable as though it was a State, in the event of a shortcoming, it should also be allowed to prevent that shortcoming with the means available to a State. For example, an individual cannot be asked to read a new book while his or her eyes must remain closed, a door cannot be shut or closed at the same time. Ethiopia rightfully stated that it was Ethiopian rebel forces that were capitalizing on the relative lawlessness on the other side of the border. Article 51 can be used against none State actors as the right to self-defence is aimed at a State that fails to honour Article 2 of the UN Charter (Hussein, 2017).

If we go against our better judgment and for the time being assume that the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was justified under international law with respect to Article 51 of the UN Charter, the principle of necessity and proportionality must be adhered to. It is imperative that all non-military means of ending an ongoing attack or deterring an anticipated threat are exhausted. In the case of Somalia, we have mentioned before that the TFG and the ICU were actively engaged in negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the dilemma. However, Ethiopia offset this balance by ensuring that the TFG was between a hard place and a rock. The TFG was land-locked and in between the overwhelming forces of the ICU and the protective ring of Ethiopian forces. Therefore, Ethiopia coerced the TFG to accept nothing other than violence or face being overrun by ICU fighters if the Ethiopian forces were to be withdrawn. It was a case of kill or be killed.

3.3. The Legality of Self-Defence in Response to the Threat of Terrorism

Blomberg, Fernholz & Levin (2013, p. 11) highlights that the nature of self-defence has changed significantly after the events of 9/11. The dynamics of warfare have equally also changed and now states use pre-emptive force in order to confront an imminent threat facing a state. Ethiopia, a long-time ally of the United States of America (US), utilized the case of the US after 9/11 where the Bush administration argued that Baghdad possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and that by striking first the security of the US was guaranteed (Marchal, 2013). In this case, the US did not wait for it to be attacked for it to react rather the pre-emptive strike was aimed at not allowing the enemy to have a military advantage.

Gegout (2012, p. 9) cites that the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia against the UIC was allegedly aimed at confronting the threat posed the ICU rather than reacting after the group had already attacked. Self-defence can also be seen as coming after a threat is determined by the state in relation to the proportionality of the ability of the threat to inflict casualties to the state. Gegout (2012, p. 9), notes that by determining whether a threat is exaggerated or serious the issue of immanence has to be weighed in the decision-making process. Some of the action of UIC in 2006 gave justification for Somali intervention under Meles Zenawi.

Gettleman (2006, p.10) indicates that in the period running to 2006, the administration of Meles Zenawi was already offering support to the (TFG), by providing the TFG government with military advisors from Ethiopia. However, from 2006, the UIC started adopting a radical policy and this was considered as a threat, with Meles government seeing the Islamists as likely to start a third front rebellion against Ethiopian. In addition, the Zenawi regime claims to have had evidence of Somali providing grounds for Islamists from across the world (Gettleman, 2006).

Yihdego (2007, p. 9) states that Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia was hinged on their right to self defence under Article 51. As much as Article 2 (4) of UN charter that states "All Members shall refrain in their international relations

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”, article 51 of the UN Charter provides right to military defense as a way of self-defense. The legality of Ethiopia’s defence in Somalia has support and at the same time lack supports of international law. When viewed through article 51 of the Charter which provides that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member State of the United Nations’, it can argued that Ethiopia did not suffer from any significance threat of armed attack as the threats of ICU government merely issued threats (Ruys, 2014)..

On the contrary, Samatar (2007, p. 162) opines that when the justification of Ethiopia intervention is seen through terrorist threat in the aftermath of September 1, 2001 attacks there exists some justification, only to the extent that terrorist action whether sponsored by a state or not. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 determined that international terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to combat such armed attack of terrorists, individual states can take self-defence measures, with Ethiopian intervention viewed so as way of self-defence.

3.4. Intervention by Invitation

The concept of intervention by invitation is a common practise used by states to justify their action in affairs of another state. Thus the concept of intervention by invasion solely lies on the consent of another state. According to Djibril (2014, p. 25) through consent, wrongfully military intervention is justifiable and becomes acceptable. The major premise of intervention by invitation that a government may invites another state thereby negating the possibility of wrongful intervention. Intervention by invitation is governed by validity of consent and conditions under which the validity is expressed. Consent can be given through *ad hoc* consent and through a prior agreement.

Ruys (2014, p. 188) further argues that consent through prior agreement is another form that has dominated the validity of intervention by invasion; through a bilateral agreement between states, one state can forcibly enter forcibly in another state territory. However, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia cannot be categorized under the consent through prior agreement; Ethiopia had no such agreement with Somalia, considering that both states have been antagonistic to each other since establishment of Said Barre rule in 1969.

According to Adhoc consent occurs when a states has valid expressed consent to use armed force in another territory. Djibril (2014, p. 26) argues that the expression of valid consent does not goes against Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter that prohibits use of coercive force but it allows for consent on use of force in another state. Article 51 also states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. Collective self defence provides for the right to self defence through intervention by invitation. Under international law, a state may request for assistance from a contemporary to help it expel an enemy or help it to combat an enemy that is occupying its territory. Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia was carried out through Adhoc consent that came at the behest of TFG government based in Baidoa (Marchal, 2013).

The TFG was internationally recognized by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), League of Arab States, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), AU and the UN to the extent that the UNSC was considering loosening the arms embargo on the country so as to allow for the rebuilding of Somalia’s security forces. Therefore, although Ethiopian forces were involved in the strife in Somalia, their involvement in Ethiopia was at the request of TFG (Reliefweb, 2006).

Mahamood and Poonja (1982, p. 4) said although the principle of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* ("things thus standing") is a part of customary international law, it is also provided in Article 62 (Fundamental Change of Circumstance) of the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The functionality of the principle in international law is premised on its use only in cases where the state parties did envisage the occurrence of the altered circumstance. Though the doctrine is not mentioned by name, Article 62 provides the only justifications for its invocation: the circumstances that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty were indeed objectively essential to the obligations of accord and the instance for the change of circumstances has had a radical effect on the obligations of the treaty.

