

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

**THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE
SOMALIAN CONFLICT**

Master Thesis

Abshir Derow

Ankara-2018

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15/01/2019

Abshir Derow

ÖZ

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Afrika Kıtası dünya sisteminin deniz aşırı hükümetlerce yüzyıllar boyunca sömürülen bölgesinde yer almaktadır. Bunun sebebi kıtada çok sayıda dokunulmamış ham madde bulunması ve uluslararası güçler ve onlara ait çok uluslu firmaların dünya sisteminde merkezi güç olmak adına bu ham maddelere sahip olmayı amaçlamalarıdır. Buna bağlı olarak yüzyıllar boyunca bu ülkeler ve ham maddeleri üzerinde kontrollerini sürdürmüşlerdir. Her ne kadar ilk başlarda amaçları ham maddeleri elde etmek, ücretsiz iş gücü ve ürünlerini satabilecekleri büyük pazarlara sahip olmak olsa da sonradan kaynaklar üzerinde hakimiyet sağlama çabasına dönüşmüştür. Bunun bir sonucu olarak da uluslararası güçlerin neden olduğu aralıksız savaş ve sefalet nedeni ile Afrika kıtası ve insanı istikrarsız hükümetlerin yönetiminde acı çekmişlerdir. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası müdahalelerin ve iç savaşların kurbanı olan Doğu Afrika ülkesi Somali ele alınmıştır. Her ne kadar iyi bir stratejik konumda yer alıyor ve zengin kaynaklara sahip olsa da, Somali'nin bu özellikleri insanları için maalesef bir fırsat yerine bir şanssızlık olmuştur. Terörist gruplar ve uluslararası firmalar kaynaklarını sömürürken, yerel halk komşu ve deniz aşırı ülkelere göç etmek zorunda kalmıştır. On yıllar boyunca Birleşmiş Milletler ve diğer uluslararası kurumlar, süregelen iç savaşı bitirmek adına barış girişimlerinde bulunuyor olsalar da bu girişimler maalesef sonuçsuz kalmış ve ülke halen savaş ortamından kurtulamamıştır. Bu tez çalışmasında tarihi arka plan ile birlikte mevcut durum analiz edilecek ve bu bağlamda bahsi geçen uluslararası güçlerin Somali'deki temel rolü ile bunların Somali'yi nasıl etkilediği incelenecektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Afrika, Somali, İç Savaş, Çatışma, Uluslararası aktörler

ABSTRACT

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For centuries Africa has been located at the periphery of the world system being exploited by overseas governments. This is because the continent possesses plenty untapped raw materials through which international powers and their multi-corporations craved to fulfil their desire to be the core powers in the world system. Accordingly, for centuries they have kept their control on those countries and their raw materials. Although initially their goal was limited on acquiring raw materials, free labour and a vast area to sell their merchandize, later their goal reverted while their greed on acquiring those lands skyrocketed. As a result, while Africa and their people were suffering under unstable governments which were caused as a result of constant war and poverty the international powers prospered. In this thesis, it will be focused on Somalia's case as a country in the horn Africa which has been a victim of international interference and civil wars. Although, it is located in a good strategic area and blessed with rich resources, it became a curse for Somali people rather than a blessing. Therefore, while the terrorist groups and international companies exploit their resources, the locals are forced to immigrate to neighbouring and overseas countries. Despite the fact, for decades, UN and other international organizations have initiated many peace accords to solve the civil war in the country they couldn't archive a positive result rather the state remained as a failed state. Therefore, in this thesis by analysing the historical background and the current situation it will try to be assessed the main role of those international powers in Somalia and how it affected the Somali conflict.

Keywords; Africa, Somalia, Civil War, Conflict, International Actors

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFLC	:	Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis
AMISOM	:	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARS	:	Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia
AU	:	African Union
DFS	:	Department of Field Support
EU	:	European Union
FAO	:	Food and Agricultural Organization
FSAU	:	Food Security Analysts Unit
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	:	Gross Death Rates
HE	:	Humanitarian Emergencies
ICU	:	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	:	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGASOM	:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia
IMB	:	International Maritime Bureau
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	:	Organization of African Union
SSDF	:	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SNM	:	Somali National Movement
SPM	:	Somali Patriotic Movement
TFC	:	Transitional Federal Constitution
TFG	:	Transitional Federal Government
TFI	:	Transitional Federal Institution

TNG	:	Transitional National Government
UAE	:	United Arab Emirates
UN	:	United Nations
UNCLOS	:	United Nations Convention on the Sea
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UNSOA	:	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNOSOM	:	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNITAF	:	Unified Task Force
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
USC	:	United Somali Congress
US	:	United States
WFP	:	World Food Program

INTRODUCTION

The failure of Somalia as a state traced to the first ferocious Ethiopia-Somalia war fought over the region of Ogaden from 1976 to 1978. Ogaden is located in the territories between Somalia and Ethiopia but populated mainly Somali nomads which communicate by Somali language. Somali president of the time President Mohamed Siad Barre, led the guerrilla fight against Ethiopia for the purpose of achieving great Somalia again without any success. He initially got support from Moscow when he became a one-party leader, leaning to the communist political ideology of one party. However, during the Somali-Ethiopian war, Moscow switched their support from supporting Somalia to supporting Ethiopia. Particularly after 1977 Somalia aggressively attacked Ethiopian army in the Ogaden region, pushed Ethiopian soldiers out of the territories and captured more than 90% of those territories. Initially, Somalia was getting armament support from Moscow which comprises approximately more than two hundred and fifty armaments, tanks and other war materials.¹

However, as soon as Moscow shifted their support from Somalia to Ethiopia, Somali troops failed to drive Ethiopian soldiers out of the Harer region. Moreover, this gave an opportunity for the Ethiopian forces to be reorganized and joined forces with Cuban and Moscow army to attack the Somali army. Despite their fight to retain their control on the Ogaden territory, Somali army were debilitated and driven out from the whole territory of the region. As a result, following the war in 1978 Somali army retreated from Ogaden territory. During the war Somali army had lost nearly eight thousand soldiers, three-fourths of its armory units, and more than half of the Somali Air Force.²

The defeat encountered in Ogaden war combined with the 1987-1991 Somaliland Liberation war struggles which led to the end of the dictatorial control

¹ Rediker, E. *The Ogaden: A Microcosm of Global Conflict*. Pittsburg, 2008

² *Ibid*

of the president of Said Barres of the Republic of Somalia. As a result, the Ogaden war became a biggest turning point in the history of Somalia.

The conflict not only resulted in the collapse of the government but also led to dispersing Somalis to be refugees in many countries. For instance, in 1979 there were one million three hundred thousand refugees in which more than a half of those settled in the northern part of Somalia, leading to one quarter of the population to be refugees. This refugee crisis increased the tension among the refugees and local people. Resentment intensified as the Issaq clan was reduced to second-class citizens in their own territory. The government's policy of recruiting refugees into the army also spurred more tensions. Furthermore, as a result of the defeat, the army and police lost their credibility which was the guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism.³

According to some scholars, economic mismanagement played an important role in the collapse of the Somali government.⁴ Since abandoning the experiment of Scientific Socialism in 1980, the government lacked a coherent development strategy. Its macroeconomic policy was described as erratic, inconsistent, and often moved from one set of objectives to another thereby confusing the domestic market. In 1990 the external debt was US\$ 1.9 billion, which was equivalent to three hundred and sixty per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) excluding 'frozen debt' to some Eastern Europe countries.⁵

This situation led to an increasing chaos in the economy of the countries followed by competition for the scarce resources. Particularly, the port of Kismayu was affected by an economic disorder after the fall of the Somali government in 1991. Furthermore, the warlords continued fighting in order to control Mogadishu, Kismayu and Baidoa for the availability of resources. Multinational organization also played a vital role in fueling the perennial conflict to put their hand on the

3 Ismail Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local - Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No 1, Pp. 113-127, 1999

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

availability of raw materials such as natural resources and played a balance of power among the regions, administrations and clans.

The conflict over natural resources was characterized by the conflict between the Hawiye and Darood over the control of Juba and Shabelle river valleys. Somalia's poor economic performance resulted due to the aggravated conflict among the clans and international corporations for the exploitation of raw materials and unending war.⁶

Over the past two decades, Somalia has been subjected to a constant and unending civil war. Despite the fact that the government tried to suppress the violence among the clans and create a peaceful environment for the Somali people, they have failed miserably. Moreover, this constant fight has led to the collapse of the previously peaceful state. This ongoing war led to a huge migration of innocent Somali citizens out of their country and their homes to neighboring or overseas countries.

For years, the failed state of Somalia has been an international focus. This is because of the constant civil war among the clans which forced United Nations (UN) to take the matters into their hands by making several attempts to bring back peace in the nation through many mechanisms. Such as, through peace-keeping missions like the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), the Ethiopian military incursion to Somalia and the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and sending in peace-keeping troops into the warring country all in an attempt to stop the violence and bring back peace to the nation. However, despite the attempts made by the international forces, the situation in Somalia still continue.

For centuries, Somalia has been one of the countries in east Africa which has been the victim of penetrated by many international actors. The situation got worst even after achieving their independence with the rise of interventions and exploitations. Decolonization was a period when many former colonies got their independence from Europeans and started a new state building process with a great hope for future. Nonetheless, many of those countries were immersed in a civil conflict for power and borders.

6 Joseph Kioi Mbugua, "Drivers of Insecurity in Somalia: Mapping Contours of Violence." Nairobi: International Peace Support Training Centre, Series 4, No. 3, 2013

This was the main legacy left from colonization for former colonies which made them vulnerable once again against the external powers. Somali situation was much worst as the conflict was not only with the neighboring countries but also within the clans. Particularly after 1991 when the government failed, millions of locals lost their lives while the state became home to external powers, terrorist groups and others. Although, many interventions were done by regional and international forces the situation still continues in the present.

Therefore, by looking the past history, this study will try to answer two main questions; “What are the roles of external actors in the Somali conflict?” and, “What were their achievements and failures in handling the Somali conflict?”

In order to answer these questions, the researcher sets the following tasks;

- i. To assess the drivers of conflict in Somalia,
- ii. To evaluate the international interventions
- iii. To analyze effectiveness of those interventions in Somali
- iv. To study why the external interventions failed.

This study employs a descriptive research study in its research design in that it seeks to find out the main reason behind the conflict in Somalia and what has been done so far to tackle the problem. The data that is collected will be analyzed and used to answer the questions for this paper. In this paper a secondary data will be used to achieve its objectives. The secondary data of this thesis obtained from sources such as; books, articles, journals which are relevant to the study, past research work, dissertation and thesis containing the necessary data relevant to the study.

In the thesis, inductive analysis is employed researcher employed where the patterns, themes and categories of analysis that come from the data were analyzed and interpreted. Further verification of information was corroborated with other sources to ascertain validity of the research findings.

The researcher is faced constraints in obtaining information on the influence of external actors to the Somali conflict. This however, was addressed by enlarging the scope of data from secondary materials to ensure that data presented was triangulated to enhance the credibility and authenticity of findings.

It is found out that clans opposed to President Barre's rule went ahead to form armed forces which had a similar agenda of resisting his regime. Finally, in January 1991, armed forces by the name of United Somali Congress (USC) ousted Siad Barre from the capital Mogadishu. After removing Barre from power, the warlord-led clan armed forces then descended upon each other, causing intense inter-clan battles. These battles escalated into a nationwide war which saw the state of Somalia collapse into a civil war which has lasted until now.

With regard to the role of external actors to the conflict, the study found out that external responses to the conflict came late as wars in other parts of the globe for example, the Gulf War commanded more attention from international bodies. Help however, finally came in the year 1992 when a UN diplomatic engagement begun and a ceasefire were negotiated in Mogadishu between the two major fighting factions. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was also formed and brought into Somalia but it was however, unable to quell the violence and address the famine being faced by the citizens.

In the thesis, various texts describing the role of external actors to the Somali conflict focusing on the drivers to the Somali conflict, external intervention to the Somali conflict, and the efficacy of the external intervention initiatives are examined. This thesis is comprised of three chapters and a conclusion. All the chapters will lead to hypothesis of the research.

In chapter one, the background of the conflict is explained in a sufficient detail. It further assess the main reason for the fall of the Republic of Somalia by answering questions as: what are the root causes of the conflict? What are the driving forces of the conflict and what has been done in the different stages of the conflict? This chapter argues the root cause of the conflict traced to the colonization legacy a period through which Europeans divided and colonized the African continent among them.

This led to the division of Somalia among three European powers of Italy, British and France. However, this chapter also identifies other factors that led to the constant war and civil conflict in the region, such as artificial borders, clan identities, tribal differences, religion and political ideologies. Finally, it discussed initial resolving mechanisms done by the regional and sub-regional organizations and what they achieved.

The second chapter is mainly composed of the local and international implications of Somali conflict. The chapter argues explaining in detail that the conflict has negatively impacted the country's economy, political and social situation. In 1991 when the conflict reached its peak stage, Somalis economy had suffered deterioration leading to high rate of unemployment and poverty. This combined with the political unrest forced citizens either to join the terrorist groups which were waiting for an opportunity to extend their control over those areas, or forced them to migrate to other countries. Finally, this chapter argues that the situation in Somalia not only affects the people in the region but also it has a great implication in the international trade. As a region which is located in the red sea area and has a cross road toward the Arab countries that are wealthy in oil and other raw materials, the increasing involvement of pirates in the region has created a fear in the traders which use those areas.

The third chapter is composed of the main thesis title which is the international interventions within the Somali conflict. In this chapter the international actors such as- the Intergovernmental Authority on development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) being the key external actors will be described in a detailed way. Here, the IGAD peace support mission in Somalia (IGASOM), and the African Union venture in Somalia (AMISOM) created through the African Union's Peace associated protection Council, a Peace facilitate venture to Somalia and the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) are examined.

Although, these described above are the main international actors but also the Arab League, the sub-regional actors which are Ethiopia, Kenya, and Eritrea as involvements are described briefly in this chapter.

Finally, the last part will be conclusion in which all the chapters of the thesis will be summarized briefly in addition to the findings.

1. THE SOMALI CONFLICT

This chapter will discuss about the country profile of Somalia. The strategic location of the country and historical, social, and economical factors caused the Somali conflict will be given a glance to clarify the interconnections of the factors that led to the collapse of the Somali government. The country's vital of geopolitical place in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean makes more concern to the international trade and naval bases in Africa. The country has suffered due to political, social, economic and cultural disintegration due to the prolonged instability caused by the background of the Siyad Barre dictatorship regime that led to clan loyalist and the consequences of foreign interferences that finally led to the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991.

1.1. Background of the Conflict

Somalia is a country positioned in the East of Africa neighboring with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Furthermore, Somalia is situated in a very essential geopolitical area as it is connected to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean which are very strategic areas for international trade and naval base. Somalia is a region famously known as 'The Horn of Africa' since Xaafuun (Hafun) near Cape Guardafui (Gees Gardafuul) which is locally known as Ras Aseir (Raas Caseyr) representing the farthest eastern point in continental Africa.⁷ Somalia extends closely from south of the Equator northward to the Gulf of Aden and sits on a critical geopolitical spot between sub-Saharan Africa, the Gulf of Arabia and southwestern Asia.

For years, Somalia has been characterized around the global arena as a country in which millions of people are suffering, civil wars, piracy, terrorism

⁷ Loan M. Lewis & Jorg H.A. Janzen. "Somalia". Retrieved from Encyclopedia Britannica: September 8, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia>

drought and famine. Since 1991, the Republic of Somalia became a failed state and civil war increased among the different casts.

As a result, many people have lost their lives and others migrated from their country. Although, the people of Somalia share the same ethnicity, language, religion and ways of living, the divisions of clans is the primary reason for the non-stop fighting.⁸The Somalis use the term “Bur Bur” to explain the period from December 1991 to March 1992, when the country was divided by a clan conflict and the factions sacked the remains of the state and fought for the control of rural and urban resources. During four months of fighting in Mogadishu, 25,000 people died and 1.5 million people have fled the country and at least 2 million are internally displaced.⁹

There are numerous elements that led to the breakdown of the Somali government. Those factors can be classified as internal and external factors. For instance, colonization, cold war and post-cold war policies have a huge impact in African countries in general and Somalia in particular. Mostly the “divide and rule” policy which was introduced during the colonization era has a negative effect in the entire continent. Furthermore, it was the root cause of the present border and civil conflict within the neighboring countries and among themselves. Colonization led to the division of the Somali territories into a fragmented five parties, whereas the Cold War paved the way for the ideologies and fight across the borders which were being exploited by the super powers.¹⁰ The Ogaden war can be considered as one of those biggest legacies in the region caused as a result of international interventions.

