

T.C.  
ATILIM UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE PROGRAMME

RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S AND RUSSIA DURING THE  
KOSOVO CRISIS

Master's Thesis

Hasan Mert Cankara

Ankara – 2015

T.C.  
ATILIM UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE PROGRAM

RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S AND RUSSIA DURING THE KOSOVO  
CRISIS

Master's Thesis


Prepared By  
Hasan Mert Cankara

Supervisor  
Assoc. Prof.Hasan Ali Karasar

Ankara-2015

## ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL


This is to certify that this thesis titled "Relations between the U.S and Russia during the Kosovo Crisis" and prepared by Hasan Mert Cankara meets with the committee's approval unanimously/ by a majority vote as Master's Thesis in the field of Department of International Relations following the successful defense of the thesis conducted in 14.08.2015.



Prof. Dr.Hasan ÜNAL / Member



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bestami BİLGİÇ / Member



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali KARASAR / Supervisor

## ETHICS DECLARATION

I hereby declare that;

- I prepared this thesis in accordance with Atilim University Graduate School of Social Sciences Thesis Writing Directive
- I prepared this thesis within the framework of academic and ethics rules
- I presented all information, documents, evaluations and findings in accordance with scientific ethical and moral principles
- I cited all sources to which I made reference in my thesis
- The work of art in this thesis is original

I hereby acknowledge all possible loss of rights in case of a contrary circumstance. (In case of any circumstance contradicting with my declaration)

14.08.2015

---



Hasan Mert CANKARA

## ÖZ

### **CANKARA, Hasan Mert. Kosova Krizi esnasında Rus Amerikan ilişkileri, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2015**

Dünya yaklaşık yarım yüzyıl boyunca iki kutuplu olarak yönetildi. İkinci dünya savaşı sonrası gelişen süreçte, ABD'nin başını çektiği batı bloğu ve SSCB'nin öncülüğündeki doğu bloğu bu iki kutbu teşkil ettiler.

1989'da Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılması ile resmi olarak bu iki kutuplu düzenin sona erdi. Bu andan sonra, dünya, Balkanlar başta olmak üzere yeni çatışma alanlarının oluşmasına sahne oldu. Eski Sosyalist Yugoslavya'nın parçalanışı, bölgedeki hâkimiyet kurma yarışını beraberinde getirdi. Balkan Krizleri, Sovyetlerin yıkılmasının ardından kurulan Rusya'nın, yeniden toparlanması ve uluslararası alanda kendine yer bulma çabaları bakımından, zor birer sınavdı.

1990'ların sonlarına doğru Kosova'da ortaya çıkan kriz, büyük bir otorite tesis etme savaşını da beraberinde getirdi. 1989 yılında gerçekleşen anayasa değişikliği ile Kosova, özerk yapısını kaybetti. Bu ondan sonra yaşanan etnik çatışmalar bütün dünyanın dikkatini Avrupa'nın bu küçük toprak parçasına yöneltti. Eski gücünden uzakta olan Rusya bu kriz esnasında Yugoslavya'nın adeta hamisi gibi davranarak, hem tezlerini kabul ettirmeye çalıştı hem de BM Güvenlik Konseyi'ndeki veto hakkı ile olası bir askeri müdahalenin önüne geçmek istedi. Fakat batı savunma bloğu NATO, ABD öncülüğünde teammüler dışına çıkılarak, herhangi bir self-determinasyon hakkı oluşmadan ve Güvenlik Konseyi kararı olmadan 76 gün süren ağır bir hava hücum harekâtı gerçekleştirdi ve böylece Miloseviç'i anlaşma masasına oturmaya ikna etti.