As Seybolt (2008, p. 22) cites that Article 62 can only be applicable when two state entities that share a disputed border sign the treaty. For this to be applicable Ethiopia had to have signed an agreement with the country it shares the border in question with which is Somalia. Since Britain signed the agreement, thus entered into an agreement with Ethiopia and not the Sovereign state of Somalia, this by default makes the treaty null and void. When the UIC, therefore, declared its intention of annexing the Ogaden and incorporating all Somali speaking people in the region to be under one government, it was least expected that this would immediately trigger a reaction from Ethiopia which would brand the UIC an imminent threat to its existence and territorial integrity (Hussein, 2017).

Somalia maintains the position that it does not recognize the border demarcations made after colonialism the reason being that Ethiopia entered into treaties with European powers without the approval or acknowledgement of Somali communities in the area (Shinn, 2003). It further argues that Africa's borders were drawn up by European powers without any prior knowledge or consideration of indigenous tribes or clans of the continent and therefore Somalia is not a party to unilateral agreements entered without its consent (Henderson, 2007). Somalia, therefore, advocates that the people of the Ogaden should be given the right to self-determination, as is enshrined in international law (Moussa, 2009).

Moussa (2009, p. 6) mentions that the inhabitants should be free to choose whether they wish to remain with Ethiopia, secede from Ethiopia and be an independent state or join Somalia. By giving the people of the Ogaden the right and the opportunity to decide their own fate Somalia believes that the issue of the Ogaden can be laid to rest once and for all. Based on these three fundamental

reasons Somalia views the issue of the Ogaden to be ultimately left to the inhabitants of the Ogaden. It is therefore only the people of the Ogaden and only them that can determine the outcome of this issue failure to which Somalia will never relinquish its claims on the Ogaden.

Allo (2010, p.11) presents a major argument made by the Ethiopian government based on Article 4, a key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Despite the fact that the AU PSC endorsed Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia, the legitimacy of the AU in making such decisions is in itself questionable. The OAU had a nasty reputation because some of the organization's leaders have been brutal dictators such as Idi Amin who was the chair of the OAU during the 1970s while committing crimes against humanity in Uganda. Fast forward to 2006 and the AU was still mirrored by allegations of being a "club of dictators" with most of the continents' such as Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni leading dictatorial regimes. This perturbing phenomenon remained a stain on not only the legitimacy of the AU; but, also, on the credibility of the organization as a whole.

Yussuf (2014) reports that the 2006 Ethiopian intervention against the ICU was argued as falling under the category of a state pursuing its interests; thus, it had little to do with stopping terrorism. That notwithstanding, a requirement to invoke self-defence by a state is that the state is required to show sufficient evidence that the reason for declaring self-defence is to protect civilian lives.

According to Zarakol (2011, p. 8) and Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010), the request by the TFG, a government perceived by Somalis as comprising warlords to call upon the ENDF was mirrored by controversy with the issue of the legitimacy of the TFG been key among them. Although the TFG was internationally recognized, it, however, was neither elected by the Somali people nor had it any ability to impose its rule in Baidoa — let alone the whole of Somalia. This is in line with the fact that legitimacy does not stem from the international community or regional organizations; but, rather, genuine legitimacy lies with the people of the state and it is they who elect the government and hold it accountable (Zoppi, 2015, p. 2). Given the internal political situation in Somalia at the time, the TFG argued

it was the officially recognized representative of the Somali people despite the UIC enjoying wider support and greater legitimacy (Hoehne, Feysa & Abdile, 2011).

Allo (2009, p. 5) reports that it is clear from the foregoing that the TFG did not satisfy the effectiveness criterion and lacked popular approval, and in that respect, it could not give any lawful consent to an external actor to intervene in militarily in Somalia. On another front, it is argued that the TFG had neither the military ability nor the political appetite to challenge Ethiopia's deployment of troops in Somalia (Lyons, 2008). It then follows that the ENDF's intervention was aimed at projecting Ethiopia's hard power with the intention of achieving military hegemony in the region and that the guise of an imminent terrorist threat to regional as well as international peace and security was merely a ruse.

According to Yihdego (2007, p. 9), the then Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, announced the official start of the offensive against entities it deemed as a threat to its security opining the Addis Ababa had taken self-defensive actions and started counterattacking the belligerent forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups (Fanta, 2007) on December 24th, 2006. Without the justification of the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, this would not be possible. From the statement of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, we learn that the justification rested on two main arguments-aggression by the ICU forces and terrorism.

Djibril (2014, p.5) notes that in light of the Ethiopian intervention it is important to analyze whether the developments on the ground in Somalia or Ethiopia fulfilled the conditions for invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter in the light of self-defence. Ethiopia further attempted to justify its military intervention in neighbouring Somalia by insisting that it was invited by the internationally recognized government of Somalia. In this thesis, emphasis is placed on establishing the validity of Ethiopia's claim of its right to "individual and collective self-defence" with respect to international law regulating the employment of might. We will also try to shed light on the international community's decision to remain silent for prolonged periods given the failed state designation of Somalia in the light of Ethiopia's military (but not limited to) intervention.

Does this silence point to an evolution of the law of self-defence globally? The use of coercive force in all aspects is forbidden by the United Nations Charter while simultaneously detailing a carefully fashioned exemption in line with its principal purpose of upholding global peace and security (United Nations, 1991). As Allo (2010, p. 3) asserts, most experts on the use of force believe there are two exceptions to overall prohibitions outlined in Article 2. The first exception is the right of “discrete and collective self-defence” stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second is the authority extended to the UNSC to use might in response to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression” stated in Chapter VII of the Charter.

Allo (2009, p.7) further indicates that Addis Ababa intended to justify their military intervention in Somalia as an invocation of its “intrinsic right of discrete or collective self-defence” embodied under Article 51 of the UN Charter. An extraction of Article 51 reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken agencies crucial to maintaining international peace and security.