⁸ Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation,” London: UK, Cambridge University Press, 2009, P. 44

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Andrew McGregor, “Who is Who in the Somalia Insurgency: A Reference Guide,” Washington DC: USA, The Jamestown Foundation Press, 2009, P. 31

Abdulahi A. Osman, Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality, In African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Edited by Prof Jakes Gerwel, Prof Jannie Malan & Mr Tor Sellstrom, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, P. 93

Although, it was a war with Ethiopia, within the Somalia state as well there was a constant unrest between the dictatorial government and the different ethnic groups.

1.2. Factors Caused the Somali Conflict

According to many African countries, the majority of Somalis are considered as part of a single homogeneous ethnic group. For instance, all Somali people share the same religion, language, culture etc. Although it is true for more than two decades one of the most dangerous and bloody civil wars in the African continent is fought in Somalia. Moreover, the same like other African countries the origin of Somali civil war traces back to the colonial period of the “divide and rule” policy which colonial powers divided most of Africa without regard to their people. Somalia was no exception of the European policies.

The Somali conflict has numerous and complex causes including political, social, economic and historical bases. Different external and internal factors had been played different roles before the start of the conflict and during the various stages of civil war in Somalia. However, colonization played the biggest part in triggering the conflict among the different clans. The seeds of Somali civil war, especially in the southern part, were planted in the late of the 19th century.¹¹ During that time the colonial powers divided the Somali territory into five different parts based on clan division which led to huge inequalities among the clans. Moreover, two out of the five territories were given to Ethiopia and Kenya at the time of independence from their colonial masters, which led to a heavy border dispute among those states.¹² According to many nationalists viewed that the establishment of the Republic of Somalia as a step towards the highest point of the nation. By the

¹¹ Abdulahi A. Osman, Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality, In African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Edited by Prof Jakes Gerwel, Prof Jannie Malan & Mr Tor Sellstrom, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, P. 93.

¹² Ibid.

time of independence in the 1960s, the foreign policy of all Somalis has focused on the task of placing all Somalis under one single nation.

As a result, it was a dilemma in which Somalia remained a country in the search of missed territories.¹³

The dictatorial regime of Mohamed Siad Barre played an important part in fueling the civil conflict in Somalia. President Siad Barre came to power in 1969 as a result of military coup which he used to remove President Abdirashid. Although, uncertain about his direct involvements in the assassination of the president, many scholars believe that he played an important role. According to some scholars, the Soviets and Siad Barre played a crucial role in the assassination of Abdirashid who was a president with the western ideology of democracy in order to shift to the communist ideology of the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Barre unlike his predecessor was considered to be an authoritarian leader by many who finally led to the collapse of the military government of Somalia. Moreover, he ruled Somalia with an iron fist until he was overthrown by the militia group in 1991. After he came to power he declared a national state with the Soviet style and developed a strong tie with Moscow and officially banned the clan loyalties and clanism in 1971 when statue representing tribalism was banned and buried symbolically¹⁵.

Moreover, he established Somali language with the Latin alphabet where others had failed and declared the establishment of the Republic of Somali composing of the Ogaden territory through west (a territory which was previously

¹³ Abdisalaam M. Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of Colonial Legacy, Revised, updated and expanded edition, HAAN Publishing, Indiana University: USA, 1996, P. 20

¹⁴ Mohamed Haji Idgiriis, "Who Assassinated the Somali President in October 1969? The Cold War, the Clan Connection, or the Coup d'État," *African Security Journal*, Vol. 10, Issue, 2, 14 Apr 2017, Pp. 131-154

¹⁵ *ibid*

ceded to Ethiopia as a result to Ethiopia-Somalia conflict), Djibouti through its northern west and the control of the Indian Ocean boundary with Kenya through its southern west.¹⁶

Throughout his regime, Barre was accused of human rights abuses. Although, he agreed to multi-party legislative election to be arranged, it got canceled later which is a main reason leading to an aggravated civil conflict among the clans and the government.¹⁷ During the colonization era, Somali was divided among Italians and British powers. However, in 1960 the two parts unified to form a Republic of Somalia during their independence. After independence however, rather than focusing on their developmental projects Somali people turned to a bloody civil war among themselves and with their neighboring countries which led to the failure of the state. As a result, the state remains divided and controlled by the clans. Moreover, the conflict led to the division of the southern and northern part of Somalia which is ruled by different governments until present with no intention of reuniting. Division did not bring a solution and the conflict for acquiring raw materials and resources didn't halt.

The economy of the country also played a main role in the civil unrest among the tribes. The shortage of Somalia's resources is one of the driving forces of the battle, as exclusive organizations compete for those scarce resources. As a result of all the competition, Somali people have experienced poverty in the past decades with no hope of any change. Moreover, the people become dependent on foreign imports and aids which hindered the country's growth. When a country is dependent on economy, politics and social support from outside sources, those

¹⁶ Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation" London: UK, Cambridge University Press, 2009, P. 90

¹⁷ George James, "Somalia's Overthrown Dictator, Mohammed Said Barre, Is Dead," The New York Times, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html>

sources can have an upper hand in manipulating the state for their own purpose as it is seen happening in many African states.¹⁸

Therefore, the main sources of conflict can be shortly summarized as political, economic and social problems within the society.

Somalia is a country which has faced many conflicts and famine within the past decades. As a result, its people are vanishing due to constant confrontations and are always waiting for a peace to come. For the past decades endless peace conferences were held outside the country in order to bring peace and stability to the state and region. Nevertheless, until present no peace is achieved by the international and diplomatic efforts. This was due to the nature of the clan politics in Somalia that is characterized as greedy for control and competes for power by different ethnic groups in the country. Still peace can only be achieved when the clan leaders come together in an agreement on a political system which could help them to halt their competition over resource allocation, power, economic and political domination. Moreover, they have to look back to the history which led to the failure of their state and they should start building their nation. Presently, many Somalis living in Diaspora are working very hard to change their situation in their country by getting education and gaining experience so that they will go back to their country and start building their state.¹⁹ This happens because education changes the people's mind towards development and national identity. As a result, Somali youth are waking up to the situation in their country and are trying to tackle their problems.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid 23

1.3. Factors driving the Somali conflict

In addition to the main root causes of the Somali conflict, some factors might be added. The first one is the identity of the clan in Somalia which played an obvious role in the conflict.

Clans can be characterized as the most important components of Somali people's identities. According to Somali people till the present, clan identity is more important than their national identity which triggers the conflict even more. Therefore, as far as Somali's are concerned only the political party which is affiliated with their clan is responsible for the survival and protection of the clan.²⁰ Unlike most African countries which shifted from monarchy and tribes to national state, the basis for Somali politics is shaped by the tribal leadership and guidance. Moreover, it is due to this political system and rivalry among the tribes to have an upper hand in the economy and politics of the society which blocked all the possibility of peace and prosperity within the state even after the collapse of the dictatorial regime of Barre which was in 1991.²¹

Although Somalia is composed of a homogenous society, the clan identity is more predominant above all identities within the nation. Clannish in Somalia existed even before the colonial era, the deep division of Somali people started from the colonial period by cementing the clan through the west state import, enhancing the clan divide and rule policy²². Therefore, the foundation of all the political parties so far is based on the political clans. This is because the head of the clans run the entire systems of the nation. This has created a major problem within the society. If one clan came to power the other clan's need to be undermined as a result, for the other clans to be heard they have to fight to come to power as well. Therefore, this fight creates a huge conflict among the nation. Somalia has a clan formula of

²⁰ Ibid 25

²¹ Ibid Andrew, 21

²² Stephen Musau, Clans' and Clannism's control over weak political institutions, in the book of "Somalia: Clan and State Politics." Edited by MicheleGonnelli, ITPCM International Commentary, Vol. IX, No. 34, 2013, p.13

4.5 which means for the four main clans; and 0.5 represent other minority clans such as Bantu Somalis and Asian Somalis.²³

Although, the minority clans could never participate in politics, there is a huge competition among the four main clans as well.

During the anti-Barre movements, the opposition groups were based on those clans. Each opposition group belonged to a specific clan. The USC that belonged to the Hawiye clan managed to force Siad Barre to escape from Mogadishu. Thus, the USC has not reached a political agreement with other anti-Barre, SNM, SPM and SSDF movements. The clan-based movements began to fight with each other after the fall of the military regime. Warlords, for example, fought to control cities like Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa.²⁴ Somali National Movement (SNM), which belonged to the Isaq clan controlled the northern regions of Somalia, after the fall of Siad Barre, they declared themselves an independent state of Somalia known as (Somaliland). The other anti-Barre based clan movement was Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which controlled and was active around Kismayo in northern Somalia.

Since there a lot factors that contributed in the Somali conflict, external factors are significant causes that propelled the internal dispute among Somalis. Some foreign actors allied with Somali politicians and warring factions to perpetuate the conflict while protecting their own interests.²⁵ For example, Ethiopia and Somalia has been fighting for territorial disputes for the last hundred years. First, Ethiopia invaded the territories of the new established Somali republic in 1960's. Then in 1977 Somali armed forces took a major attack on Ethiopia to restore some of the Somali populated territories inside Ethiopia. Since then, Ethiopia

²³ Ibid 24

²⁴ African Union Communiqué of the AU, PSC 69th Meeting, January 19, 2007. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced, and Stateless Persons 2007" 33 pages.

²⁵ Ibid Mbugua

regularly took preventive strategies to block and hinder all efforts to stabilize Somalia or rebuild its government by supporting the rebellion movements for arming warlords.²⁶

Somalia's geopolitical significance attracted many global actors who took advantage of its instability and weaker governments. Egypt, for instance, used Somalia as a tool fight and put pressure on Ethiopia on the issues of Nile water politics. On the other hand, Eritrea exploited Somalia's dissatisfaction with Ethiopia because of its interventionist policies and its occupation of Ogaden.²⁷ Eritrea also maintains good relations with Somalia due to its border dispute with Djibouti preventing itself to have threats from Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya, along United States made intervention in Somalia citing security threats coming from Somalia such as Al-shabaab and its surrogate Al Itihad.

In 1991 Somalia's central government headed by Siad Barre regime collapsed after long-standing clashes with the opposition rebel groups. After the fall of Siyad's dictatorship, the national army broke down into factions which joined the fighting militias in the civil war. Their weapons which once used to defend the people was started to use in the civil war against Somali warlords. So that the weapons and armies went under the control of four major militia leaders:

1. A significant portion of weapons and the private army defected to join the faction of former general Mohamed Farah Aided, the man who was responsible for ousting Siad Barre. With many heavy of artillery pieces and controlled large part of Mogadishu as well as southern Somalia.
2. Some forces were loyal to general Mohamed Said Hersi commonly known as 'Morgan', the son in-law of Siad Barre, constituted the second largest

²⁶ Erik Frenkil, "The Lion Comes to Mogadishu: Why Ethiopia Invaded Somalia in 2006", Research Gate, 2015, p. 5

²⁷ Ibid Mbugua

armed group in Somalia and his militia controlled most of Southwest Somalia including the city of Bardere.

3. Also some forces were loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohamed, who once elected as president of transitional government that did not operate effectively, was controlling some parties of Mogadishu.
4. Finally, the last forces were loyal to Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess who had controlled the strategic city of Kismayu in Southern Somalia²⁸.

This led to the start of the civil war among warlords. After that the UN was put in an arm embargo on Somalia in 1992 until present time,²⁹ but it is not operated effectively. The weapons of the military government fell into the hands of the militias. The sources of weapons used in the Somali conflict can be grouped as:

1. Since it is a geopolitically vital location, Somalia got military support from the Soviet Union and the United States which was primarily used in the civil war.
2. The second source was the Ethiopian government which supported and armed the militias to topple the Siyad Barre regime.
3. The weapons left by the failed UN and US-led operations in 1993 and after which left a significant number of weapons in their bases³⁰.

1.4. Building blocks and regional initiatives

After the collapse of the Somali government, several reconciliation initiatives were undertaken. The first two peace conferences for restoring a Somali government took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. The conference ended with the agreement of Ali Mahdi as president but this result was quickly dismissed

²⁸ Samuel M. Katz “Operation Restore Hope And Unosom: the international military mission of mercy in Somalia”. Concord: Hong Kong, 1993.

²⁹ Cornor Gaffey, “Why Somalia Wants a 25 years Arms Embargo Lifted,” Newsweek, Thu, Sep 27, 2018, <https://www.newsweek.com/somalia-arms-embargo-al-shabab-608409>

³⁰ Afyare Abdi Elmi and Dr Abdullah Barise, “The Somalia Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies,” African Security Study, Vol. 15, Issue.1, Jul 2010, Pp. 32-54

by General Muhammad Farah Aidid. This led to start of the civil war in Mogadishu which then spread to southern Somalia in general. Two years later, another peace conference held in Adis-ababa resulted in two agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament.

However, the agreement later fell apart and failed to secure lasting peace.³¹ This was followed by other peace conferences such as the one held in Cairo in 1997. The participants of this conference included both Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, two rival warlords in Mogadishu, and provided 13-person council of president, a prime minister and national assembly. But the delegates did not reach an agreement on the issue of leadership. This left the fragile broken country without leaders.³²

Somalia's disengagement from Western governments has led to the diplomatic initiative to advance regional states, and especially with Ethiopia.³³ Addis Ababa's commitment has been driven by geopolitical, security and economic interests, as well as by the concern to end the political turmoil in Somalia. Ethiopia was particularly concerned about the growth of Islamic armed group in Somalia which was a threat to their nation.³⁴ Accordingly, in 1997, they confronted and annihilated Somali groups from their border areas of the Itihad camp.

In addition, Ethiopian government arranged a joint meeting with different Somali political groups in their country in order to come to an agreement with them. Arab States League also made an effort of arbitration among those groups for peace

³¹ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), "Somali Peace Process," Press Release under AMISOM condemns the killing of civilians by Al-Shabaab terrorists in Mogadishu's Hawlwadaag district, September 3, 2008.

³² Ibid.

³³ David M. Anderson Jacob McKnight, "Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa," *African Affairs*, Volume 114, Issue 454, 1 January 2015, Pages 1–27, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu082>

³⁴ Robinson Colin, "Revisiting the Rise and fall of the Somalia Armed Forces 1960-2012," *Defence and Security Analysis*, Taylor and Francis, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2016, Pp. 237-252

and stability in the region. However, the rivalry among the tribes got worse with the passing time. Furthermore, the neighboring Ethiopia-Eritrean war which started in 1998 greatly affected not only the disruption of the horn of Africa region, but it also gave a new impetus to the disordering of Somalia. This is because both nations sided with different political groups in Somalia which fueled to the already in existence. This led to a proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.³⁵

Finally, the Somalia conflict which caused the failure of the central government of Somalia was driven by geopolitical interest by the neighboring countries, international community, warlords and clan elders. The clan system is the main danger of Somalia's state building and has suffered since the people are more loyal to their clans than the governmental system. The external efforts of rebuilding the country accompanied by especial interest worsened the conflict in Somalia; since they helped different militia for their own interests boosted the war. The peace initiatives by neighboring countries have not formed much result instead they were fueling the conflicts.

³⁵ Ibid, Anderson and McKnight.

2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOMALI CONFLICT

This chapter analyzes the local and international implications of the conflict in Somalia. As described in the previous chapter, the combinations of internal and external factors were the main causes of the unrest situation in Somalia which has affected the country negatively. As a country located in the horn of Africa, Somalia is known by a non-ending bloodshed and poverty forcing their people to migrate all over the world with less hope of peace and development. Moreover, it is a country which has received a lot of attention by United Nations and received plenty of support for the peace process and aid for their population. However, regardless of all those efforts nothing has changed so far. This is because outside intervention has only fueled the power struggle among the clans. However, for a peace to come in the country and in the region it is necessary for the people of Somalia to come together for the same goal of restoring their country and work towards achieving their countries development.³⁶ In order to have a clear understanding of the main implications of the Somali state collapse, it is necessary to analyze how they have affected the country politically, economically and socially by dividing it into local and international implications.

2.1. Local implications

2.1.1. Political implications

The total collapse of central government of Somalia caused political factions within to fight more vigorously among each other. This triggered the civil war in the country to be fuelled. Therefore, in the same year in 1991, as the result of the conflict, the northern part of Somalia which is currently known as Somaliland separated them from the rest part of Somalia by creating its own government, parliament and legal system and still exists at present. However, the chaos did not stop with the separation of the northern part, rather it became worst.

³⁶ John Pike, "Somalia Civil War." Boston: USA, Wadsworth Publishing, 2012, Pp. 34-39

As explained before the main cause of the conflict and separation of the state was due to the legacy of colonization which forced the country to be divided into many parts. However, even after independence when Somalia became a sovereign state the conflict continued among the locals.