Bu kriz, Rusya ile süper güç ABD'nin adeta bir gövde gösterisine sahne olmuş, fakat o zamanda geçiş dönemindeki Rusların zayıflığından dolayı ABD'nin zaferi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu sebeple, halen günümüzde de devam eden ve en son Kırım'ın Ruslar tarafından ilhakı ile sonuçlanan çekişmelerin temeli olarak Kosova Krizi, bu çalışmada ele alınmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kosova, ABD, Rusya Federasyonu, Birleşmiş Milletler, NATO

## ABSTRACT

**CANKARA, Hasan Mert. Relations between US and Russia during the Kosovo Crisis, MA Thesis, Ankara, 2015**

The world was governed by two polar forces for approximately half a century. The USA-led western bloc and the Soviet Union-led eastern bloc formed these two polar forces in the post-World War II era.

It has been accepted that this bipolarity was ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1989. Later, the world has witnessed the formation of new conflict zones such as Balkans. The break-up of former socialist Yugoslavia has led to the race for dominating the area. Russia was formed after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the Balkan crises were challenging their efforts to pick themselves up and claim a spot in the international arena.

The crisis in Kosovo in late 1990s has led to the battle for securing an authority. Kosovo lost its autonomous status after the change of constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic. Ethnic battles after this have caused the whole world to pay attention to this small land in Europe. Far from its powerful times, Russian Federation has acted like a countenancer of the FRY, and they have tried to supply their policies. Furthermore, they wanted to prevent a possible military intervention by using their veto right in the UN Security Council. However, the western defence alliance NATO carried out an unprecedented 76 day-long air strike operation without a self-determination right or a Security Council decision, thus forced Milosevic to reach an agreement.

This crisis has caused a demonstration of power between Russia, which was formed after collapse of the USSR, and the superpower USA. But due to weaknesses of Russia in transition period, it ended with the victory of the USA. Therefore, this study discusses the Kosovo crisis as an origin to the conflicts that persists today, most recently concluded with the annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation.

**Key Words:** Kosovo, USA, Russian Federation, United Nations, NATO

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the very beginning, I want to acknowledge my respected advisor Professor Hasan Ali Karasar. He has spent his worthy time during my thesis with full of his patience. He has become the beacon top of the hill to me for any academic research. At the meantime, I want to send my gratitude to my Dean Professor Hasan Ünal and to Assistant Professor Gözde Yalçın for their sympathy to my endless questions.

Also I want to thank my family; Mustafa Çağatay Cankara, Feray Cankara, Merve Demir and also my lovely spouse Merve Çiçek for their mental support during my anxious days.

Furthermore, I want to pay my pleasant to my company commander and to my colleagues for giving flexible work-hours to me during the year.

At the end, I want to send my special gratitude to my former battalion commander MA Lieutenant Colonel Cem Yılmaz, current Assistant Military Attaché in France. He was a guide not just only for my academic career, but also to my horizons. He is the one who take me to this academic path and I will not omit this.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ÖZ .....	i
ABSTRACT .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1

### CHAPTER ONE

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOSOVO

1.1. Kosovo before the Ottoman Empire .....	4
1.2. Kosovo during Ottoman Empire .....	8
1.2.1. The arrival of Ottoman Empire to Kosovo .....	8
1.2.2. Ottoman Rule over Kosovo at its peak .....	9
1.2.3. Weakening of the Ottoman Control over Kosovo and Serbian Revolution.....	11
1.3. Kosovo during Kingdom of Yugoslavia .....	14
1.4. Kosovo during Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia .....	16
1.5. Kosovo during Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-1999).....	20

### CHAPTER TWO

#### THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE RUSSIA

2.1. Relations between the Tsarist Russia and the USA .....	22
2.2. Relations between USSR and US .....	25
2.2.1. Relations between USSR and US during interwar period (1917-1939) .....	25
2.2.2. Relations between USSR and US during the World War II (1939-1945) .....	27
2.2.3 Relations between USSR and US during the Cold War (1945-1991) .....	28