According to ICJ Advisory Opinion (2004), the term “inherent” used in the statement above reiterates the natural right of a State with respect to international law to defend itself from an armed attack by means of using military force or otherwise. At the time the UN Charter was adopted, the idea of collective self-defence was not widely accepted as “inherent” as a matter of international law. Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) in Nicaragua asserted the “inherent” nature of both types of self-defence, the right to individual and or collective self-defence. The court further specified in a statement in Nicaragua “the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right which any state possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self-defence (Bamfo, 2010).

Djibril (2014, p. 8) views that the assumption that Ethiopia's claim of being invited by the Somali Transitional Federal Government was lawful according to international law, the question is which state attacked Somalia? Given the fact that the ICU was a Somali armed group, it would be unlawful for Ethiopia to claim that it was acting in line with the UN Charter, in particular, Article 51 and the right to collective self-defence.

To further complicate an already complicated situation, Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia were not signatories to any preceding multilateral or bilateral treaties before the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 nor after it. According to (Ismail, 2016), Somalia and Ethiopia were involved in a number of military and political confrontations before the collapse of the Barre regime. Also, Ethiopia was one of the key state supporters of the armed rebellion against the Barre government financially as well as providing military hardware and logistics. However, the Barre regime only responded by fighting the rebels within the Somali border. On the other hand, one of the other endless justifications of the Ethiopian government for its military intervention in Somalia was that the militants were supplying arms to Ethiopian rebels fighting to overthrow the Ethiopian government. However, arming a rebel group does not constitute an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is the case for both individual and collective self-defence.

Ruys (2014, p. 164) argues that although in principle international law permits intervention by invitation; such form of intervention are problematic in their own ways when it occurs in a civil war situation like in Somalia. Yihdego (2007, p. 4) further states that in cases where states are encountering foreign military attack or attack from internal armed rebels, there exist significant legality of justifying the intervention by invitation and thus a state can be assisted by another state as a way of self- defence.

Samatar (2007, p. 158) posits that in cases of civil war situation like in Somalia where a democratically elected government did not exist, effecting such a principle is problematic and thus can be deemed illegal. In line with international law, intervention by invitation should be done by a constitutionally elected

government on an ad hoc basis; otherwise the intervention is not will be to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter which prohibits of the use of force. He further argues that though invitation for intervention was carried by President Yusuf's of the TFG, the government was not constitutionally elected and its support was limited to small area in Somalia; with large parts of Somalia under the UIC which brought stability to major cities under control. In such fragile situation, intervention by invitation is controversial as there was not only a democratically elected government (although TFG had international recognition) but also Somalia had been in a state of civil war for two decades. Nevertheless, when taken into recognition that interim government had regional legitimacy, the invitation by interim government to Ethiopia may be seen by some as lawful. Despite this in light of Article 2 (4) that recognized intervention by invitation solely from a state, intervention by TFG government is still unlawful and outside the international laws and norms.

3.5. Summary of the Chapter

Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia known periods of open conflict. As this dissertation has analysed, however, the legality of the 2006-2009 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia remains questionable to date. According to Ethiopia, the main argument for deploying its troops was then the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of its territory. The incursion into Somalia was thus legitimized as an act of self-defence under international law hence a call for military involvement.

The UIC did not have any extremist views during its early stages rather it was primarily concerned with restoring law and order to south-central Somalia using Islamic Sharia. However, Ethiopia was of a contrary view: the Islamist group posed an imminent threat. This served as the main premise for invoking Ethiopia's interference with the internal affairs of Somalia. Through a preventive war, Meles Zenawi had hoped to demonstrate Ethiopia's strength in an unstable region, as well as the power of his own government to an Ethiopian populace.

The invitation from the TFG for the deployment of Ethiopia troops to enter Somalia and combat the Islamist militants raised doubts on the legitimacy of the

TFG government itself as the representative of the Somalia state. The notion of intervention by invitation opened up a whole new debate on the legality of foreign intervention. As evidence by Ethiopia, state behaviour is undoubtedly driven by self-interests and interests inherently change with time depending on the duration with which these interests fall under—long-term or short-term.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOMALIA AND AFTERMATH OF THE 2006 ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS

4.1. Introduction

The previous governments before Siad Barre, Siad Barre regime, and successive government of Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Al-Shabaab have historically been proponents of Greater Somalia. Their approach envisaged a pan Somali geared at uniting to Somali inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa. Historically, this has been a major source of conflict between Somali and three of its neighbors-Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Relations between Somalia and these three states have been poisoned by persistent claims to areas in the three states inhabited by ethnic Somalis (Rudincová, 2016). Over the past decades, successive Somali governments did not pay attention to demarcated border line with Ethiopia, which was drawn by colonialists (The Guardian, 2006).

The turn of the year 2008/09 represented a significant juncture for Somalia, featuring both the resignation of the President of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Abdallahi Yusuf, and the withdrawal of the around 3000 Ethiopia armed forces which had been deployed since the military intervention in December 2006. The future of Somalia by early January 2009 thus seemed both bleak and unpredictable (Interpeace, 2009). It is on the basis of scenarios that played out thereafter that this thesis examines the impact of the 2006-2009 Ethiopian incursion in Somalia on the country's relationship domestically, regionally and internationally. Of particular importance are the implications of Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia for the international society.

4.2. The Intra-Country Impact of the Ethiopian Intervention: Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political Impact of the Aftermath of the Ethiopian Intervention

As much as Ethiopia justified the intervention in Somalia, and with goals of Ethiopian intervention revolving around self defense and promoting stability and security of Ethiopia. The military intervention in Ethiopia like any other intervention comes with costs and consequences socio-economically and politically, and this section sought to understand the impacts of the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia.