It got much worse when Barre's political oppression and dictatorship created discrimination among the clans which forced them to establish an opposition movement against him.³⁷ One of these parties was SNM, which was supported by Ethiopian government. It established in 1980s in order to fight against dictator regime. Accordingly, after Barre decided a single party government; they started to fight desperately in order to overthrow the existing government. However, in order to defeat the anti-Barre movements, the government's army started bombarding several cities. One of the towns which was heavily bombed was Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, which was completely reduced to rubble. So, the huge suffering of Isaq clan with their SNM were subjected by the Siad Barre administration throughout the war and the domination of the Somali republic by the southerners, that finally persuaded the Somalilanders to want secession, with the idea of independence will come one day.³⁸

Nonetheless, now it is almost 27 years since Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia, but until present time none of the countries in the world recognized it as an independent state.³⁹ Though it is not recognized officially by the UN and other international organizations, it has exercised as a de facto state since 1991 that made it fragile as economically, socially and politically due to the lack of de jure recognition by neighbouring and international states.

³⁷ RedieBereketab, "Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: Challenges to Postcolonial State-Building," The Nordic African Institute, Discussion Paper 75, 2012, P. 37, www.nai.uu.se, access date 25 Sep 2018

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Daniel Pelz, "25 years on, Somaliland struggles for recognition," DW made for minds, 2016, <https://www.dw.com/en/25-years-on-somaliland-struggles-for-recognition/a-19488683>, Access date, 18 September 2018

On the other side, Puntland declared itself as an independent local administration in 1998. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland desires to be member of the federal government of Somalia. Puntland was built up as a semi-independent state, trying to guarantee for the interests of its people through whom they were ensured during the reconstructing of the Somali Government⁴⁰. Over the years, these local states of Puntland and Somaliland have engaged in violent clashes. The most disputed area is the border between Somaliland and Puntland in which the tensions among them over the Sool and Sanaag regions have persisted.

Furthermore, Barre's government was overthrown as a result of the rise of extremist groups known as warlords. As Barre fled, the outer part of the USC announced Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim President, while the inside part of the USC which was headed by General Mohamed Farah Aydeed refused the nomination and challenged the other side, and common war between the two groups wrapped Mogadishu soon, with large number of civilian casualties because of overwhelming mounted guns being used inside the limits of a thickly populated urban environment⁴¹. The conflict between these militias turned into a violent confrontation which lasted for four months, destroying the remained parties of public and private infrastructures and also killing approximately 25,000 civilians⁴². Accordingly, other parties of the country also were engaged in civil wars between militias. For example both the SNF and USC committed crimes against innocent populations in Gedo region of Somalia by cutting off the parties of the body and burning as well as widespread use of rape. While the SNF under General Morgan and SPM under Colonel Omar Jess struggled over the port zone around Kismayo⁴³.

⁴⁰ Somalia Programme, "The Search For Peace," 2009, www.crdssomalia.org, Accessed date 19 September 2018

⁴¹ Gerard Prunier, "Somalia, Fall of Siad Barre and Civil War," Mass Atrocity Endings, World Peace Foundation, 2015, <https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war>, Access date 18 September 2018

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid.

However, there had been no functional government until 2012, during that time, more than 14 peace initiative attempts were done to establish a central government by holding major national peace conferences outside the country, which most of them didn't succeed. Five months after the military regime was overthrown, the Djibouti president Hassan Gulaid Abtidon invited the leaders of six armed groups to talk. The first peace conference for Somali politicians held in Djibouti in 2000 which sprang the so-called transitional national government of Somalia, that gained the recognition of UN and as well as the organisation of African Union (OAU). But the TNG failed to operate and had controlled only small part of the capital city of Mogadishu due to the lack of large external recognition and power to control all over the country, even it is failed to ensure the security of its member, while number of its personnel were assassinated in Mogadishu⁴⁴.

Additionally, another meeting conference to restore peace and central government in Somalia was planned in 2002 under the supervision of IGAD⁴⁵, with several numbers of Somali political leaders gathered for national reconciliation conference in Kenya. According to the previous one, this conference achieved several progresses including greater help from international actors; enlarge representations of armed groups and an agenda which emphasizes a long-term process focused on resolution of key issues of conflict rather than mere haggling over power-sharing. Despite these laudable features, however, the talks immediately encountered a host of all-too-familiar problems that threatened to undermine the initiative.

2.1.2. Social implications

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in Africa which has existed as a state for less than half a century. After they had succeeded to overthrown of Barre

⁴⁴ Ken Menkhaus, "State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts," *Review of African Political Economy*, 30:97, 2003, Pp.405-422,

⁴⁵ BjørnMøller, "The Somalian Conflict, New DIIS Report on the role of external actors," Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report, 2009, <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-somali-conflict>, accessed 17 September 2018

regime, rather than focusing on their state building, Somali people spent their time mostly in civil conflict or fighting to maintain stability. Divided between warlords and Islamic militants, the East African nation faces an uncertain future, with few signs that change is coming. In the 2005 UNICEF national survey on Somalia highlighted the dangers that children face with a demographic mortality rate of 135 deaths per 1,000 children under the age of five.⁴⁶ This is well above the rates of the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. With only 29% of children under two years old who are immunized against measles.

This was mainly caused due to continuing civil conflicts, piracy and terrorism through which the local people are exposed. Although, humanitarian agencies started aiding Somali people since the start of the conflict, due to the danger those humanitarian workers faced, they were forced to withdraw from those areas of conflict. Generally when a county is hit by disaster like in Somali which was caused by conflict, civilian's life are more at risk than the people which are directly involved in the conflict. This is mainly due to the fact that the rebellion groups, terrorists groups and the warlords hijack the rations and aids which were delivered from the humanitarian agencies to the local people making the situation of the people worst. This situation not only forced the people to migrate to other countries but also forced many young Somalis to be part of the terrorist and piracy groups in order to survive.

UN officials warned several times that almost half of Somali people needed humanitarian aid. As a result, starting from 1992, many UN agencies were entering Somalia to provide immediate relief. However, it didn't stop the mortality rate of the people which were dying as a result of war, draught and diseases.

Mortality rates have been widely used as an indicator of the impact of violent events on the civilian population and of the progress of humanitarian

⁴⁶ Ibid

operations.⁴⁷ The retrospective surveys on mortality conducted by the FSAU and NGOs have given an idea on the how conflict has impacted people living in that area. The measures used are gross death rates (GDR), defined as deaths per 10,000 inhabitants in the medium term per day; and under-5 mortality rates (U5DR), and defined as deaths for every 10,000 mid-term children fewer than 5 years of age. Although mortality surveys conducted by relief agencies during humanitarian crises are not examined by the institutional review committees, they must adhere to the informed consent protocols.⁴⁸

In recent years, Somalia has earned the ignominy of being classified as “one of the humiliating common places for woman, one of the hardest places for mothers and children to have bad experience⁴⁹”. These factors contribute to high female illiteracy, widespread female genital mutilation, early and forced marriages, high levels of maternal and child mortality, inadequate health services, high incidence of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Poverty, malnutrition, displacement, armed and social conflict, economic and political inequality, are among widespread common problems that faced the civilians throughout the country. It is a known fact that when a conflict arises in a country, women and children became victims of the conflict nonetheless, men as a leaders and protectors of families are also affected highly with loss of family members and separations.

Despite the fact that many scholars view men as the main proprietors of conflicts and wars which forced women and infants to be victims of the viciousness.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Debarati Guha-Sapir and Ruwan Ratnayake, “Consequences of Ongoing Civil Conflict in Somalia: Evidence for Public Health Responses,” *PLoS Medicine*, 2009 <<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000108>>.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Nöelle Lee Okoth, and Judith Gardner, “A War on Men?: The enduring consequences of war and conflict on Somali men,” Rift Value institutes meeting reports, 29-30 April June 2013, Pp. 3-11

Yet men and boys have been the targets of systematic and extensive gender-based violence, usually clan-related killings; threatened with death and subject to torture; profoundly humiliated; and coerced to participate in militia groups.⁵¹ In addition, in Somalia where the culture is a patriarch culture where a male becomes the breadwinner of the family, it is very difficult to see his family or relatives starve due to conflict and drought. That's why it very hard to imagine the devastating physiological effect the conflict has on men. Research of Institute of the Rift Valley in Kenya made on the effects of the war on Somali men on which this relationship is based, is beginning to fill this gap.⁵² It generates evidence that the Somali society sets high standards for men, war and instability since 1991 have severely limited their opportunities to meet these standards and this has important consequences for women and children, as well as for men. Making many to ask questions about men, equivalent to those made by gender analysis of women, reveals a new understanding of causes of conflict means to Somali men.. Its effect on male identities has implications for the conflict, peace and well-being of women, girls, men and boys. Two critical theories support analysis in this relationship. First, that kind is a relational concept, that both genders identities are created in relation to each other.⁵³ Secondly, vulnerability in conflict settings is not common to women and children.

Impact on vulnerability of Somali men can aid both national and international agencies to design policies and more effective interventions that help children and women as well as men.⁵⁴

2.1.3. Economic implications

Economy is another factor which is being affected by the constant conflict in Somalia. As a result, the endless bloodshed in Somalia led to the dramatic failing

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² Judith Gardner (Eds.), "The Impact of war on Somalian Men," Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2000

⁵³ Judith Gardner and Judy El-Bushra, "The impact of war on Somalia men and its effects on the family, women and children," Rift Valley institute briefing paper, February 2016

⁵⁴ Ibid

economy which forced the locals to poverty and dependency on foreign aids. Although Somalia was a country suitable for an international trade due to its strategic location, everything went down after 1991. Naturally, Somalia has the second biggest coastline on the African continent and large marine economic zone but, the fishery activities of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have yet exploited as fully as possible. The collapse of the state opened up the coastal waters of Somalia to large illegal fishing by foreign fishers who are taking advantage due to the lack of powerful government that able to protect its coastlines from illegal activities.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the trade networks such as transport, ports and airports were closed leading to economic stagnation in the nation. For instance, Somalia before the common war had four functional noteworthy ports (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bossaso and Berbera), a couple of little coastal ports and three worldwide airports.

During the civil war, the main port of capital Mogadishu remains closed since 1994 due to the attacks between the warlords went for picking up power over these central focuses which are the essential source of cash and salary to fund their arms that would manage the control through violence.⁵⁶ As well as the international airport of Mogadishu remains shut since the departure of UNOSOM II. Areas of the runway are asserted by four different militias, one of which had mined its segment to keep planes from landing.

⁵⁵ Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Somalia's Post-Conflict Economy: A Political Economy Approach," <https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1067&context=bildhaan>, [accessed 20 September 2018].

⁵⁶ Marano Anna, "Somalia: Money and Civil War a Contermporary View of Somalia," African Holocaust, 2005, <http://www.africanholocaust.net/articles/Somalia%20Money%20and%20Civil%20War.htm>

The remaining economy of the country was hold by the rebellion forces. Followed by excessive supply of money in the market which led to higher inflation rate, largely to finance the conflict, which caused the Somali shillings flooded the markets, rapidly increasing the money supply, sending of the value of the shilling to fall and causing hyperinflation, with price increases of between 200% and 700% in just six months⁵⁷. All local people whether living in the rural or urban areas were directly affected economically as the result of the conflict. Somalia became known in the international arena as the country with high poverty rate. In particular, urban and rural poor and internally displaced people depend on the market and have limited capacity to cope with sudden and dramatic price increases.

Drought became another factor affecting country's economy, particularly when the farmers and nomads failed to produce local commodities that contribute to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capital for the economy of the country which was affected negatively. At the same time when drought hit the country even the livestock in which the pastoral society of Somalia depends on for their survival, were affected greatly. When availability of water and food was affected as a result of drought, the situation led to another shock of rising of food and water prices for their day to day activities.⁵⁸This situation added with the economic inflation of the country caused because of conflict and political unrest, led to the increasingly devaluation of Somali currency.

The devaluing of the shilling currency has direct effect on the whole population in general leading to skyrocketing inflation rate making impossible for the Somali people to survive without foreign aid and support. For instance, the price of rice which is one of the main food ingredients consumed in everyday meal in all the regions of Somalia was tripled as a result of the economic inflation. Throughout the years, other basic items price used by every household in Somalia such as the

⁵⁷ *ibid*

⁵⁸ *Samson S. Wasara* "Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups," *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, Pp. 39-60

vegetable, oil and sugar has also skyrocketed⁵⁹making living in Somalia very difficult not only due to conflict, but also economic situation as well.

Though conflict combined with drought had wracked Somalia's economy completely, in truth, decades before the start of the conflict, Somalia's economy was totally dependent on imports from foreign countries. In the pre-colonial era Somalia's population was a pastoral society depending on livestock mainly for their survival nevertheless, as they integrated in the world system with globalization, their communitarian tradition started decaying with the imposition of foreign traders and later colonization.⁶⁰ Accordingly, all products including the basic food items were imported from overseas however, with all trade activities being blocked due to the conflict; it became impossible for the locals to get even imported food products. Still whatever little they got was blocked by the rebellion forces which led to a completely dependency on the humanitarian agencies.

Therefore, families in order to survive they substitute their consumption of rice and other nutritious to only corn and sorghum products with lower prices. Yet in the last 15 years even those products price increased dramatically due to the drought, leading the people to famine.

Not only does the country's cereal production decreased but in the last two years almost all production stopped when compared to the other years. It was expected again that the main cereal crop in July and August would be significantly lower than normal levels.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Oliver Degomme and Debrati Guha-Sapir, "Mortality and nutrition surveys by Non-Governmental organisations. Perspectives from the CE-DAT database," *Emerging Themes in Epidemiology*, 2007, <https://ete-online.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1742-7622-4-11>

⁶⁰ Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Somalia's Post-Conflict Economy: A Political Economy Approach," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol. 7, Article 8, 2008, p. 131, <https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol7/iss1/8>

⁶¹ Paul Collier, "Bottom Billion," Oxford Press, 2007, <http://irm.bc.edu/reserves/mh100/sull/mh10029.pdf>

The merchants line up to buy directly from the farms for transport in the areas with cereal deficiencies in the south and up to the central-northern regions.⁶² High fuel and transport costs in return affected the cost of grains dramatically. Furthermore, the price of sorghum produced locally is similar in all the regions of Somalia at present either the same or higher cost than the imported grains. This is due to the fact that the availability of local grains is very limited or non-existent in many areas of Somalia.

In the past couple of years the prices of domestic and imported food products continued to increase two or three times of the average prices seen in the past five years. Therefore, most locals are dependent on foreign aids such as the acute food and livelihood crises (AFLC) agencies and humanitarian emergency (HE). The past lower and middle societies are forced to a higher poverty rate and trying to survive by begging in the streets, emigrating out of their country, selling their products etc. According to international humanitarian agencies, AFLC and HE in 2008, it is predicted that more than 600,000 populations are experiencing food crisis and are living under poverty. This data represents almost 21% of the total population of Somalia.⁶³

Therefore, Somali people in general adopted the situation by cutting overall spending on food consumption mainly on basic needs; substitute their consumption of rice to much cheaper grains etc. Furthermore, they pulled out their children from school, going to hospital for medical care, consumption of petrol etc. This resulted in the reduction of living standard of the population, illiteracy and higher death rate. Moreover, as finding employment became impossible they were forced to a hard

⁶² Checchi Finns, and Roberts Leonard, "Interpreting and using mortality data in humanitarian Emergencies," London: UK, Chatham press, 29th may 2007, Pp. 23-24

⁶³ Benjamin Coghlan and others, "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey," Lancet, 2006, Pp. 44–51, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(06\)67923-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)67923-3).

labor for a meager salary which involves mainly a child and forced labor and others started depending only from remittance payment from their relatives in Diaspora.⁶⁴

As mentioned before, from 1991 until present time, there has been more than eight food crisis. A combination of violent conflict with drought and food crisis made life difficult for the people which triggered the already fueled conflict among the tribes. For instance, in order to survive, people from one region can conquer the lands of the other regions and with a failed government there is no law that protects the locals. Understanding the above factors can make it easily to grasp the root cause of the problem which led to the failure of Somalia as a state completely dependent on foreign powers.⁶⁵ The constant wars dried up the coffers of the country financially and forced them to fall in a debt which they cannot repay for a long time. This situation in return forced them to be hold as leverage by those who provide those loans. Even after independence Somalia like other African countries couldn't go forward.

Finally, the Islamic militant groups got a hold of a large area which was the source of agricultural products on the south part of Somalia. However, they tried to make the local peoples life difficult by applying different strategies such as by applying drip irrigation system which helps cultivate more lands with a limited amount of water and created an employment for the locals as well. However, their fight is not only for the interest of the people for instance, during the famine of 2011-2012 they had banned to distribute the relief aids provided by the humanitarian agencies to Somali people. This led to deterioration of people's life and highest death rate. According to the UN higher commissioner of Refugees in Somalia Mr. Bruno, the famine experienced in Somalia is triggered by Al-Shabaab

⁶⁴ Tilman Brück and Kati Schindler, "The Impact of Violent Conflicts on Households: What Do We Know and What Should We Know about War Widows?," *Oxford Development Studies*, 37.3 (2009), 289–309 <hBrück Tilman & Schindler Kati, "The Impact of Violent Conflicts on Households: What Do We Know and What Should We Know about War Widows?," *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2009, Pp. 289-309, DOI: [10.1080/13600810903108321](https://doi.org/10.1080/13600810903108321)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

control over the productive areas and imports. They use this strategy in order to recruit people to their movement. The local people have no choice but to be recruited by those Islamic groups in order to avoid poverty and death.⁶⁶

2.2. International implications

The conflict of Somalia not only affected the situation within the country but it has also international implications, affecting the international trade through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region. Furthermore, it has created a biggest threat to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya through which they became the victims of terrorist attack.

2.2.1. Piracy

The conflict that occurred in Somalia for decades combined with the famine, drought and high unemployment rates has forced many Somalis to become pirates. With a failed government in power, it became hard to stop the piracy going around in the gulf region. Particularly after the collapse of Barre's government in 1991, many groups joined in illegal activity.

Although, the US peacekeeping forces, the UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II controlled the coastal regions of Somalia from the start of the conflict, the US army followed with the two UN operations in Somalia withdrew in 1994.⁶⁷ During Barre's regime he has controlled the naval bases in those areas, trading and fishing activities. However, after the collapse of the regime, piracy and maritime crime in

⁶⁶ Gary E. Weir, "FISH, FAMILY, AND PROFIT Piracy and the Horn of Africa," *Naval WarCollegeReview*, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2009, Pp. 15–29, <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>, [accessed 20 May 2018].

⁶⁷ Michael Smith, "Somalia: Pushing Humanitarianism into the Post Pollyannaish Era, & Applying Previous Lessons Learned Today," Case-Specific Briefing Paper, Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies, University of Denver, 2012, https://www.du.edu/korbel/crric/media/documents/michael_smith.pdf

those areas increased dramatically putting the people living in that area at the highest risk of survival.⁶⁸

However, the Somali piracy not only affected the lives of the local but also peace in the horn of Africa in particular. Piracy as defined by many is an illegal act of violence executed in Maritimes and international shipping passengers and crews for the reason of raiding, murdering and terrorizing another countries shipments.⁶⁹ If it is within their countries territory it is considered as robbery however, if it is done in international water it is piracy. It is true that the main cause of piracy and terrorism is due to the failed state which couldn't control the illegal activities in the country, Somalia can be described as one of the examples of this problem. For instance, according to some, the international disturbance undertaken by Somali pirates was caused due to lack of governmental control and the conflict among the provisional governments and the head of the tribes itself which gave the criminals a right to act upon their wish.⁷⁰

According to many scholars, the main cause of poverty in a country is due to lack of development, infrastructural activities, employment opportunities and the lack of governmental control over the country. This was true regarding the case of Somalia and other failed governmental countries.

They created a threat not only to their country but also to their region and international environment as well. The threat of maritime piracy exists in the Horn of Africa due to the desperate situation in Somalia and the devastated political economy along the coast.⁷¹ The pirates also use human trafficking and robbing as a

⁶⁸ Ibid, Gary

⁶⁹ James Kraska, and Brian Wilson. "MARITIME PIRACY IN EAST AFRICA." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 2, 2009, pp. 55–68. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24358194.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ ibid

source of money laundering with their biggest networks in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia as well.⁷²

Nevertheless the western countries did not fully comprehend the whole situation of piracy which is going in the horn of Africa. For decades the world didn't have an idea of what was happening or about the toxic substance which was discharged in the coastal areas of the region. It was only became known in the 2005 when the Asian tsunami happened, exposing tons of radioactive waste and toxic chemicals dumped in the coastal area of Somalia, shocking the whole world. As a result of this, Somalis suffered medical complications such as hemorrhage, unusual skin disorder, and respiratory problem however, with all this situations happening international Medias turned their face from the issue.⁷³

In addition, the incident also affected the livelihood of the people whose life depends on those coastal areas. Those people were dependent on fishing and selling of those sea products for their lives and their families' survival. However, with the start of the conflict the situation in those areas got worse mainly due to the absence of a legitimate government that protects its areas. Likewise, when there is no law and order, local people or outsiders can get an opportunity to exploit the area and its resources without fear.

This will in turn create a clash among the locals which depend on it for their livelihood and others.⁷⁴Therefore, as competition in the coastal region increased, the locals shifted their activity from fishing to piracy in those areas terrorizing the region.

⁷² Godwin Rapando Murunga, "Conict in Somalia and Crime in Kenya: Understanding the Trans-Territoriality of Crime," *African and Asian Studies*, 4.1-2 (2005), 137-62 <<https://doi.org/10.1163/1569209054547319>>.

⁷³ Roland Marchal, "Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia," *International Affairs*, 83.6 (2007), 1091-1106 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00675.x>>.

⁷⁴ Terry McKnight and Michael Hirsh, Pirate Ally: Commanding Task Force 151 of Somalia, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: USA, 2012.

This led to the dramatically rising of people joining in the illegal activity in the region which created a concern in the international field. Although, the neighboring countries tried their best to tackle the problem at hand but couldn't protect the area much. According to the 2002 report provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the piracy attack in the coastal area of Somalia rose from 335 in 2001 to 370 in 2002 creating a threat in the region.⁷⁵ As a result, international communities have to come up with a mechanism which could solve the current issue in order to make a stop to the recurring problem. According to the international law, piracy should be handled and based on the 1958 convention on the high seas and the 1982 UN convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In fact, France and Denmark have freed pirates captured on several occasions due to lack of evidence and other technical logistical aspects.⁷⁶

As a result of these interventions, some of the problems were tackled to some extent with the investigation and trial undertaken by some states. For instance, United States of America, United Kingdom and Kenya have participated in the trial of Somali pirates. Therefore, when the verdict was passed, Kenya has arrested a large number of people which were involved in piracy and prosecuted in the criminal court. However, as a result of this prosecution, Kenya's security became at risk due to the violent threat and terrorism attack by the Islamic group of Al-Shabaab.⁷⁷

2.2.2. Terrorism

Another direct consequence of the conflict inside and outside the country is terrorism. In many countries, terrorist groups start their activities when there is no control over the government or when the state is a failed one. Terrorism is an illegal practice of violence and coercion against countries unarmed civilians and terrorizing them in order to get their name heard and political gain. It was an act

⁷⁶ David Gardner, "Five Somali pirates drown as they squabble over their \$3million ransom," Mail Online, 2009, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1110585/Five-Somali-pirates-drown-squabble-3million-ransom.html>, accessed 22 May 2018

⁷⁷ Bruce Sterling, "The Pirate Stock Exchange" Pluto Press, London: UK, 2009, Pp. 87-88

which became popular with the September 11, 2001 with the attack of the twin towers in USA which made the US president of that time President Gorge W. Bush to declare a war on terror and applied their entire forces to wipe out those groups from many areas.

However, since then a lot of terrorist groups have been organized, terrorizing the whole globe, using different strategies. Their claim is that the governments of those countries are too weak and lacking to be a strong government therefore, in order to gain control they demand the support of the locals and withdrawal of international governments. Furthermore, the failed governments with no control give a favorable environment to the militants who trained and learned the tactics of the guerrillas. It was the same case like the others with the Al-shabab group in Somalia as well. They started to be organized after Ethiopian war and the transitional government of Somalia jointly attacked and discarded the Islamic group which took the power in the country by driving out the transitional government of Somalia.⁷⁸

In Somalia there are at least half a dozen groups that the State Department believes have links to Al Qaeda or other related terrorist groups.⁷⁹ Somalia is a country which became a cornerstone for many terrorist groups especially after the fall of Barre's regime.

The main reason for this is the unstable governments which do not have any power to control over the security of its borders, the lack of controlling mechanism for illegal activities in the country, the civil conflict within the society and the increased poverty rate which forced many people to join those groups in return for a salary to help them feed their families. According to the global actors, the main cause for the growing terrorist groups in the region is the fall of the government, all

⁷⁸ Yanofsky *David*. "Somali piracy was reduced to zero this year". Quartz. Retrieved, 14 January 2010, P. 44

⁷⁹ Browyn Bruton, and Paul Peter "The Splintering of Alshabab" Pearson Publishing, New York: US, 2012, Pp. 100-111

the factors combined could be listed as the reason for the instant growing of the groups.

After the attack and conquest of Ethiopia, several commentators such as Scott Baudauf considered the Ethiopian intervention as a "foreign occupation" to Somalia. Moreover, Baudauf argued that "Islamic forces could withdraw, regroup and recruit thousands of new fighters, inside and outside the country, to repel foreign and Christian occupation of their country".⁸⁰ According to him, the conquest made by Ethiopia in their land has fueled the already worst condition of the state. However, it is important to note that in 2001, the administration of Washington began to worry about the relationship between Somalia and Al Qaeda after the September 11 attack. Therefore, many believed that it was a plan by Al Qaeda to use Somalia as a home for those groups even before the attack by Ethiopia. The administration was increasingly concerned that members of Al Qaeda could leave Afghanistan and move to Somalia.⁸¹

Alongside Al-Shabaab, other Islamic radical groups have also compromised the peace in Somalia. Al-Ittihad (Islamic Union, IU) is one member who was initially placed in the top list of terrorist which were provided by US states department after the September 11 attack. As a result, like the other terrorist groups, US administration put a sanction on their assets and any of their activities.

However, this embargo has negatively affected the situation of the people living in the area.⁸² The Al-Itihad was established in 1980 however, they became active starting from mid-1990s to 2000s. The main goal of this group is that to install an Islamic state in Somalia. Furthermore, they want to impose Sharia law

⁸⁰ Healy Sharks, "Peacemaking in the Midst of War London" Longhorn Publishers, 2009, Pp. 44-46

⁸¹ Dipesh, Gadher. "Britons 'spearhead Kenya terror wave,'" Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, P. 317

⁸² Ibid

strictly in the state and the group participated in military activities in support of people of Somali origin in Ethiopia.

The Islamic group of Al-Ittihad was becoming a threat to Ethiopia as they were supporting different opposition groups of Ethiopia in the Ogaden region while terrorizing the entire area of Ethiopia. According to Tedros Dagne, the Islamist group of Al-Ittihad is becoming a biggest threat in the peace and stability in the region and have a direct connection to other terrorist organizations.⁸³ Moreover, Ethiopia has accused them in the UN of terrorizing the region in general and particularly across the Somali borders to Ethiopia. As a result, with the help of the US army, Ethiopia attacked those groups driving them from the territory of Somalia and bringing the TFG in power again.

Though the attack and conquest made by Ethiopia was questioned by many states, for Ethiopia's direct intervention was the only way to stop the terrorist groups which threatened the security of its country. Moreover, it was one of their ways of stopping the Islamic groups from forming an Islamic government in Somalia. Yet, for the other east African countries they didn't take the issue lightly as it increases Ethiopian political influence in the region.

The second biggest terrorist group which has a link with Al Qaeda is the Al-Shabaab. This terrorist group came to attention after their Ethiopian attack of Somalia and later after their withdrawal from the territory of Somalia. The Al-Shabaab group controls the southern part of Somalia until present.

This terrorist group receives a lot of support from other groups moreover, until present they have terrorized Ethiopia and Kenya.⁸⁴

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ Wright Robin, "Rock the Kasbah" Oxford University Press, New York: US, 2011, P. 136

In writing about the source of inspiration and financial support for Al Shabaab, it is argued that "extremists hardened by the battle of safe shelters along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan were entering the east of Africa".⁸⁵ For instance, one of the biggest catastrophes they caused was organizing a terrorist attack in the American embassy in Nairobi and Dares Salaam. During the terrorist attack in Kenya, 213 people lost their lives out of which 12 were US citizens and 11 Tanzanian people working in the embassy.⁸⁶ According to Medias, the bomber in Kenya was a Kenyan national who has ties with Al-Qaeda. It is believed that Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was born in Mombasa, Kenya and received training with the group.⁸⁷

Saleh Ali was one of the Al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia who was in the wanted list of the FBI for long time until he was killed by the US in 2009 in his hiding place of Barawa, Somalia. He was one of the suspects who participated in the bombing of the Israeli owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 and in the failed shooting of the Israeli aircraft. Furthermore, he worked as Al-Shabaab's Chief Military planner who has a direct connection with the Al-Qaeda. All this terrorist groups combined together became the main source of instability in Somalia. Somalia is going down every single day with the continually growing of piracy and terrorist groups unless an international help is provided there is no hope for the country in particular and in the region in general.⁸⁸

Piracy is already causing nightmares to the regional and international community while it became impossible to tackle the problem.

⁸⁵ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Global War on Terror," Longhorn Publishers, London: UK, 2011, P. 367

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Steinburg George and Anthony Weber, "Jihadism in Africa,": Pluto Press: London, 2015

⁸⁸ Zeiger Stanley and Anderson Aly Anderson, "Countering violent extremism," Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2015, P. 112.

2.2.3. Humanitarian crisis

Famine and droughts can be prevented or at least its effects can be minimized on the society if institutions and instruments of government are in place effectively but, when the government's responsibility to react the crisis is absent or generally weak no one can escape from the possibility of serious food insecurities. The continues conflict in the country forced Somalis to severe food shortages, a lot of civilians were displaced because of food crisis and the armed groups were tried to corrupt food aids brought by humanitarian agencies.⁸⁹

2.2.3.1. Famine and drought

Somalia has encountered numerous disasters after the separation of the military government in 1991. The absence of environmental regulations and natural disaster risk management strategy in Somalia clarifies that civilians didn't get national support and help. The collapse of the government, in turn, led to an unresolved civil war between different tribes and militias over the control of resources and power. So this continuous conflict forced international agencies such as UN peacekeeping missions and US peacekeeping forces to operate in the country. Under the support of the United Nations, US government agreed to send almost 30,000 US military forces to Somalia.⁹⁰ Their main goal was to provide the delivery of food and emergency supplies through the country.

⁸⁹ Guha-Sapir Debarati and Ratnayake Ruwan, "Consequences of Ongoing Civil Conflict in Somalia: Evidence for Public Health Responses," *PLoS Medicine*, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000108>

⁹⁰ Jeffrey A. Lefebvre. "The U.s. Military Intervention In Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?" *Middle East Policy*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, pp. 44–62., doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.1993.tb00058.x.

the decision was come under the name of “operation restore hope” after the United Nations Security Council had adopted resolution 794 calling for the United Nations unified task to "utilize all vital intends to build up as quickly as time permits a protected environment for humanitarian relief in Somalia."⁹¹

In the years of 1974, 1975, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2011, Somalia had been suffering droughts in different parts of its territory. The food situation declined in 2001 because of heavy rains in Ethiopia, which resulted in floods in Southern Somalia. The year 2011, was the driest year in decades, the Somali population was not really ready to confront it and the state of famine was declared by the UN in certain regions of Somalia.⁹²

Additionally, droughts caused by not only heavy rains and floods, but there were other factors leading to humanitarian problems, those included the ones which are caused by cutting trees for burning charcoal and desertification. Others were in the form of overgrazing and continuous inter-clan conflicts. Although most of disasters happen by natural means, some disasters in Somalia were manmade disasters. For instance, while drought played an important part in the famine of the society, the conflict among the clans alongside hijacking of food aids which were provided by humanitarian agencies by the terrorist organization has also triggered the already existing famine and poverty in the southern and central parts of Somalia.⁹³ Furthermore, banning 16 different humanitarian agencies including UN from operating in the area providing food and other health facilities, seriously affected hundreds of thousands of people. Therefore, with no help from the outside and a year-long drought has wiped out products and herds of animals in the region,

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Mehdi Achour, “The State of Environmental Migration 2011,” 2011, 1–16, <http://labos.ulg.ac.be/hugo/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2017/11/The-State-of-Environmental-Migration-2011-75-90.pdf>.

⁹³ Heritage institute, “The Heritage Institute” (mogadishu, 2017), www.heritageinstitute.org.

killing a huge number of thousands of people and forcing several thousand more to flee from the country as refugees⁹⁴.