4.2.1. The end of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) Reconciliation Process and the Entrenchment of Terrorism as a Source of Conflict in Southern and Central Somalia

After the ascension to power of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Somalia had started a path of healing and ending the protracted conflict that started with the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. However, with the 2006 Ethiopian military intervention, this reconciliation process fragmented and clans that were for or against the intervention were pitted against each other. Religion has also been cited as a cause of conflict in the Southern and central regions of Somalia region of southern Somalia (Muhyadin, 2017).

The root of religion to the Somali conflict is largely due to the fact that the Southern and central regions of Somalia region has been a safe haven for terrorist groupings operating regionally, nationally or internationally. One of the most notorious terrorist groupings, Al Shabaab for instance, is situated in the southern region of Southern and central regions of Somalia and has for many years been using the southern port of Kismayu as its epicentre and commercial hub even though it has since been uprooted from the port following the military incursion codenamed Operation Linda Nchi (Muhyadin, 2017).

In most scholarly discourses, religion has been blamed for causing terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2006; Ngari & Reva, 2017). Indeed, religious extremism is a major cause of terrorism. According to Pratt (2010, p. 11), religion provides motivation and justification for terrorist acts. In addition, religion provides images of cosmic war in effect allowing terrorist operatives to believe that they are waging spiritual scenarios. Pratt (2010, p. 13) also stresses that religion does not cause terrorism but instead, religion provides doctrinal justification for terrorism based on an individual interpretation of symbols in holy books.

Oded (2007, pp. 7-9) claims that the 2006 Ethiopian intervention led to disruption of the socio-political and economic way of life in the Southern and Central part of Somalia in two main ways; it made it easy for the two regions to come under the influence of a number of Islamic ideologies ranging from Sufi Islam, Islax, Wahabbi to Tabliq, with these groups been pro-Islamic extremism and terrorism. Secondly, he argues that Ethiopian intervention contributed to the emergence of a terrorism friendly environment in Somalia.

Abdullahi (2011, p. 9) suggests that this probably explains the escalation of extremist religious groupings in the Southern and central regions of Somalia region that have been among the greatest contributors of conflict as well as sectarian violence. Most of the Southern and central regions of Somalia region's terror groupings are fighting for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia (Al Shabaab and Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama), while others are opposed to the same.

Thus it can be concluded that although the Ethiopian intervention resulted to the collapse of UIC government, it on the other hand led to the regrouping of Islamic insurgents, who began launching daring attacks at the flank of Ethiopian forces, including head-on suicide attacks. Further terrorist attacks conducted under the disguise of Islam were launched in markets, towns, roadside claiming several civilian casualties. Ethiopia's attempt to stop the terrorism acts was ruthless as it resulted in over 1000 civilians killed within a month, thereby angering the civilian population, who became more sympathetic to terrorist groups, with some considered as sharing similar religion beliefs and culture (Rudincová, 2016).

The Al Shabaab terrorist organization, which is formally known as Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin an Arabic phrase denoting the Mujahidin Youth Movement, emerged about the late years of the 2000s in Somalia largely due to a proliferation of Islamist and clan-based militias in southern Somalia. According to Blanchard (2013, p. 3), the terror group is affiliated to the larger Al Qaeda terrorist group, besides it is also a local Islamist insurgent group. Accordingly, he explains that Al Shabaab was muted and established as a militia after the fall of the local Islamic Courts Union (ICU) following the 2006 Ethiopian intervention (Blanchard, 2013). The Islamic Courts Union as earlier mentioned had emerged in the 1990s to fill in the gap left by the collapse of the central authority in Somalia. With the fall of the ICU, he states Al Shabaab rose to fill in the void as well as to help the southern and central regions of Somalia to get rid of the Ethiopian imperial army that had invaded in 2006.

However, unlike the courts and their militias, which were driven by clan based and nationalist interests the Al-shabaab were driven by religious interest and not clan interest, with the overall aim of the group been the formation of Somalia Islamic caliphate. It also draws experience from the terrorist battlefields of the Al Qaeda and Taliban as some of its leaders reportedly trained in Afghanistan (Williams, 2018).

Bamfo (2010, p. 61) proposes that the group was founded years earlier before the Ethiopian intervention, with the period between the Ethiopian intervention of December 24, 2006, and early 2008 holding great significance to the emergence of the group. Before the intervention, the group was more a player with the UIC government, largely acting as the military wing of the courts. However, Ethiopian intervention contributed greatly to the ideological transformation of the group who became more radical and strictly campaigned for enforcement of sharia law as they lacked a moderating influence in the name of UIC leaders. (Wise, 2011).

After the intervention, Foster-Bowser and Sanders (2012, p. 13) states that Al-shabaab also positioned itself as a nationalist movement considering that most Somalis were concerned with “kicking” Ethiopians out of Somalia. Alshabaab took advantage of this to build a propaganda around reclamation of Somalia

leading to meteoric rise of the group, with numbers swelling into thousands. Thus it is evident that the Ethiopian intervention was also a driver to Al-shabab growth, with the group adopting a dual strategy of both religious movement and national movement. In this regard it can also be seen that the Ethiopian intervention altered the partnership of the groups with other groups. As a result of the growth in members, Al-shabaab saw no need of collaborating with other groups but opted to pursue solitary strategy (Wise, 2011).

During the period of Al-shabab emergence, other group also emerged opposed to Al-shabbab. Menkhaus (2011, p. 7) mentions, Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama emerged as a militia grouping in the central region of Southern and central regions of Somalia with a leaning towards the Sufis Islamic and opposed to the Salafi and Wahabi ideologies propagated by Al Shabaab. In the earlier years of the 2000s, Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama was a peaceful military outfit that was establishing schools as well as propping up social activities aimed at supporting the spread of their brand of Islam until around the year 2008 when Al-Shabaab desecrated the graves of Sufi Ulama as well as snowballing restrictions on the regions under their control (Menkhaus, 2011).

Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama reacted by fighting Al Shabaab and driving them out of their areas with the aid of arsenal supplied by Ethiopia. The group is usually funded by locals in exchange for fortification services, which seems to give the group legitimacy. The group usually gets into conflict with the Al Shabaab as they fight for control of strategic resources (Menkhaus, 2011).

Although at the early stages the rise of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) was welcomed by the international partners as a way to moderate and check the influence of Al-shabab, ASWJ is viewed as constituting the Somali problem and not the solution. Through ASWJ the militia control along clan has been institutionalized and legally accepted by the international community who still consider the group important in the fight against Al-shabaab (Di Domenicantonio, 2015).

In addition, Di Domenicantonio (2015, p. 12) explains that the rise of ASWJ has established militia as important political actor in Somalia thus limiting the post conflict stability process. He further explains that ASWJ and the TFG have basked in uncertain relationship that involves participation in governance structures of TFG (Bamfo, 2010). However, the group has also attacked the government forces in recent past besides taking control of some key towns, thus showing that the group is also a thorn in the flesh for TFG and international partners.

4.3. Entrenchment of Clannism as a Driver of Conflict in Somalia

After the 2006 intervention of Somalia by Addis Ababa, the predominant Somali mode of government after the fall of the then military strongman, Mohammed Siad Barre, in 1991, Islamic Courts, was ousted out of power. To counter this vacuum, Somalis resorted to the clan rivalries that went all the way to the period before the colonization of Somalia. In a classic example of regime insecurity dilemma, clan leaders and demagogues alike in the aftermath of the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia resorted to the use of this factor in order to help them ascend to power (Muhyadin, 2017).

Muhyadin (2017, p.56) in furthering his point argues that the Ethiopian government in their attempt to promote friendly government after the intervention also promoted “federalism” through clan factions. As a way of controlling instability created by their intervention, the Ethiopian government also pursued and supported relationships with clan leaders as a way of pacifying the country he opines. Nonetheless, this resulted in strengthening the clan identity thereby limiting the possibility of long lasting stability through creating of a multi-polar states, with different centers of power.

4.4. The Economic Impact of the 2006 Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia

According to Marangio (2012, p. 11), in the wake of the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, there was unfettered competition for resources coupled with large numbers of unemployed youth. With the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union, there was no arbiter to control the competition for resources among the different groups or a creator of an enabling environment to spur economic growth to create employment opportunities. To this end, the two scholars argue that the most important denominator that has created and sustained the clan-based militias that have put the Horn of Africa country under siege is the competition for power which inevitably leads to the control of the vast resources in the Southern and central regions of Somalia (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

Elmi and Barise (2006, p. 8) postulate that the present conflict in the Southern and central regions of Somalia is driven by the competition over resources and thus can be referred to as resource based conflicts. These resource conflicts were usually historically settled by traditional leaders by employing the widely accepted Somali traditional legal system called *Heer*. However, in the wake of the dawn of the 21st century, it dawned on political leaders that types of resources needed and means used to obtain them have changed. To this effect therefore, the conflict has shifted to the pursuit of political power in government resources as this avail both resources and means to control resources in the countryside (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

Generally, the population of the southern Somalia region of Jubbaland and central regions of Somalia are classified as pastoral and agricultural communities, with a noteworthy number engaged in trade and fisheries for those living in coastal areas. The vast resources that the southern region has as well as the seaports that serve as commercial hubs have also been a subject of competition from various clan and individual interests. In the absence of an arbitrating leviathan, the endpoint has been conflict in a classic example where the might is always right and where the lesser powers seek to exact revenge on economic grievances (Menkhaus, 2011).

According to the World Bank, there has been an intense competition over the control of the seaports in southern Somalia leading to conflict. These struggles to control the seaports of Mogadishu El-maan and Kismayo have led to strife between warload seeking to control the seaport for revenue generation (World Bank, 2005). According to Meaza and Beyene (2017, p. 5), three years after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, many business men in urban areas were operating under Islamic Sharia law. This was driven to a great extent by the need to allow businessmen and dealers to operate and have entry to the seaports of Jubbaland, thereby culminating in the formation of a coalition clans, militia leaders, civic groups and Islamists in 2005 under sharia law to govern the conflict ridden Southern and central regions of Somalia.

Another arena of conflict caused by competition over resources is the conflict over control of traditional clan lands. According to the World Bank (2005, p. 17), the rate of metropolization is increasing rapidly occasioned by rural to urban migration as well as the migration of groups escaping conflict. In the case of the former, groups have been migrating to seek employment opportunities while in the case of the latter; the protracted civil war in Somalia has transformed the clan settlement patterns.

The World Bank (2005, p. 21) report argues that strong clans have occupied treasured urban and agricultural real estate by coercion. This has resulted in changing the settlement patterns with clan not have significant influence driven out of areas of southern Somalia such as Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley as well as Mogadishu. These areas, the report mentions have also had a significant increase in Militias and armed groups that have taken over good urban and agricultural land for economic gain. Competition for power, authority and resources has resulted to changing clan power dynamics leading to increased clan conflicts the reports cites.

Hagman (2016, p. 11) also sees the struggle for the control of the productive areas around the Wabi Shebelle and Juba rivers as a contributing causative agent of conflict in the southern Somalia region of Southern and central regions of Somalia. In this agriculturally productive region, the struggle to control the areas is associated with its suitability for banana plantation and proximity to Mogadishu.

Although the struggle and the ensuing conflict is essentially a class struggle it had dimensions of clan identities, with each contending to gain control over the areas. Roy (2009, p. 8) suggests that the collapse of the state after the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 allowed the emergence of sub-clans and warlords to occupy these lands. Complicating the issue of peace is the fact that many original inhabitants of most lands in the southern Somalia region of Southern and central regions of Somalia migrated to urban areas, principally on the coast, which have also been habited by warlords and militias through coercion.