2.2.3.2. Refugees and migrants

Somalia is one of the top ten countries listed in the world with the largest number of immigrants.⁹⁵ This huge wave of immigration was mainly caused as a result of the constant conflict which started after the failure of the government. In addition to the conflict, famine and higher unemployment rate was also another factors which forced Somali youth to migrate to different countries. Out of the massive number of refugees which migrated from the horn of Africa, Somali people took the top within the displaced list.⁹⁶

According to UNHCR, during the last two decades, more than two million Somali people are displaced by the conflict, an estimated number of 1.5 million people are internally displaced in Somalia and nearly 900,000 are refugees in the neighboring states, including some 308,700 in Kenya, 246,700 in Ethiopia and 255,600 in Yemen.⁹⁷ The majority of migrants moved to Yemen were male which left their families in Somalia aiming to find a job in Yemen in order to send money back to their left family and also they were afraid of getting armament by terrorist group of Al-Shabab. Moreover, Somalis immigrated not only to the neighboring states but also to different countries of Europe. For instance, research done by UNHCR in 2010 stated that the largest number of Somali refugee is found in UK

⁹⁴ “Al-Shabaab Bans 16 Aid Agencies | The Independent,” accessed September 11, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/al-shabaab-bans-16-aid-agencies-6269288.html>.

⁹⁵ Nassim Majidi, “Afghan and Somali (post-) conflict migration to the EU,” forced migration review, FMR 51, January 2016, Pp. 32-33, www.fmreview.org/destination-europe

⁹⁶ Laura Hammond, “History, Overview, Trends and Issues in Major Somali Refugee Displacements in the near Region,” *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 13 (2014): 1–25, [tps://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1147&context=bildhaan](https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1147&context=bildhaan).

⁹⁷ UNHCR, “Supplementary Appeal: Nigeria Situation,” no. July (2017): 1–4, <http://www.unhcr.org/591ae0e17.pdf>.

whereas Netherlands became the next country where the second largest refugee number of Somalis exists.⁹⁸

Some Somali migrants moved from their homes to urban regions and as well as to the different neighboring states on the ground of ecological conditions that represented a risk to their survival and livelihood. For pastoral people, which constitute more than half of the population, displaced because of the dry seasons and lack of water to find pastures to feed their animals and also to their livelihood as a result of internal displacements.

Lastly, the failure of the powerful government of Somalia and the start of civil war and conflict caused a lack of law and order, instability and political factions within the country. As a result of the conflict, the northern part of Somalia separated from the rest of Somalia by creating its own government.

Moreover, the economy of the country also was affected by the constant conflict which led to the people poverty and dependency on foreign aids. therefore, the conflict has created the biggest threat to the neighboring states through which become the victims of terrorist attacks and as well as it has affected the international trade through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region by rising piracy in the country.

⁹⁸ Anja van Heelsum, "Why Somalis Move? An Investigation into Migratory Processes among Somalis," accessed September 24, 2018, http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bestand:Somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.

3. THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE SOMALI CONFLICT

For centuries, the states in the east of Africa have been victims of external powers. However, after their independence, although those powers work in a proxy, their direct involvement has stopped. Nevertheless, for Somalia, it was another issue even after its independence from colonial powers with the start of the civil war and conflict, the involvement of international powers was triggered. Especially after the fall of Barre's government, Somalia became the centre of penetration with no government to protect it. Therefore, in this chapter, it will study the involvement of regional, sub-regional and international actors in the Somali conflict.

3.1. Regional actors

As explained in the first two chapters, the Somali conflict was not only triggered by internal factors, regional and international interventions also provoked the conflict. The regional actors such as the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) have played a significant role in initiating peace in the region by creating an operational administration in Somalia. This is because Somali conflict has affected not only the neighboring countries but also the peace of the horn Africa in general.

3.1.1. IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on development (IGAD) is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African splendid Lakes. Its main head offices are in Djibouti metropolis. Primary objective of IGAD is to support the member states to realize their economic development through joint collaboration and integration to reduce poverty, environmental protection, peace and security in the region.

The meeting of Heads of States & Governments amended the IGAD constitution & settlement and modified gave it a new call the Intergovernmental Authority on development (IGAD).⁹⁹ According to IGAD regulations and rules that, IGAD request 3 candidates to be nominated from a country who desires to contest for the location, then a panel is going to all candidates and after many considerations they choose the candidates. Those chosen candidates could be elected by the means of Head of states assembly for the period of four years or more if renewed.¹⁰⁰

3.1.2. IGAD's Role in Somalia

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was established in 1986 to coordinate the efforts of the Horn of African nations to dispose the prevalence of persistent drought and famine from the region. The main reason behind the formation of the bloc lies on East African countries need to protect their countries and region from being affected by any possible disaster that can occur in their neighboring country. That's why they established a regional bloc responsible for famine and drought. However, within years, its mandates started to be expanded to include certain upcoming situations. Therefore, in 1996 IGAD's mandate was reviewed to include peace and security beside its normal mandate of economic corporation and development.¹⁰¹ During the same year of the revision of its mandates the member states agreed to include a clause for peace resolution and prevention of conflict as part of the objective of IGAD in order to protect the region from a continuous conflict and to create stability. The main reason behind this was without attaining stability in the region the economic integration alone would not be effective in achieving the goal of the bloc.

⁹⁹ Sally Healy & Mark Bradbury, "Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict," Conflict Trends 21., 2010, <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict>, Date of access, 31/08/2018

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid

Therefore, as stated in its mandates related to the security of the horn of African region, IGAD played an important role in the reconciliation process of its member states such as within Somalia, Somalia-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Djibouti.¹⁰²

As a result, when the conflict arose in Somalia, it did not only affect inside Somalia, but it also hugely influenced the peace and stability of the entire region. This situation forced the regional powers to be directly involved in devising a possible solution which can help them create a lasting peace and security in the region. Although before the involvement of IGAD the UN and USA has unsuccessfully tried for achieving peace in the region in general and in Somalia in particular through installing new administrations, negotiations and aids, after the establishment of IGAD, the international powers started working in cooperation with the IGAD and AU. However, their efforts couldn't achieve the desired result.¹⁰³ As a result, the following years the situation got worst with the rise of terrorism and piracy shaking the peace and stability in the region. Following the departure of the United Nations Operation to Somalia (UNOSOM) and America troops from Somalia in 1995, IGAD took the initiative of keeping peace in Somalia. Since then it considers the issue of Somalia on the top of their priorities and mediated some of peace processes that aimed to set up relevant authorities in Somalia.

The leaders of the member states of IGAD met with the goal of discussing the Somali issues in Khartoum, Sudan in 2002, with the main goal of achieving a sustainable peace and stability in the country. During their meeting they agreed to sponsor the Eldoret peace conference which held in the Eldoret, the town located in Kenya, and reconciliation conference in which the representatives of the Somali people could take part in the establishment of its own national government.

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Paul, Woodward. *The IGAD and Regional Relations in the Horn of Africa*. (London: Pluto Press, 2013)34

The Eldoret/Mbagathi peace settlement resulted in signing an agreement on “Termination of Conflict and the Structure and Principle of the Somali National Reconciliation Process” which was held during the meeting in 27 October 2002. This agreement stipulates all parties should abstain from using forces as a means of conflict resolution. The IGAD council ministers played a remarkable role in the negotiation process. Although, this conference was number fourteenth conference held as a means of mediation on the Somali peace process after the collapse of the state, nothing came out of the conference as well.¹⁰⁴

However, after years of discussions, at the end they set a transitional federal government administration in Somalia. This peace conference was the first peace conference initiated by the IGAD member states in the history of Somalia regarding the states issue.¹⁰⁵ The main reason for the conference was primarily to set a stable state in the country in particular and lasting peace in the horn of Africa.

Second, it was the first peace conference through which the member states were unified agreed to finance the peace conference. Although, there has been some disagreements in their previous encounters in this situation they showed their joint solidarity. After long discussion the conference resulted in setting a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) with its own new Transitional Federal Constitution (TFC) and institutions (TFI).¹⁰⁶ However, the TFG which was set in 2004 as a result of the IGAD peace conference was stationed in Kenya until 2005.

¹⁰⁴ Peace and Security Council, “Information note on the situation in Somalia” 55th Meeting 17th June 2006, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/information-note-situation-somalia>

¹⁰⁵ Paul, Woodward, Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Ross, Love. Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. (London: Chatham press, 2009) 121

Furthermore, the TFG parliament didn't meet in the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu until 2006, still even when they officially moved and met in Mogadishu, they lacked solidarity and agreement in their discussion.¹⁰⁷ Although, TFG was an administration which was recognized by IGAD and other international states, they had little control over Somalia. At that time, the beginning of 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was the one in full control of the most of southern part of Somalia. Not only the TFG faced resistance within Somalia, but also they faced resistance from the neighboring countries of Djibouti and Eritrea as they were considered as the satellite of the Ethiopian government in Somalia. Finally, IGAD playing an important part better than the UN and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) furthermore, in the process they gained financial support of AU, UN and UNSC for the peace conference.

The Transitional Government of Somalia was the second legitimate government which was recognized by the IGAD, AU, and UN. However, they couldn't set the government in Somalia or defeat the Islamic groups.¹⁰⁸ This was the biggest challenge through which IGAD and other international community faced. This situation led to the deterioration of the peace process initiated by IGAD and resulted in increasing conflict within the Somalia in general and in the region in particular. As a result, the IGAD member states withdrew their financial and military support from the region with the exception of the Ethiopian state. However, it is through this peace conference the IGAD member states gained a greater opportunity of setting peacekeeping forces. However, the new Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) faced a lot of challenges as a result of the loss of the financial assistance which was provided by IGAD. After all the measures they took financially and militarily to support TFG but, nothing was achieved as they have planned. As a result, after evaluating the situation in Somalia in the first months of

¹⁰⁷ Stephanie Hanson and EbenKaplari, "Somalia's Transitional Government," Counsel on Foreign Relations, 12 May 2008, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somalias-transitional-government>

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

2005, the member states of IGAD presented their proposal to the African union in the conference held in Abuja, Nigeria.

Their proposal led to the formation of IGASOM which is a subsidiary plan which helps the transitional government of Somalia to be relocated in Mogadishu. This plan was approved by the member states of IGAD. Therefore, in the conference; IGAD approved the deployment of 10,000 peacekeeping forces in Somalia (IGASOM).¹⁰⁹ Followed in 2006 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also passed a resolution of 1725 which approved the deployment of African union peacekeeping forces to Somalia.¹¹⁰ However, regardless of all those efforts, the transitional government faced a lot of challenges trying to set a government within Somalia.

Those challenges mainly came from the different members of the clans which want their own members to lead the state. Moreover, the dispute among the transition government's members, the President and Ministers was also another major source which led the TFG to lose its power within the Somali state. As a result, despite the fact that President Abdullahi Yusuf was elected with the approval of IGAD and other international powers to form the transitional government of Somalia in 2008, he was forced to resign from his position due to international pressure. After failing to bring order in the state, he was accused by the regional and international powers as a hindrance to peace within Somalia.¹¹¹

Before the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf in December 2008 a UN led peace conference was held in Djibouti in May of the same year. In the

¹⁰⁹ Sally Healy, "Regional and Global Axes of Conflict- Peace-making in the midst of war: An assessment of IGAD's contribution of regional security," Royal Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper no. 59, 2009, P. 14.

¹¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹¹ Thomson Reuters, "FACTBOX: Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf resigns," World News December 29, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-president-yusuf-factbox-sb/factbox-somali-president-abdullahi-yusuf-resigns-idUSTRE4BS1US20081229>, Access date: 17.09.2018

conference the Prime minister of the TFG, the UN political office of Somalia (UNPOS) and a new moderate Somali party which was based in some parts of Eritrea and Yemen called the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) met to discuss mainly the removal of the president and others.¹¹² During the peace conference discussion, which took about five different rounds of discussions, ARS demanded the urgent removal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, removal of the TFG President and negotiations and declaration.¹¹³ Following to the peace agreement, President Yusuf resigned from his position.

Thirty days after his resignation, in accordance with Djibouti agreement, an election was held in Djibouti with the joining of the previous parliament members and new party members. In the election although sixteen candidates for presidency have participated, two withdrew from the election and three left before the voting, leaving eleven candidates. Nevertheless, finally Sheikh Sharif of the ARS party was elected as president by majority of the parliament votes as the seventh president of the Somali republic.¹¹⁴ During the election they elected a new Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) composed of ARS and TFG party members.

Despite the fact that, Sheikh Sharif was a strict Islamist leader, unlike the others Islamist leaders, he believed in an open discussion with the west, regional and international governments. However, at the same like his predecessors he used nepotism in electing the Prime minister and the members of the parliament from his relatives and clan members. However, the mixture of clan and Islamic Courts Union which ruled Somalia for years were the major factors which led to the failure of the state. Furthermore, it is because of those factors the peace process initiated by international community got stalled.

¹¹² Apuuli Phillip Kasaija, "The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: Results and problems," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Taylor and Francis Group, 2010, Vol. 28, No. 3, Pp. 261-282

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

3.1.3. IGAD Member States and the Somali Conflict

Although, the competition among the different Somali clan members resulted with the failure of the peace conference initiated by the regional and international powers, the competition and conflict among the regional and international powers is also another source of problem which led to the increasing conflict in Somalia. For instance, the IGAD member states are well known for their constant conflict and competition among each other. For years, the horn of African region is described as the most volatile region in the world due to the fact that the member states are constantly at war with each other. Therefore, putting the member states together in a round table to solve the problem of the region is very unlikely. With the entire member states used the conflict in Somalia as a proxy of their conflict. The case of Eritrea and Ethiopia can be taken as a good example as both countries are members of IGAD supported different parties as a proxy to their border conflict which has started since 1998. As a result, the conflict within the regional bloc can be described as another cause for the failure of the peace attempts.

The main reason behind the conflict between IGAD member states was the interference of the foreign powers. Due to the strategic importance of Horn of African region, as the region is a bridge which connects Middle East, Northern Africa from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and the Sub-Saharan (SSA), it has been vulnerable against international interference and conquest. Therefore, even after decolonization, the region remained under constant conflict which resulted in the emergence of new fragmented countries such as the separation of Ethiopia and Eritrea, South Sudan and North Sudan, and Somalia and Somaliland.¹¹⁵

The emergence of new states is another case for a new scramble for Africa which is caused by another international power. Particularly for the neighboring states of Somalia which are Kenya and Ethiopia, the rise of an Islamic state as a

¹¹⁵ SALLY HEALY, "Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 87, No. 1, 2011, pp. 105-120, Accessed: 23-09-2018

ruling party of Somalia had a great implication as they have a great number of Somali population settling within their countries and borders.¹¹⁶ This in turn created a threat to the national security of both countries which awakened their interest in the region and forced them to be involved directly in Somali issues by trying to remove the Islamic government from power. However, not only the regional powers but also western powers were involved either by proxy or directly which triggered the conflict in the country. For the US and the West, tackling the issue of terrorism in the region was on their top priorities which forced them to act upon. Ethiopia's desire to see a government re-established in Somalia derived from concerns about the activities of a radical Islamist group, Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, which emerged in the early 1990s.¹¹⁷ This group's main agenda was to reorganize all the Somalis in the region under the Sharia law, giving less importance to different factions and clan members. This in turn would affect the reorganization of Somali communities living in the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia, which was against the domestic policy of both countries. As a result, in 1996 the Ethiopian forces destroyed the radical Islamic groups, deeming they have connections with other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and other groups. They did this without any intervention of the IGAD members, AU, UN and other international communities. In the following years, Ethiopia initiated a new Somali political party which was led by later Mr. Abdulahi Yusuf, who was Pro-Ethiopian and Pro-West, which became a president of the TFG later with the support of IGAD and the West. However, with the start of the conflict between the IGAD members Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, the Somali peace process was not only halted but also fuelled a proxy conflict, which exploded with both countries supporting different parties. Starting with this period, both countries were seen supporting and aiding opposite factions by organizing meetings in their respective countries, providing armaments and financial aids.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

In the following year the President of Djibouti organized a Peace conference in his country within IGAD's agenda by inviting the different civilian leaders with the exception of the different faction leaders and military leaders.¹¹⁸ This peace conference was funded by IGAD and Arab countries which led to the formation of the Transitional National Government of Somalia with President Abdiqasim Salad as the head of the TNG. Although, this government not for long but was successful and recognized by sub-regional, regional and international communities. However, it was not recognized or accepted by the Somali tribes or Somali people that created a challenge to the new government to operate within the nation. At first, Ethiopia and Djibouti which were IGAD members were working in agreement about the issue of Somalia. However, in 2002 when a new negotiation on setting a transitional parliament started in Kenya, the other faction leaders of Somalia were invited but it took time to set the parliament members. As a result, with time the President Abdiqasim who was supported by Djibouti, couldn't achieve any result. With this in 2003 when the mandate expired he became as one of the faction leaders which disappointed Djibouti and withdraw their support from Ethiopia and Kenya to Eritrea and Uganda.¹¹⁹

Although, after long discussions and negotiations in 2004, IGAD solved the problems by electing the Parliament of the TNG and President Abdulahi was elected as the President of Somalia. Somalia was divided in to two areas as Somaliland and Somalia being led by two different Government leaders and parliaments. The same like the other international communities, the IGAD member states were more concerned for their own national interest rather than that of Somali people or Somalia. As result, what they offer as a solution was based on their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the member states were divided, for instance, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti were supporting the idea of a sovereign state policy with a central

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Ibid

administration while Ethiopia and Uganda were in favour of federal states through which the nation would remain united but can have independent states.¹²⁰

Their standing came from their fear of what is going to appear in their territory particularly with the first case their fear was not to promote tribal identities in their territories and fear of fragmentation of their states, as those are composed of different ethnic groups. However, countries such as Ethiopia supported the federal states concept since it is also federal state. That's why in the two peace conferences held in Djibouti and Kenya, Ethiopia pushed for a federal state while the others demanded for a national unity. From both peace conferences the international communities were expecting a positive result in the state and the horn of Africa. However, due to the competition and the selfish goals of the member states, Somalia remained in constant conflict. This situation forced Somali people to migrate and remain refugees in other countries. Furthermore, with a failed state at hand, the region became a centre of terrorism and piracy putting the lives of the people in the region and the world in danger.