Ethiopian intervention resulted to the strengthening of warlords across Somalia and the warlords increased their control of agricultural land, profitable business and the ports in Somalia. Most of the warlords established a protection rackets to control most of the resources. The consequence of warlords consolidating control over their territory and resources in most parts of Somalia was increased suffering of domestic populations due to reduced limited opportunities for the population. The rise of warlords also established taxation-protection relationship which has continued to pilferage state funds across Somalia in the form of illegal taxation denying the national government revenue that can be used for economic development (Love, 2009).

4.5. Increase in Youth Unemployment and Disadvantaged Somalis regarding Employment Opportunities

According to Mbugua (2013, p. 24), due to socio-economic and political exclusion, the youths in the southern Somalia have been limited from contributing to peace building and reconciliation efforts, with some of the limiting factors including breakdown of family structure, lack of economic opportunities, illiteracy and cultural barriers. These youths have in effect turned into conflict usually as a source of their daily livelihood as well as an expression of socio-economic and political desperation. The economic desperation is more worrying since, Mbugua (2013, p. 25) posits that with unemployment rate at more than 50% and over 70 per cent of the population being under 30 years.

Following the Ethiopian intervention, state collapse continued greatly affecting the local economy, and with the absence of a stable government, the establishment of favourable business environment in most parts of Somalia has become difficult and this has resulted to limited job opportunities in the formal sector. Although Aid organizations are some of the biggest employers in Somalia, the instability occasioned by the Ethiopian intervention further disenfranchised youth unemployment in formal sector, particularly through the education sector. As a result of the crippled education system, job opportunities has been dominated by non-locals further exacerbating the youth unemployment (Hagmann, 2016).

4.6. The Political Impact of the 2006 Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia

In as much as the conflict of the southern Somali region of Southern and central regions of Somalia has largely been traced to socio-cultural and economic factors, politics is also to blame. As a matter of fact, it is the interplay of the political factors and the socio-cultural and economic facets of Southern and central regions of Somalia that has been wreaking havoc in the southern Somali region of Southern and central regions of Somalia. This section seeks to examine the political factors that have perpetuated and sustained conflict in the southern Somali region of Southern and central regions of Somalia.

Even though clannism has largely been blamed as a source of conflict in the Southern and central regions of Somalia, as a cultural attribute, clannism is insufficient to initiate or sustain conflict of such catastrophic margins as the two-decade civil war that has plagued Somalia since the ouster of the military strongman, Siad Barre. Rather, the exploitation of the politics surrounding clannism has led to conflict in the southern Somali region of Southern and central regions of Somalia.

According to Stewart (1998, p. 8), in any given society, there are a number of differences in individuals' circumstances, culturally, geographically and economically. Stewart argues that in any given polity, group identity offers opportunity for political mobilization in their quest for power and. Group identity

is exploited based on historical background and culture. However, since cultural metamorphoses alone are not sufficient to bring about violent group mobilization, its invocation as largely as a pursuit of power in the greed grievance continuum or the perpetuation of the politics of inclusion and exclusion.

According to Dias (2013, p. 9), societies may engage in conflict along or across ethnic lines but not as a response to the queerness of the socio-cultural characteristics of the other community or ethnicity. Rather, he further postulates, it is nearly always the case that the different ethnic groups are conflicting over distribution of resources, whether economic, political, or both.

In the wake of the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, a crisis of nationality ensued in the southern and central regions of Somalia. According to Mbugua (2013, p. 9), Somalia in general is characterized by a lack of a national vision and identity. Indeed, Mbugua laments, this is one of the most predominant factors that clans identification with national government thus making the quest for a central leviathan to lord over Somalia, reign on the lawlessness and restore order and stability has proven a mirage.

This aspect of clannism as the centre of nationalism has been heightened and augmented by the heritage of colonialism as well as the cold war heritage whereby clannism was employed as an instrument of division and as a basis of the politics of inclusion and exclusion. National integration and stabilization are greatly hindered by clan divisions (Mbugua, 2013).

Mbugua (2013, p. 27) posits that following the ascension to power of militias in the wake of the void left by the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union, the ensuing clan-based militias used excessive force and collective punishment for clans whose members defied these clan-based militias. Furthermore, the opposition movement formed to engineer and execute the removal of these clan-based militias was also based on clans. To this effect therefore, the departure of the Islamic Courts Union did not herald an era of a better Somalia but marked a start of an even ferocious inter-clan conflict expeditions amongst the new entrants to the power bases.

4.7. Increased Foreign Engagement and Strengthened Foreign Relations in Somalia

The 2006 intervention in Somalia by Ethiopia was deemed a military success following the retreat of UIC troops from direct battle, encouraging the withdrawal of Ethiopia in 2009. However, after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops the TFG quickly lost control of Jubbaland. What sprung up in ascendancy after the fall of the UIC to control of parts of Jubbaland was its loosely affiliated youth-military wing-Al-Shabaab group. The international community designated Al-shabaab and militias and clan-based groups affiliated to it as a terrorist group owing to its linkage to Al-Qaeda. This presented Somalia's neighboring countries and regional organizations the opportunity to occupy it once more in the name of fighting Al-Shabaab (Mbugua, 2013).

IGAD and the AU member states advanced into Somalia in a UN sanctioned peacekeeping mission: African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Troop contributing countries to the Somalia peace effort included contingents of "African troops" mostly from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, and Ethiopia. To date, most of the backing accorded to the current Federal Government of Somalia (FSG) militarily has come from AMISOM which constitute the "army" of Somalia. Although AMISOM troops might have managed to force Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu; but, given Al-Shabaab's highly publicized suicide bombing operations in the Horn of Africa, the fight for Somalia seems far from over (Pijovic, 2014). Ironically, the presence of Al-Shabaab has served to renew Somalia's international engagement.

Due to the growing challenge of continuing to support the TFG and the unsustainability of offering support to TFG against increased insurgency the Ethiopia troops withdrew from Ethiopia in January 2009. Against a background of fear, the UN political office in Somalia and US state department pushed for creation of AMISON, only for this to fail and US pushed for deployment of UN peace keeping force. However, all this attempts failed leading to increased diplomatic engagement (Bruton, 2010, p. 10).