3.1.4. Achievements and Challenges of IGAD in its Effort to Resolve the Somali Conflict

Although they didn't bring a lasting peace and security in the region the IGAD member states has played an important role trying to solve the Somali conflict. All the sub-regional, regional and international blocs are established primary to solve regional issues such as economic, social and political issues. Therefore, it is the job of those blocs first to talk about the prevalent issues in their region however; if they could not solve the issue then the regional members such as AU interfere in the issue and later the UN. That is why IGAD as the east Africa

¹²⁰ Ali Noor Abdi, "Evaluating Peace Making Processes, the Case of IGAD in Somalia Conflict," Master's thesis, 2002, Pp. 85,
http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/101497/Ali_Evaluating%20Peace%20Making%20Processes%20the%20Case%20of%20IGAD%20in%20Somalia%20Conflict.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

bloc were actively participating in the Somali conflict although with the support of other international communities. However, while tackling the problem they also achieved some results and faced many challenges.

IGAD's Achievements in Solving the Somali Issue: Although the challenges experienced by IGAD overweight the achievements they attained, they have also achieved cease fire for a while by initiating different peace conferences. For years after the failure of the President Barre government in 1991, the UN and USA were playing an active role in initiating a peace process without success. However, after 1995, they withdrew completely from the territory leaving IGAD to hand the situation in its regions.¹²¹The following year, IGAD started playing the biggest role in finding a lasting solution for the state and the region placing Somalia as the top of its priority. As a result, after that year they started initiating a peace process. In 2002, IGAD Heads of State and Government met in Khartoum and took a progressive decision to bring about sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.¹²²

Accordingly, initially they financed the Eldoret peace conference. In 2004, the IGAD composed of seven countries of East Africa organized a conference in Kenya, Eldoret province by inviting the civil societies and leaders of Somalia. Although, IGAD took initiative of the conference, it was USA, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, the European Commission, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League which financed majority of the conference through which Kenya was nominated to chair the peace process.¹²³The main result of the peace conference

¹²¹ MemarAyalewDemeke, "Conflict Resolution Responses of IGAD and AU to the Somalia Crises," *International Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2014, Pp. 248-257

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Report from US Department of State, "Eldoret conference could mean peace for Somalia, U.S. official says," 2002, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eldoret-conference-could-mean-peace-somalia-us-official-says>.

was the signing of the “Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principle of the Somali National Reconciliation Process”.¹²⁴

Furthermore, this conference opened the door for the discussion of setting a transitional government which was set after two years. This peace conference was one of the achievements of IGAD in the region as it brought a result and ceasefire in the region. And it was different from the other peace process initiated by the bloc or other international communities. Furthermore, it was the only peace process which was accepted by almost all countries in the world and they placed their hope in the process. The main reason for this was because it led to settle a legitimate government with president and parliaments elected by representatives of Somali people.

Secondly, although the IGAD member states were known for their conflict and competition, this was the first time they agreed on the same thing which made it unique. Finally the peace conference resulted in the creation of the TFG. As a result, it became the first legitimate peace conference which achieved those things and accepted by all the member states and international communities. However, the same like the other resolutions; it became unsuccessful as the Transitional Government was not able to control all over the country for that matter. But until the next peace conference, the Transitional Government remained weak and faced armed confrontations from the clans and faction leaders which finally forced the President to resign by Somali factions, IGAD members and international communities.

The TFG which was elected by representatives from the local civil societies and supported by IGAD, AU and UN, still didn't achieve the expected result. Despite the fact the establishment of the TFG was greeted positively and enthusiastically by the UN and the western states, initially there was a mixed feeling

¹²⁴ Memar Ayalew Demeke, “Conflict Resolution Responses of IGAD and AU to the Somalia Crises,” *International Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2014, Pp. 248-257

from the people of Somalia, but later it became negative. Therefore, even with a legitimate government composed of president, prime minister and parliament members, they didn't set a proper government in Mogadishu. Moreover, during the time, some parties of Somalia were ruled by the Islamic forces which created a threat to Ethiopia and Kenya which are neighboring states. During the period after the election, the TFG became government only on papers without a real power except in some parts of the country while the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Shabab gained control of almost all the state, which disappointed the other members of the parliament and the people of Somalia. As a result, in 2008 without achieving their purpose, the local tribe heads, members of the parliament and newly established Islamic party Alliance of Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) with the help of IGAD and UN forced the president to resign from his position.¹²⁵

During the year in 2008, when Al-Shabab and others radical Islam forces of Somalia attacked Ethiopia and the Somali parts which was controlled by TFG believing the federal Transitional Government was Pro-Ethiopian government. Furthermore, since 2006 the Ethiopian forces attacked the Islamic forces and occupied some areas in Somalia. Therefore, in 2008 peace conference initiated by IGAD among the TFG and the opposition group of ARS in which opposition parties demanded withdrawal of Ethiopian armies from Somalia. Ethiopian occupation in 2006 has created an opposite result as it triggered the rise of radical jihadist insurgents, Al-Qaeda's intervention, anti-west and anti-UN sentiments.¹²⁶

Therefore, the TFG not only failed to establish a legitimate government in Somalia, but also triggered anti-west and anti-other donors' sentiment within the people. In order to solve the mounting problems in the region, the Djibouti peace agreement was signed with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and elected as president

¹²⁵ The following years President Abdulahi was elected as a president the members of the parliament of the TFG were divided among themselves. As a result, some of the members decided to elect another new president with the help of ARS parties and other warlords.

¹²⁶ Ken Menkhaus, "SOMALIA," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 4, 2009, Pp.6-12, DOI:10.1080/03071840903216395.

for the TFG.¹²⁷ This accord was the second accord which was initiated by IGAD and another successful peace agreement in Somalia. After the peace agreement, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia to be replaced by the UN and AU peace keeping forces. However, the same like the other leaders, Sheikh Sharif also spent his time traveling and seeking funds from international community rather than establishing a legitimate government which can create a stable government.

According to the Reuters news, the UN in Somalia uncovered that out of the every \$ 10 donated to the TFG during Sheikh Sharif rule, the \$ 7 was not used for the states use.¹²⁸ After his accusation of corruption by donors, Sheikh Sharif also failed out of favor of the people, because of not having done enough to restore law, order and basic services. He declared to stand as a candidate for a news term in the office but, IGAD and UN agencies replaced by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the 8th president of Somalia in a fair election.

Throughout those times until present, although less evident, IGAD member states have played a very important role in initiating peace process for Somalia. They have also succeeded in achieving a ceasefire though not for long. Particularly the two peace accords were initiated and financed partially by IGAD. They have also succeeded to elect two Transitional Federal Government Presidents for two terms. These two can be described as the achievements of IGAD in Somali conflict.

The Challenges faced by IGAD while resolving the Somali conflict:

Since its establishment, IGAD has faced certain challenges in handling economic and political issues in the east Africa. The main reason is related with the fact that Africa is one of the most volatile region in the world in which almost all the members of IGAD were fighting for border conflict. Not only that but also the area

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Yara Bayoumy, "Somali president hits back against U.N. graft charges," Reuters news, 17 August 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-president-corruption/somali-president-hits-back-against-u-n-graft-charges-idUSBRE87G0UH20120817>, access date, 24/09/2018

was hit by poverty and drought for years. As a legacy of colonization and Cold War, East Africa, with the same like the whole Africa was suffering, in some cases until recently, a conflict over an artificially drawn border which was done during the scramble for Africa by the European colonizers. Although colonization is over years ago, its legacy and proxy war remained in the continent. As a result, in order to protect themselves from a future disaster, African countries created sub-regional, regional and international blocs. IGAD was created by east African countries to protect themselves against poverty, drought, and to protect their regional security.

However, since its establishment, member states have faced certain difficulties because of the conflict in all over the areas. For instance, Eritrea-Ethiopian conflict, Somalia-Ethiopia, Somalia-Kenya, within Somali civil conflict and Sudan South and the North. They have tried to solve the conflict of Sudan and Somalia however, they succeeded in dividing Sudan into two parts while achieving very little in Somali case. The main challenge they faced in achieving the desired result in the case of Somalia was a combination of different factors.

After the formation of IGAD particularly since 1996 they had took an active role in resolving the Somali conflict. During the year, the US and UN withdrew their peace process after unsuccessfully trying to solve the issue for years since 1991 followed by the failure of the Barre state. From that time onward, they gave the responsibilities to IGAD only appearing if the situation came out of hand and providing finances. However, IGAD by itself as a bloc composed of different states with different opinions and political ideologies which was very hard to come up with a lasting solution.

One of the main challenges faced by IGAD was the conflict among the member states which was caused as a result of rivalry. This rivalry among each other led waste of time, unnecessary negotiations and wastage of money. For a negotiation to succeed, all the sides have to work together openly towards the achievements of their mutual goals, if other parties are trying to enforce their own interests, the negotiation will be a failure. This is what happened to the case of Somalia initiated by IGAD. All the parties involved in the process were separated

on what is good for their foreign policy and territory than what is best for Somalia and its people. For instance, Ethiopia-Eritrean political stands can be taken as an example of this with both countries using this arena as a proxy to their long lasting border conflict and with both countries supporting different factions.¹²⁹

The second challenge was commitment to work towards a lasting solution in Somalia and in the region. The Horn of African countries are known for its constant conflict and international penetrations. With full of conflict in its territories, those countries are less committed to solve the issue of a neighboring country. Furthermore, they use the conflict among themselves while trying to negotiate for the region's peace and security. As a result, it became the most ineffective bloc and open for penetration by other international forces. Therefore, the instability in the region has created a huge challenge in the solving the problems of Somalia.¹³⁰

The third challenge IGAD encountered was lack of power. IGAD member states are composed of less population, military, economic and political powers.¹³¹ Even Ethiopia and Kenya which have more population are lacking of stability and facing economic dependency and conflict for border issues. While the resource reaches country like Sudan was struggling with a civil conflict which led to the separation between south and north. Therefore, as a result of their economic and military dependency, they became victims of international and regional penetration. It is also a known fact that the one who provides money is the one who calls the shots in foreign policy.

Forth challenge was the fear of the neighboring states for the raise of Islamist groups in the region. Horn of Africa is composed of largely Islamic

¹²⁹ Ipinmoye Ayodele Olu& Saleh Dauda, "Regional Integration in Africa: The Challenges and Achievements of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)," *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Modern Education (IJMRME)*, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja, Abuja, Volume I, Issue II, 2015, Pp. 134-138, www.rdmodernresearch.org

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Ibid

habitants after North Africa, therefore, with the rise of the Al-shabab and other Islamic radicals in Somalia created spread fear to the countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya which share not only borders but also minor tribes in their borders. This condition forced those countries to deploy military forces to Somalia in order to protect themselves from terrorism. However, it worsened the already started conflict as a result; both countries became the victims of terrorist attacks in many cases. Particularly in Kenya, Al-shabab has organized several terrorist attacks. In between 2008 and 2015 they have organized 272 attacks in Kenya and 5 attacks in Ethiopia.¹³²The main reason behind this was because both countries share territories with Somalia to the south and they have deployed their military forces in the country. Therefore, the Somali terrorist groups want both countries to withdraw their forces from all its borders. The terrorist groups mostly attacks the areas in which those countries benefit from tourists.¹³³ This condition made it difficult to the IGAD members in their peace negotiation process.

3.1.5. The Role of African Union

The African Union (AU) is a continental alliance composed of fifty-five countries in Africa. This Union was established in 2002 replacing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the agenda of promoting economic and political stability in Africa through solidarity and support. The main reason for the replacement of OAU by AU was due to the fact that the OAU leaders were more concerned about the strong country leaders rather than the continent itself. Therefore, after 22 years of representing the continent, AU came to picture. Although, for years after the failure of Somalia in 1991, the UN and US, unsuccessfully tried working for bringing peace in the region. However, after the causality, they experienced and financial lost they faced, they completely lost their interest in the region and withdrew their forces from Somalia. Particularly when

¹³² The conversation, “Why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya – and what the country can do about it,” November 2017, <http://theconversation.com/why-al-shabaab-targets-kenya-and-what-the-country-can-do-about-it-87371>, access date, 24/04/2018

¹³³ Ibid

Clinton was elected as a president, the US lost a complete interest in the negotiation process and left after mandating the regions problem solving to AU and IGAD as it was related to their region.¹³⁴

Democracy and peace are two areas through which human beings can achieve development and prosperity. For this purpose, the AU was established to promote peace, democracy and economic corporation to African countries which were torn due to war and colonization. Furthermore, in order to protect the countries from further disasters by protecting the security of those areas, democracy and peace in many African countries is hindered with lengthy and violent conflicts and civil wars. The main reason behind this was due to the fact that the borders of African countries were drawn artificially by European powers to satisfy their greed and protect themselves from the eruption of violence among themselves. The AU has set itself aspirational goals to solve the problem, by putting strategic planes to be achieved by 2020 such as, replacing armaments by education and work, attaining peace and tolerance in order to nurtured Africa's children and youths via training in its challenge of democracy promoting and peace building, the AU has engineered associate expansive and robust normative framework, plus mechanisms and institutions to implement this framework.¹³⁵

These mechanisms and institutions had been instrumental in strengthening democratic governance in AU Member States rising from violent struggle. The normative framework could also be seen as a part of the AU's efforts to sell democratic governance and also the rule of law, in every area of the human beings-targeted socio-monetary improvement. Not like the corporation of African cohesion (OAU) charter (1963) that embraced the school of thought of non-interference within the internal affairs of Member States the AU organic Act (2000) embraces a latest school of thought of non-indifference to human rights abuses among the territory of AU Member States. This belief shift has bold the AU

¹³⁴ Ibid, Sally Healy, Sally

¹³⁵ Ibid.

in its democracy-promoting and peace building mandate, particularly in fragile and battle-affected states.¹³⁶

The AU become fashioned with the enterprise of speeding up integration within the continent in an attempt to allow Africa to play its rightful position within the worldwide economy at identical time as at the equal time addressing a myriad of monetary, political and social troubles presently plaguing its member states. The AU succeeded in the commercialism of African unity (OAU) that had failing multiple times in achieving their mandate. The AU relies completely on the common vision of a united and durable Africa and at the need to make a partnership between governments and the segments of civil society, especially women, youngsters and also the private region, if you would like to administer a lift to unity and oneness amongst the peoples of Africa. It focuses on the advertising of peace, protection and balance at the continent as a requirement for the implementation of the advance and integration calendar of the Union. In the end, the AU is constructing towards an additional unity and cohesion between the African countries and its humans.¹³⁷

Article 3 of the essential Act of the AU provides the next as a result of the targets of the African Union: to amass bigger commonness and commonness between the African countries and also the peoples of Africa; to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its Member States; to spice up the political and socio-monetary integration of the continent; to push and defend African commonplace positions on troubles of hobby to the continent and its peoples to encourage worldwide cooperation, taking account of the charter of the United countries and also the widespread announcement of Human Rights.

AU promotes peace, safety, and stability on the continent; to push democratic principles and establishments, widespread participation and right

¹³⁶ Adams, Saeed. *Border Changes*: (London: Pluto Press:2013)17

¹³⁷ Ibid.

governance; to sell and guard human and peoples' rights. According to the African charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and totally different applicable human rights instruments; to ascertain the essential things which enable the continent to play its rightful position within the worldwide financial set-ups. In international negotiations: to sell property improvement on the economic, social, and cultural tiers additionally to the mix of African economies; to sell co-operation altogether fields of act to boost the residing needs of African peoples; to coordinate and harmonize the principles among the present and future close monetary teams for the slow attainment of the targets of the Union. Furthermore, its mandate is to boost the event of the continent via mercantilism analysis altogether fields, especially technological ability and generation; to paintings with applicable worldwide partners within the obliteration of preventable sicknesses and therefore the commerce of right fitness at the continent.¹³⁸The same way in the Somali case, AU also played an important role in achieving peace and security in the region.

In general, when the sub-regional powers could not solve the immediate problem which arises in the region, regional interference should be required. As a result, when civil war in Somalia elevated not only did it affect east Africa but also African countries in general which forced the AU to interfere directly by providing funds and military forces against terrorist groups. Therefore, in order to bring stability in the region and the country, the AU started their intervention in Somalia in 2007 by establishing an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),¹³⁹ a mission which was specifically deployed for the purpose of protecting the security of the region and fight terrorism.

¹³⁸ Selmi, Saferworld,, "Towards a more effective early warning system in the Horn of Africa" (London, Cambridge University Press, 2015, P. 22

¹³⁹ Kedir Ahmed, "Impact of AMISOM's (The African Union Mission in Somalia) Intervention in Somalia," International Politics of Africa, Diploma Thesis, 2013, <https://www.grin.com/document/307221>

3.1.6. Background of AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a mission deployed from the Continental Union of Africa for the purpose of keeping peace and security in the region. Later, six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Council have conjointly been approved by the international organization council.¹⁴⁰ It was a legal entity which was established in 2007, specifically to solve the issues related with Somalia as it became an international problem. Furthermore, it was regionally accepted by the AU member states and international communities. As it was established through the African Union's Peace associated protection Council with an initial of six month mandate. AMISOM modified and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority to the enhancement of IGAD's Peace accords ventured in Somalia IGASOM. As a result, after its establishment, it started to undertake security issues and other assignments in Somalia under the authority of the AU. Although, AMISOM came to picture after the failure of IGAD to bring peace and stability in the region, their mission started after many peace initiatives taken by IGAD and other international communities.¹⁴¹

The same like the problems faced with IGAD, US and UN, the AMISON mission have also faced different challenges however; they have managed to deploy peacekeeping forces recruited from many nations of the continent. Particularly after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces it was the peace keeping mission which control in the areas formerly occupied by the Ethiopian forces and tried to keep stability in Somalia. Starting from 2011, the mission took an active role in fighting with the purpose of recovering the areas which were occupied by the radical Islamic groups of Al-Shabaab and installing the TGF in power in Somalia. Moreover the council approved the African Union Mission to require all measures, as acceptable,

¹⁴⁰ Tripp Arnos, "Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime," London: UKCambridgeUniversity Press, 2010, P. 44

¹⁴¹ Isabel K. Düsterhöft and Antonia I. Gerlach, "The Successes and Failures of the Interventions of the European Union, the African Union and Neighbouring Powers in Somalia," *Security and Peace, Conflict in Africa: Regional and International Dimension*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2013, Pp. 18-23, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24233144>

to hold out support for dialogue and reconciliation by helping with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those concerned in a very national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, as well as political leaders, kinship group leaders, spiritual leaders and representatives of civil society.¹⁴²

The aim of the peacekeeping was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report of intervals in sixty days achievable UN peacekeeping forces. In October, 2014, the protection Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) gave an inexperienced lightweight to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30 Nov 2015.

3.1.7. AMISOM in Somalia

The same like the former missions in Somalia, the goal of AMISOM was to establish a stable government based on what the international, regional and sub-regional powers want rather than what the people of Somalia needed. As a result, depict the fact they were welcomed positively but couldn't achieve the desired result of keeping the security of the area. The main reason for this was due to the fact that all the previous and current missions' deployed had their own goals of installing the TFG government which was Pro-west, Pro-Ethiopia and Pro-Kenya. However, the government was not accepted by the Islamic radicals and the tribal leaders which made the AMISON's mission difficult to achieve.

AMISOM's main mandates were to establish a legitimate government, bring peace and stability in the state, security of the region and provide humanitarian aid to the people who suffered as a result of the civil war. The peacekeeping forces were mostly from countries such as Burundi and Uganda which deployed closer to 6100 forces followed by countries which provided smaller forces (Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Sierra Léon).¹⁴³ During the time of the mission,

¹⁴² Scott Jone, "The Art of Not Being Governed," Upland Southeast Asia, Yale University Press, 2010, P. 30

¹⁴³ Ibid, Isabel

approximately \$ 250 million per year was spent from donors for the purpose of the mission.¹⁴⁴ However, for years, AMISOM focused on fighting against terrorism and tried to install the TGF government to their proper place in Mogadishu while abandoning the humanitarian mission. Furthermore, although, this mission was deployed to redo the failed attempts made by IGAD to bring stability in the region, in reality, they took the same standing with their predecessors.

The main challenge the AMISOM mission faced during their time in Somalia was that they entered a war zone directly which was against their mandate of peacekeeping as there was no peace to keep.¹⁴⁵ As a result, the mission faced difficulties during the first month of its duty as they were constantly attacked by the Islamic radicals of Al-Shabab. Therefore, NATO and other international community started helping them in their mission by providing military and financial support however; this situation fueled the already existed attack of terrorism. Furthermore, it raised a negative sentiment to the people of Somalia. What further triggered the Somali Islamic group was the full involvement of Ethiopian forces with AMISOM in its mission on Somalia. This intensified the adverse image of the mission within the Somali tribes and starting to accuse the peace keeping force for the violation of human right.¹⁴⁶ Mainly after the AU turned a blind eye on the attack made the areas where civilians live.

AU plays an important role in protecting the security of the continent and initiating peace to the areas which are in conflict. However, as the continent is composed of states which are economically and politically dependent on international powers for their survival, it is hard to protect peace and security within the continent if the Union is weak against other powers. Therefore, no matter how the AU tried to solve the problem in the region it is not free from foreign interference. This is the main weakness not only the mission but, also AU faced in

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

general. As they are dependent on foreign powers for their almost all operation, they are not free to decide according to the best interest of the states or the region. USA, EU, China, Arab league and other powers interfere in many situations regarding the welfare of the states.

As a result, the fight between the terrorist group and AMISOM continued ferociously while the peace keeping forces were joined by Ethiopian army, Al-Shabab got support from Al-Qaeda's forces. Ethiopian forces joined the war later to the mission after being affected by the war going in their borders and terrorism act in its country, claiming self-defense against the threat to its security. Therefore, AMISOM, Ethiopian and TFG of Somali forces jointly succeeded in liberating most of the southern parts of Somalia from the Al-Shabab occupation. Similarly Kenya followed the lead of Ethiopia to join in the war against the extremists parties mainly because its national security was at risk. Furthermore, Kenya was the country which was penetrated heavily by Al-Shabab's terrorism particularly in its touristic areas.¹⁴⁷ This act of Terrorism in Kenya has affected Kenyan's economy negatively while it decreased the number of tourists who visits per year. Though, originally only 1600 Ugandan forces were deployed to Somalia in 2007, later with the addition of other countries of peacekeeping forces such as Ethiopia, Kenya etc. In 2017, the deployed forces reached up to 22,000 making it one of the most expensive missions in Africa through since 2014 approximately 1 billion dollar was spent per year.¹⁴⁸

The main reason behind the involvement of those countries and regional powers was triggered due to the risk which threatens the national securities of the region in general and Somali neighbors in particular. After the fall of the powerful government in 1991, the number of terrorist acts and piracy has risen over the years affecting not only the security of the region but also international security. However, regardless of the military and economy support provided to AMISOM

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, The conversation

¹⁴⁸ Paul D. Williams, "Lessons Learned in Somalia: AMISOM and Contemporary Peace Enforcement," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-learned-somalia-amisom-and-contemporary-peace-enforcement>

they couldn't achieve the desired goal of achieving peace in the region. Although, they have achieved in recovering some of the cities held by Al-Shabab and installing a legitimate President and parliament in Mogadishu in 2017 but could not entirely eradicate the terrorist forces from those areas. As a result, their intervention did not bring a desired result in Somalia well as in return they have exhausted their funds.

Until now, the UN peace keeping forces and other international donors were providing funds for keeping the mission while they do their work in the area, however at present their willingness to keep providing fund for keeping forces is lacking. In an interview made with Simon Mulongo, Deputy to the AU Commission in Mogadishu in May 2018 about the current challenge of the mission in Somalia, he explained as, while there have been offers of additional aerial assets, the rate at which the UN reimburses countries willing to supply and maintain them is said to be low, making it less attractive for them to put these vital capabilities at our disposal. Logistics are therefore unreliable and erratic, and our troops are therefore overstretched and unable to secure the expansive territory and protect their supply lines.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, in his interview he explained while AMISOM was facing economic and resource challenges, Al-Shabab took advantage with the help of Islam radicals, they have gained an advantage against them.¹⁵⁰ In addition, as they are part of the local people, they can collect information easily from the locals. And the economic problem within the country made it easy for the terrorist groups to hire locals which are hit by poverty and unemployment.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ In an interview with the Africa Center, Simon Mulongo, deputy to the AU Commission in Mogadishu, says that AMISOM's gains could never have been realized if it had continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template. African Centre for Strategic Studies, "AMISOM's Hard-Earned Lessons in Somalia," 30th May 2018, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/amisom-hard-earned-lessons-somalia/>

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ Ibid

3.2. International Actors

For centuries, Africa has been penetrated by international powers. This was due to the fact that the continent is known for its availability of resources, strategic and geopolitical importance. Horn of Africa as part of the continent and its geographical and strategic location was the first region to be penetrated by international powers. As a result, as part of the scramble for Africa the region was also divided among British, French and Italy. This artificial partition which became later a reality has greatly impacted the region. That's why even after their independence those countries fell in to the cycle of constant conflict and deterioration rather than working together towards the attainment of national development and peace in the region.

The main reason for the conflict was due to the fact during the partition of the borders; those European powers drew the borders without care for the people, tribe and other facts. This makes it difficult for the countries to manage their own boundaries. For instance, the Somali tribes living in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti are the same with the other habitants of the horn of Africa. Furthermore, even after decolonization the interest and greed of international powers is still existed as a result they used those new nations as a proxy for their political and economic gains. That was the case even during the Cold War when the two super powers divided the entire world and made them fight against each other.

3.2.1. The Role of Arab League in the Conflict

Somalia became a member of the Arab League in 1974, years before the failure of the state. Although, Somalis are not from Arab ethnic groups, but its connection due culture and religion are tied with the Arab countries. Furthermore, Somalia's geographical location allows it to trade easily with the Arab countries via the Arabian Peninsula.¹⁵² However, they are considered as part of the Arab cultures by their African counterparts. Also Somalia joined the league for trade purpose with

¹⁵² U.S library of congress, "Relations with Arab Countries,"
<http://countrystudies.us/somalia/79.htm>

the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, which lies across the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, no one was shocked to see Somalia to become a member of the Arab organizations. Initially Somalia joined the Arab league in order to fight against Washington and Moscow ideologies.

However, in 1977, the Barre's government of Somalia leaned towards Moscow by becoming a single party state receiving aid from the Soviet.¹⁵³ Believing on the support of the Soviet during the year, Somalia moved with the plan of establishing the greater Somalia again. In order to achieve its plan, the following years, Somalia fought wars with Ethiopia in the Ogaden region in order to recover its territory. However, when Soviet decided to support Ethiopia they experienced a devastating defeat against Ethiopia. The catastrophe they faced combined with the economic disaster it encountered made the government unpopular.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, more than the disappointment of the Moscow, the reaction of some of the Arab states angered Somalia. The Cairo and Riyadh governments supported Somalia during the war, while Libya supported Ethiopia. As a result, in the following years Barre broke all relations from Tripoli.

Later the support they get from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries made Somalia to be dependent on them for funds. Therefore, they took Saudi Arabia side against Qatar in their fight. However, Saudi Arabia was not willing to support Somalia for long. Moreover, during the recent blockade against Qatar, Somalia was requested to join Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) sides against Qatar, offering a financial aid to the government, but the current government had refused the offer and remained neutral. As a result of that, UAE had ended military cooperation program between both countries that was started in 2014, which was training and paying some members of the Somali army. During the eruption of the civil war, none of the Arab league members were willing to accept Somali refugees

¹⁵³ Hafed Al-Ghwell, "What Ever Happened to Somalia?" Arab news, <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1301391>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

rather they deported them from their countries forbidding them a work permit. Breaking the international law about deporting refugees from the country they have escaped.

Although, this and other events led to the fall of Barres' government in 1991, Ethiopian and Libyan government supported a rebellion against the Somali government leading to the split of the country into two northern and southern parts.¹⁵⁵ This opened a door for the failure of Somalia as a state. After the failure of the state in 1991 Somalia became a center of rivalry and proxy war not only between the regional states but also the Arab league member states. For instance in one side Saudi Arabia and UAE and in another side Qatar and Turkey. Somalia's geographical location and its waters is one of the main factors which drove those Arab states the same like others to control part of the areas. Somalia is close to vital oil routes and its ports could also serve landlocked Ethiopia, which has a population of 100 million.¹⁵⁶

The Arab league gave their support to the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia in order to reestablish peace in the nation. However, the problem is within the Arab league because of the disagreement among the member states they are using Somalia as a center of rivalry for their control. The Arab Union is made of Arab countries which share the same religion, culture and ethnicity. More importantly they were divided among the two sectarian division of Islam (Shia and Sunni).¹⁵⁷ This religious division hinders the league from uniting their ideas to achieve their goals. As a result, the rich members of the Union use their power to gain an upper hand over the other members.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Maggie Fick, "Harbouring ambitions: Gulf States scramble for Somalia," Reuters, May 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-gulf-analysis/harboring-ambitions-gulf-states-scramble-for-somalia-idUSKBN1I23B4>

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

After the defeat of Somalia by Ethiopian army with the help of Soviet, other Arab countries supported Somalia while Egypt chose to side with Ethiopia. This decision by Cairo was mainly influenced by their own national interest which they have on the Nile River. The Nile River which was the main life line of Egypt, more than 80% of it originates from Ethiopia.¹⁵⁸ As a result, in order to have influence over Ethiopia, Egypt is forced to shift its foreign policy for its own national interest. As a result, for years they have supported the union of Somalia while rejecting the identity of Somaliland. However, at the same time Cairo and Riyadh share a common goal halting the influence of Addis-Ababa from Somalia.

Other than that Riyadh has its own goals which no others share. The first one is spreading their influence over East Africa.¹⁵⁹ For this purpose Riyadh has donated millions of dollars to Somalia and other countries in east Africa. Furthermore, they provide education opportunities for Somalis by doing so they became the largest donors in the country making the country to be dependent on their fund. Second goal is to spread their style of Islam in the region.¹⁶⁰ And it is this religion which became one of the causes of civil war in Somalia.

Iraq and Iran intervened in the horn of Africa to curtail each other's influence in the region. Therefore, in 2014, the Arab league members arrived in Somalia for a peace conference and trying to minimize the gap among the different tribes and setting a legitimate government. But all of them had their own interest at heart rather than their need for achieving security in Somalia and in the region. Furthermore, until present they have not helped Somalia in any way with the exception of the funds they have provided to increase their own interest in the area and its resources.

¹⁵⁸ Nikola Pijovic, "Seceding but not succeeding: Africa International Relations and Somaliland's lacking international recognition," CIRR Vol. XIX, No. 68, 2013, P.13

¹⁵⁹ Analysis, "The Great GAME: The Arabs and The Great Game in Somalia," Octobr 31, 2006, <https://www.biyokulule.com/The%20Great%20Game.htm>

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

3.2.2. The Role of the UN in the Somali Conflict

The United Nation (UN) is an organization first established during the Second World War with 26 members which vowed to destroy the Axis forces. The goal of UN is to preserve peace and security in the world. Unlike the regional and sub-regional blocs, the UN represents sovereign countries throughout the world. They are also responsible for drafting resolutions which could support countries to develop and protect their people. When a problem arises in a state within one region first it is the mandate of the regional and sub-regional organization to try to solve the problem but, when they couldn't solve the problem the UN are required to interfere in the situation. International community UN will deploy their forces from countries around the world.

With the case of Somalia, UN was engaged from the start of the civil conflict. This is due to the fact that there were no sub-regional or strong regional powers that could protect the peace and securities of the nation in particular and the region in general. Initially, international community was withdrawn on many occasions throughout infrequent outbreaks of violence. A series of Security Council resolutions (733, 746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped to impose a ceasefire between the 2 key factions, signed at the top of March 1992.