Fortunately, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009 also provided for increased internal diplomatic with some of the factions of Islamist movement and as a result one of the factions of the Islamist reform movement, the Djibouti branch of the Alliance for the Deliberation of Somalia (ARS-Djibouti) merged with TFG. The merger in January 2009 was hailed by UN as heralding a national unity government and as a result the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was formed marking a new era in the post-Siad Barre era.

Somalia's major international dispute is with Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Plaut (2007, p. 9) stresses that ending of 2006 intervention through the withdrawal of Ethiopian soldiers in January 2009 paved the way forward for commencement of politics in Somalia which have continued to steadily improve. Towards this he argues that FGS has made significant headway in stabilizing Somalia by helping in establishment of government institutions and strengthening relationships with regional powers.

One such tangible effect of Ethiopian intervention has been the advancement is the Foreign Policy of Somalia. The federal government of Somalia developed a foreign policy with key objectives in ensuring the country's security, territorial integrity and sovereignty; to promote peace and congruence through non-interference of neighbouring states affairs and promote well-being of its people. It is worthy to note that Somalia has begun a process of reconstruction, development and democratisation parallel to an emerging partnership between the country and the international community (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2015).

Since 2011 the Somalia government has recognized the important role that Ethiopia plays in its stability and security. Somalia government went on to establish relations with Ethiopia having realized that the latter plays a crucial role in the former's redevelopment efforts, and as one of the 5 countries contributing troops to AMISOM mission to maintain peace in the country. In 2014, the Ethiopia ambassador to Somalia stated that the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia was not limited to security and stability but for the overall development of Somalia (Fana Television, 2014). For instance, regarding overall development of Somalia, Ethiopia has contributed to improvement in education through provision of

scholarship to graduate and postgraduate Somali students, and through helping in curriculum development in Somalia education system. Another agreement on the transport sector had been signed between the two states establishing a program that developed the civil aviation systems in Somalia (Fana Television, 2014).

Even though the US closed their embassy in Somalia in 1991 they never formally severed diplomatic relations with Somalia. In 2006, the United States (US) took the lead in establishing the International Somalia Contact Group (BBC News, 2006). The Obama administration chose to continue in the foreign policy of President Bush by providing support in the form of ammunition shipments and diplomatic support to promote stability in the region (BBC News, 2006).

Following the completion of political transition in Somalia in 2011, a new president and federal parliament was elected through indirect election leading to formal recognition of the FGS by US in January 17, 2013. On September 2015, the Department of State formally launched the US Mission to Somalia, based in the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. On June 2016, US sworn-in its the first Ambassador to Somalia after 25 years; whereas, in reciprocity, after a 23-year diplomatic absence, the FGS's first ambassador was accredited to Washington on July 2014 and the Somali embassy re-opened on November 2015 in Washington (BBC News, 2006).

Since then US foreign policy objectives in Somalia have been revolved around promoting the stability of Somalia, prevent the use of Somalia by terrorist, alleviate human suffering in Somalia and promote democracy and good governance. In this regard, the US has proffered an over \$240 million since 2011 to help meet this goal. US work in Somalia has involved working closely with other bilateral and donor partners to realize the dream of stable and prosperous Somalia (US Department of State, 2017). In terms of trade and investment, the US has little export to Somalia, with such export limited to food products, donation and machinery. Somalia on the other hand exports precious stones to Somalia. Despite the limited trade and investment opportunity, the recognition by US on Somalia territorial and sovereign integrity based on Somalia provision constitution is an important step (US Department of State, 2017).

4.8. Summary of the Chapter

Somalia has been a failed state: deprived of a central government and characterized with clan fiefdoms, and wanton violence. All the efforts to bring stability and create a viable national government have come to naught. The 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somali was informed by a historical conflict that centered on a territorial and political strife between the territories of present-day Ethiopia and Somalia. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009, however, paved the way for Somalia's international partners to continuously respond to calls for increased support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FSG) in efforts directed toward re-establishing international.

The current regime in Somalia has welcomed enablers to help galvanize its agenda of peace, security and nation-building as well as facilitate a smooth transition characteristic of free and fair elections. In pursuit of Somalia's stabilization and peace-building, the international community exercises its mandate led by the maxims of Somali ownership, flexibility, collaboration and partnerships. To this day, Somalia's domestic, regional and international partners are supporting the FGS's state-building agenda.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to assess the sources and consequences of intra-regional state-led interventions using the Ethiopian intervention to Somalia as a case study. The study focused on understanding the underlying factors that caused the intervention investigate the legal ground for it and capture the consequences it had on Somalia domestically, regionally and internationally. The conclusions are presented here.

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in late 2006 may go down the annals of history as one of the most daring if not imprudent strategic decision any African government has made on its neighbour. This follows from historical patterns of conflict between the two countries that encompass territorial disputes, proxy rebel movements, and a fight to control the fate of Islamic political organizations in Somalia. Addis Ababa invaded Somalia to affect its political project, that is, install a pro-Ethiopian regime in Mogadishu. However, gathering of momentum by the UIC presented Ethiopia with characteristics going beyond the military sector.

The Islamist group posed a significant challenge to sovereignty of Ethiopia, more so through continuity of the boundaries and the population; besides, the rise of spread of Islamic ideology affected the control of TFG; affecting the spread of Ethiopia ideology of federalism to the neighbouring country, with loss of control of the TFG government threatening the national security of Ethiopia. And, with the two countries being neighbours, the rise of Islamic group posed a risk to national cohesion in Ethiopia by its likelihood to impact of ethnic imbalance in Ethiopia, further giving rise to securitization process through deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia between 2006 and 2009.