These efforts were motor-assisted by alternative international bodies, like the Organization for African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Muslim Courts, UNOSOMI which was initially established by the UN in order to protect the region from further civil conflict and possible war.¹⁶¹ The UN mission to Somalia was established after the failing of the state in 1991, during the war between the clans and the government became violent. The civil war continued throughout the following year causing the death of more than three hundred thousand civilians and approximately 4 million people were displaced either by

¹⁶¹ Department of Public Information, United Nations, "Somalia – United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), 21 March 1997, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

immigrating to other countries or other areas.¹⁶² Furthermore, the region was hit by drought and poverty in addition to the civil struggle going around.

As a result, the international community was forced to interfere in the humanitarian crisis. As a result, in 1992 the UN mission was organized to undertake observation task initially with a team members elected to study what is happening in Somalia and in the region. These members elected to study the situation in Somalia were from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe, served under Chief Military Observer Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan.¹⁶³ However, the situation in Somalia got from bad to worse with the people forced to be refugees in the neighboring countries and other international countries. As a result, in the same year the UN was forced to deploy military forces and supplies to the people which were displaced because of the civil war.

After the observation committee finished their work the mission prepared to undertake a humanitarian aid for a hundred day strategic plan. Under this plan they have devised some goals to be attained like plans such as, poverty reduction by providing food aids, establishing first aids, providing clean drinking water, providing places for refugees, preventing of mass influx of refugees to other areas with initiating a cease fire among the different parties.¹⁶⁴ In order to achieve these goals millions of funds were spent. Despite, the effort made by UN for the ceasefire, the fighting among the tribes still continued.

Throughout the 1992 the conditions in Somalia grew worst affecting the neighboring countries and the region of east Africa. While Somalia continued to be fragmented the conditions of the people got much worst. This situation created another challenge to the UN peace keeping forces deployed in Somali. As the

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

number of factions grew the possibility of reaching the people with food and other humanitarian aids become very difficult. This is because of the difficulties of the mission which faced while transporting the foods and other first aid from one territory to another territory. Moreover, the factions also started to stop this movement of aids in order to gain an upper hand in the conflict. Some were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention.

Troops were shot, aid ships attacked and prevented from arrival to their destination, cargos were laid-off upon and aid agencies. Moreover, terrorism and piracy reached its high level during this year. Meanwhile, millions of locals were forced to flee their home to protect themselves and their families from famine and murder as a result of conflict. While the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid who was the head of the USC called for the withdrawal of the UN peace keeping forces from Somalia moreover, declared a hostile intent against other international powers peace keeping forces.¹⁶⁵

In December of the same year the UN Security Council agreed to accept help from the US.¹⁶⁶ Allowing Washington to take a leading role not only in initiating a peace process among the warlords but also provide foreign aids to Somalia. This is the period in which Washington increased its power after Soviet Union's collapse. As a result, Washington was calling the shots on the decisions regarding many cases in the UN council. The following years they established a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) a task which was led by Washington to undertake the humanitarian aid, under take national development process and economic

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ United Nations 6046th Meeting, "SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES STATES TO USE LAND-BASED OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA, AS PART OF FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY OFF COAST, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING 1851," Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2008, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9541.doc.htm>

revitalization.¹⁶⁷ Regardless US troop's leading the mission; more than twenty two countries also sent armies to work alongside the US armies.¹⁶⁸

Until the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, the UN forces managed to recover almost half part of Somalia and reached many parts of the state with humanitarian aid. However, in the next year they decided to replace the task force name to UNIOSOMII.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, deeming the time has come to reestablish the UNIOSOM task force secondly the general secretary of the UN convinced the replacement of the task forces by the UNIOSOMII. According to him this mission will work towards securing peace in the region and help the local people to works towards their countries economic, socially and political development under their guidance.¹⁷⁰

3.2.3. The UN intervention to Somalia

The United Nations mission for Somalia started their intervention from the initial start of the civil war in 1991. Furthermore, in order to solve the problem they played a huge role in easing the disaster in which the people of Somalia faced through humanitarian aids and by instigating a ceasefire among the warlords. The first intervention was initiated by the UN by calling the organization of African unity, the Arab league and Islamic court to a round table on how to handle the rising civil war. After long talk though, not for long they have succeeded to cease the war for a few months however, with time the situation in Somalia went from bad to worst. Throughout the years several UN humanitarian agencies and NGO's continued their humanitarian work alongside the UN peace keeping mission.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, Department of Public Information UN

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Franke Benedikt, "Africa's evolving security architecture and the concept of multilayered security communities," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 43, 2008, Pp. 313–39

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Those UN agencies could be listed as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO).¹⁷¹ Though, those humanitarian UN agencies and NGO's provide immediate relief to the Somali society in the long run, they created an economy dependency on the region because humanitarian aids do not solve the permanent problem of the nation but by creating employment or work opportunities. It just relieved the states for a little while after they withdrew the crisis remained the same. This was the case not only in Somalia but in almost all third war countries.

After the Second World War when most African and Asian countries gained their independence from their colonial powers they didn't remain independent for a long time. Though they had the formality of sovereign states, they were re-colonized by economy and diplomatic factors. That was the case which started during the Cold War lean to one side policy which forced those countries to be divided among two strong powers of Moscow and Washington. After 1991, when a single super power appeared as the hegemon in the world politics, all the countries around the world started adopting their strategy as their policy. Furthermore, those policies were applied in the countries by indirect intervention which was opposite to the colonization time. The west applied their policy using the UN agencies such as World Bank, IMF and other Pro-west agencies by preaching democratization, economic liberalization and privatization.

However, Somalia unlike the other countries didn't encounter the neo-liberalization policies despite the fact that IMF and the World Bank started working in the late 1989.¹⁷² As a result, they can't benefit from those agencies therefore;

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² International Monetary Fund (IMF) News, "Six Things to Know about Somalia's Economy," April 11, 2017, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/11/NA041117-Six-Things-to-Know-About-Somalia-Economy>

they become dependent from the UN humanitarian agencies. Those humanitarian agencies have given over \$4.5 billion donations during 2013.¹⁷³ Nevertheless, those donations did not come freely in return those agencies required to install the government which can help them to penetrate the region more.

After the replacement of the special task force with the United Nation peacekeeping force in Somalia UNISOMII, the UN forces started to negotiation with the warlord general who was the leader of the militia forces about disarmament and ceasefire without a positive result. UNITAF was licensed below Chapter VII of the world organization Charter.¹⁷⁴ Thinking that UN intervention would somehow convince the militia leader to negotiation ceasefire and disarm was rather underestimation of the warlord's orientation.¹⁷⁵ After recognizing that their strategy of peacekeeping is not going to work they launched an attack against the militia groups. However, the UN forces were defeated by the warlord in the mid of 1993 an encounter which not only was humiliating for the UN but also forced them to retreat out of the state in 1995.¹⁷⁶ As a result this period ended the peacekeeping process initiated by the UN peacekeeping mission for Somalia.

The US had a strategic interest in Somalia which started during the Cold War, that's why they took initiative in 1992 to lead a peace keeping force under the guidance of the UN, spending millions of dollars in the mission. However, after being defeated in the confrontation against the militia army and lost some of their

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Killander Magnusm "The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights," *The First Reviews and the Way Forward*, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 30 (2008): Pp. 41–75.

¹⁷⁵ Robert G Patman, "Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993," *African Affairs*, Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society, Vol. 96, No. 385 (Oct., 1997), pp. 509-533, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/723817>, Accessed: 26-09-2018

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

soldiers they decided to withdraw from the Somalia.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the peace keeping missions become more expensive than their initial expectation. As a result, they lost their interest in the area and in the country calling their soldiers from the area. This situation continued until September 11 when a terrorist attack was made in US which forced them to inter those with the availability of terrorist.

The humanitarian agencies also suffered by the constant attacks from the militia forces. This was due to the fact that the NGO's and humanitarian agencies were closely linked with US and UN peacekeeping forces. Therefore, deeming them to be part of the peace keeping mission they faced certain difficulties. Furthermore, some members of the NGO were killed while rations were robbed from their compound.¹⁷⁸ This in turn created a tension among the NGO's and UN forces for not providing enough security for the humanitarian agencies

The actions of the UN intervention had negative effects in the social and economic of the country as well. Despite the initial promise of the mission which was attainment of peace and stability in Somalia and supporting the country to achieve economic development and growth, the peace keeping forces were amerced in a fight which took a long time. Furthermore, since the start of the international intervention more than 399, 000 people lose their life due to conflict, poverty and sickness. Furthermore, with all the military and humanitarian operation they undertook and the fund which they spent the result was very little. This situation combined with the support the UN provided Ethiopia caused violence within the militia and the people of Somalia and triggered the already going conflict.¹⁷⁹

After many failed attempts by the United Nation peacekeeping forces, first the US then the other members such as France, Belgium and others decided to

¹⁷⁷ Afyare Abdi Elmi & Dr Abdullahi Barise, "The Somali Conflict: Rootcauses, obstacles, and peace-building strategies," *African Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006, Pp. 32-54,

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ Ibid

withdrew from Somalia. As a result, after a discussion in the UN under the Resolution 954, the United Nation peace keeping forces withdrew from Somalia and its territory without achieving anything. However, their intervention didn't stop although they never undertook another effect behind the other regional organizations of OAU, AU, Arab league and others they continued to intervene in the conflict, in some cases by providing funds for humanitarian and peace conferences. However, the interventions did not help either Somalia or the people of Somalia because rather than adopting a strategy which could be apply to the people in the region they tried to solve the problem based on their own ideas of peace and stability.

3.2.4. The UN Support to AMISOM

The AMISOM is a special peacekeeping mission in Somalia which specifically works with African countries but under the guidance of the United Nations. Out of the fifty-four members, only six provided forces to join the AMISOM peacekeeping forces funded by the UN, EU and other international powers. Moreover, those countries that sent their troops have their own security interest in the region that's why despite the cost they are willing to keep the peace keeping forces. However, it is one of the most expensive missions.

On 16 of January, 2009, the United Nations council passed Resolution 1863 requesting the secretary-general to deliver a provision support package to the African Union Mission in African country (AMISOM). One shortly thenceforth, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon set that the package ought to be delivered through a complete support workplace overseen by the Department of Field Support (DFS): the United Nations Support workplace for the African Union Mission in African country (UNSOA). UNSOA's initial package coated "accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armored vehicles [for AMISOM's police officers], helicopters, vehicle maintenance, and communications, some sweetening

of key provision facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services.”¹⁸⁰ So as to deliver these services, DFS adopted a staffing model that deployed personnel to national capital, Nairobi, and Entebbe.

However, the same with the UN forces and other peacekeeping missions they are not welcomed by Somalia's. The main reason for this is that this mission all wants to install the transitional government in the country. As a result, they have also suffered a huge blow from the Al-Shabab terrorist attacks and fights. It is true since their entry in Somalia they have recovered certain cities from the terrorist groups however; the Al-Shabab has more advantage over those peace keeping forces as they can mingle with the society easily. As a result, Al-Shabab has succeeded in organizing terrorist attacks against the mission and civilians. This led to the failure of the mission to maintain peace in the region. Although, they participated in peace conferences which were funded by UN and other international powers but they couldn't achieve a desired result.

In the conclusion, As it is discussed in this chapter in detail, the involvement of sub-regional, regional and international actors in solving the issues of conflict in Somalia, one way or another those actors failed in achieving peace and stability in Somalia and Horn of Africa. What's more, as their involvement increased the conflict increased as well. This was due to the fact that the people of Somalia and the rebel groups couldn't accept their penetration. Furthermore, all the actors have self-interest in common which caused the peace accords to fail numerous times regardless of the funds spent on peacekeeping troops, humanitarian agencies and peace accords.

¹⁸⁰ Samuel, Schulman and Williams, Davids. Photo Essay: *AMISOM, RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) Journal* vol 157:5 (2012)

CONCLUSION

As it was shown in the previous chapters, the main root cause of the Somali conflict traced back to the times where European powers divided and colonized the Africa continent. Somalia as part of Africa was divided into three parts by British, France and Italy, without regard to the culture, ethnicity and religious affiliation of the people. In addition, once they colonized the parts, colonizers transferred their cultures and political ideologies to the areas which they conquered. By doing so, they hindered all the possibilities of future peace and unity in the region. That is mainly the reason that the former colonies immersed in fight against each other starting from the independence. While the population sharing the same ethnicity, religion and culture tried to be split them from the state which were annexed after their independence.

Colonization didn't only create an artificial border but also divided the region into different political ideologies and new cultures. Another reason which forced the country to be submerged in an ending conflict was the "divide and rule" strategy which gives power to a few elite to rule over the majority. The same as in Somalia, the few elite people led them as head of the clans. Moreover Somalis are more affiliated to their clans rather than to their states. As a result, it was really hard to achieve a sovereign state with legal entity which takes the lead in the development of the country. When a leader is also elected, he elects parliament members from his tribes giving power to his clan members and disregarding others, leading to conflict for power and control of resources. This is an ending process which has been occurring for decades after the independence of the country from colonizers.

Though, in order to solve the existing conflict which took lives of millions of Somalis, the international powers entered to intervene in Somalia starting from 1991. We didn't see the external interventions to solve the conflict or the peace building initiatives to succeed; rather they fueled the already existing conflict. The international organization such as the UN, OAU, AU, IGAD and Arab League with the addition of individual international powers such as the US, Russia etc, have tried

in many times to initiate a peace process. However, regardless of those all initiations of accords and financial supports they accomplished nothing. Rather than solving the problem they made matters worse in the region in general. The only international actors which played an important role in the conflict were the humanitarian agencies. Because at least those agencies tried to save many lives as possible to the people who were suffering as a result of the conflict and draught.

There are three essential dimensions of the intervention in Somalia as international, regional and sub-regional. The civil war cannot be described as the simplest political and economic hobbies of the Somalis however, strategic interests of the global actors, mainly the EU and the US. As Somalia is located in the strategic vicinity which connects to the Arab peninsula it can be used as a rout to transport oil from the Arab countries. Moreover, for decades they have penetrated the region. The conflict in Somalia has brought about the thriving lifestyles of terrorism and the emergence of the danger of the piracy off the coast of Somalia which threatens international trade activities for the global actors at the Horn of Africa. As a result, the international actors have deployed their peacekeeping mission in order to protect their own interest. For instance, they deployed special peacekeeping forces to keep security in the gulf region to protect the international shipments form piracy and terrorism more than that of the operation in Mogadishu with the intention of protecting civilians from death and starvation.

Presently, there are optimist discussions going for the establishment of proper and legitimate government in Somalia with long-lasting peace in mind. For this purpose international actors are investing millions of dollars. However, the diversity of actors, objectives and assumptions has created various challenges in the negotiation process. In this environment, there is a hazard that external factors will implement projects that contradict one another's efforts, and/or may additionally ultimately over-dominate the space needed for a Somali-brokered political settlement. Furthermore, all their strategies are not in alignment with what Somalia needs at this moment.

Moreover, regardless of the amount of money spent for the negotiation of peace process nothing is achieved. Mainly because all the actors have different interests in the region which caused an overlap of interest. When we start with sub-regional actors, the IGAD members regardless of the efforts done nothing have come out of their work mainly due to the conflict among the member states (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan (North and South), Djibouti-Eritrea etc). The proxy fight among the countries to install the government of their choice made it difficult to succeed in the peace conference.

Similar with the Arab league countries, the competition among the countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran made the situation worse. This is because those countries interest were not maintaining peace in the region but their interests were to control the strategic area and establishing their sects and political ideology. The UN intervention was also not different from the other interventions just in a biggest form of fight of self-interest countries within the world.

However, we can't just conclude it is only the international intervention which drove the country to fail because of a civil conflict. While the international actors remain in their place the greediness of the clan leaders is another important internal factor which led to the hostile ethnic conflict.

With all the above information's in line step one needed is for Somalia leadership is to prioritize the look for a political agreement with the armed insurgents. Clerics, enterprise leaders and extended family elders to rebuild the specified agree with, without which a political accord may be impossible. This is because first Somali people have to agree among themselves to solve their own problems before asking for international intervention. Because, if a country is not interested in solving its problems, it can be used by an outside actors. The global community should also to help these projects and step up its financial assist to allow these authorities to become qualitatively special from the beyond failed transitional government.

The important thing to finishing this cycle is the establishment of an all-inclusive peace and reconciliation process that could cause the creation of definitely famous, credible and valid authorities. Different contentious trouble like; sharia, federalism, clan and identity politics can best be tackled successfully as soon as a consensual fashion of politics, if now not democracy, replaces the present day politics of extended family quotas, ideological polarization, Islamism.

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