The quest to reinforce the capability of the TFG showcased Ethiopia's ability to implement problem solving approach in its regional security architecture, going beyond the traditional security approach of military intervention. Nevertheless, the Ethiopia intervention was considered as a short gap measure which succeeded in contributing to counter-terrorism efforts by pacifying terrorism

in line with global counter-terrorism agenda. In the long run, the 2006-2009 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia can be summed as the adoption of an exceptional political measure.

Somalia-Ethiopia relationship is associated with manifestation of conflicts. As this thesis has analyzed, however, the legality of the 2006-2009 Addis Ababa's intervention in Somalia remains questionable to date. According to Addis Ababa, their intervention in Somali was legitimate as it was premised on self-defence under the international law, with troops deployed to protect the sovereignty of its territory.

The UIC did not have any extremist views during its early stages rather it was primarily concerned with restoring law and order to south central Somalia using Islamic Sharia. However, Addis Ababa was of a contrary view: the Islamist group posed an imminent threat. This served as the main the premise for invoking Ethiopia's interference with the internal affairs of Somalia. Through a preventive war, Meles Zenawi was expecting to showcase Ethiopia's military might in the horn of Africa and greater Africa.

The invitation from the transitional federal government for the deployment of troops by Addis Ababa to enter Somalia and combat the Islamist militants raised doubts on the legality of TFG as unifying factor for Somali state. The notion of intervention by invitation opened up a whole new debate on the legality of foreign intervention. As evidence by Addis Ababa, state behaviour is undoubtedly driven by self-interests and interests inherently change with time depending on the duration with which these interests fall under—long-term or short-term.

Somalia has been a failed state: bedeviled by absence of central and national government, afflicted by clan-states and wrecked by deadly spats of violence despite concerted effort to establish stable national government. The 2006 Addis Ababa's intervention in Somali was informed by conflict a historical conflict hinged on Ethiopia's dispute with Somalia on territories and establishment of greater Somalia land state. The withdrawal of troops by Addis Ababa in 2009, however, paved the way for Somalia's international partners to continuously respond to calls

for increased support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FSG) in efforts directed toward re-establishing international.

The current regime in Somalia has welcomed enablers to help galvanize its agenda of peace, security and nation-building as well as facilitate a smooth transition characteristic of free and fair elections. In pursuit of Somalia's stabilization and peace-building, the international community exercised its mandate according to the principle of respect for sovereignty, collaboration among international partners. To this day, Somalia's domestic, regional and international partners are supporting the FGS's state-building agenda of promoting governance, democracy national reconciliation and inclusivity at all levels of government.

As we have aptly seen, Somalia has been in a devastated state of anarchy and delusion since the Ethiopian incursion. This has created an environment which facilitates the creation of issues such as piracy and terrorism, problems that extend the violence and disruption beyond the confines of Somalia's borders. To this effect therefore, in order to understand the conflict and the attempts made at resolving it, one must understand the source of the conflict especially in the volatile regions of southern Somalia, a fete this study has accomplished.

The legality of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia brings to fore the complexities associated with rule of self-defence, specifically in light of terrorism threat and failed state. Ethiopia legitimacy is based on request by the TFG government and right to self-defence from the threat of attacks emanating from Somalia. Ethiopia justification of intervention in Somalia the study suggest is based on a combination of factors, specifically Islamic militants' consolidation of power, declaration of holy war by UIC, presence of Ethiopians working with UIC and existence of troops from Eritrea. In light of the factors relied in justifying Ethiopia intervention in Somalia it can be argued that the standard met is rather subjective and not congruent with UN charter requirement of significant occurrence of attack proportionate magnitude before effecting self-defensive measure.

Somalia conflict as the study shows is best seen through continuum of three categories that revolve around precolonial to colonial, colonial to independence of

Somalia, from the independence to the Ogaden war with in 1978 and from the Somalia-Ethiopian war to the state collapse. These categories with their interconnection have either contributed to the Somalia conflict in a in a progressive or regressing pattern.

The 2006 military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia had its own motivation. However the study findings demonstrate that reality of the motivation is far from been clear. Despite this the common undercutting themes can be characterized as religious wars: Christian Abyssinians and lowland Somali Muslims; economic reasons, particularly the need to secure access to the sea; security interest; need to prevent establishment of Islamic fundamentalist government and as a counter-terrorism strategy.

The 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia is associated with potential merits and demerits.

The Merits of Ethiopia's however short-term include the ousting of UIC from power and the establishment of TFG, the promotion of moderate Islamist in government thereby neutralizing the rise of Islamist fundamentalist in state. Although the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia had its own merits, the study showed that the demerits of the intervention in Somalia in terms of its socio-economic and political effects far outweighs the merits.

According to a Somalia proverb, what happen in a decade was structured and owns its origin to the previous decade. Indeed, based on this the findings of the study suggest that breakdown in Somalia state in 1990s paved way for Ethiopian intervention which inadvertently paved way for the emergence of Al-Shabaab and proliferation of competing groups. Evidence presented in this study suggest that these factors have subjected Somalia into a perpetual conflict state affecting the socio-economic and political development of the state. This is evident as the Ethiopian intervention was premised on fomenting the fragmentation of the Somali state and promoting the rise of clan fiefdoms; limiting formation of national government to promote national development of the state.

The active interference of Ethiopia in the Somali through the Military intervention is a possible indication as to why reconciliation has been a mirage in Somalia for so long. Although, Ethiopian intervention, was premised as a short term and long term security measure, the aftermath of the intervention only showed that military intervention, whether based on problematic approach or military solution approach only serves the interests of country (s) intervening. Countries intervention only pursues policies that will promote their interest and not conflict state interest, leading to erosion of governance, rule of law, national security, democracy and even economic prosperity.

Military intervention is most occasioned by foreign policy and diplomatic engagement towards a state. However, as much as military intervention emanates from foreign policy and diplomatic engagements, the aftermath of military engagement has the potential to re-organize the conflict state foreign policy and foreign policy and diplomatic engagement of the international community.

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