### CHAPTER THREE

#### KOSOVO CRISIS AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

3.1. Kosovo War .....	35
-----------------------	----

3.2. United Nations during Kosovo Crisis .....	41
3.2.1. UN Before the Operation Allied Force .....	42
3.2.2. UN After the Operation Allied Forces .....	47
3.3. NATO during Kosovo Crisis .....	50
3.4. Russian Theses and Putin's Speeches for the Kosovo Crisis.....	54

## CHAPTER THREE

### CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION.....	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	63

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

WWI:	World War I
WWII:	World War II
CPY:	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
SFRY:	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FRY:	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UÇK:	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves
USA:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USAF:	United States Air Force
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR:	United Nations Protection Forces
LDK:	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves
KDOM:	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
KVM:	Kosovo Verification Mission

KFOR: Kosovo Force

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis mainly covers the Kosovo Crisis and its reactions. It can be said that the constitutional amendment of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990 triggered this crisis. From that time till now, Kosovar territory have witnessed both military and political conflicts. Besides that, Kosovo Crisis had a significant influence on the relations between the Russian Federation and the USA. After the end of the cold war, Kosovo Crisis and its sequences have paved the way for possible military operation to a sovereign country for the reason of the human rights without an UN Security Council resolution even it is legitimate or not.

The actual name “Kosovo” is of Turkish-Albanian origin and was used to designate the Kosovo *vilayet* which, before the Balkan War of 1912, covered the territory of Sandjak, Gornije, Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, as well as northern Macedonia up to Veles, and eastern Macedonia up to the Bregalnica catchment. This territory paved the way to transform of the international law practices and this period will be explained in detail in this thesis.

Also, you can find a brief history of the relations between the Russian Federation and the USA. Because, Kosovo Crisis witnessed the conflict between American-led western policy and Russian-led eastern counter-policy. The history among these two states, the USA and the RF, could be a guiding to come across to understand the discordance between them during the Kosovo Crisis.

This thesis facilitates English, French and Turkish sources in order to develop a balanced view of how the Kosovo Crisis was perceived by the American, the Russian, the Serbian and the European perspective. I have focused official international agencies’ reports such as the United Nations and NATO in general. I believe this method can secure the objectivity. In this manner, everyone who read this thesis can deduct his or her own ideas impartially.

The main conceptual and historical framework for this thesis was provided by special monographs of the Russian, Turkish and Western scholars. Julie Kim, Noam

Chomsky, Miranda Vickers, Dusan T. Batakovic were the most significant writers about Kosovo, Kosovo Crisis and its effect on the relations between the USA and the Russian Federation.

Julie Kim from Congressional Report Service has focused on mostly the background of the Operation Allied Forces, its development and the effects of it. She published lots of essays related with the Kosovo Crisis. Noam Chomsky, famous linguist, has especially focused on the legitimacy and legality of this operation. He strongly believes that this crisis and the followed path during the crisis was unlawful and the policies implemented after the crisis were double standards with no doubt. Miranda Vickers has usually focused on the historical background of the crisis and Kosovo. Her precious works concentrated to the history of Kosovo and thence, I can benefit. Dusan T. Batakovic is the editor of the *Balkanica* series. It was also a precious work for all Balkan history.

As for Turkish sources, there are lots of valuable works related with the historical background of Kosovo and the crisis. Especially Ottoman times for Kosovo, Professor Halil İnalcık has been my guide through this thesis.

First chapter of my thesis deals with the historical background of Kosovo, starting with Illyrians in 4<sup>th</sup> BC. In different periods of time, the Balkan Peninsula was inhabited by different settlers who were fighting for controlling this region because of its beauty of nature, fertile soil and strategic location. Second chapter concentrates on the history of the relations between the Russian Federation and the USA. This topic could be another master thesis along itself and for this reason I have tried to give just a brief chronology in this chapter.

Third chapter is the main chapter which focuses on the Kosovo Crisis in detail. I have used generally United Nations and NATO documents in this chapter to. The reason that I have chosen these documents, is for the broad spectrum of infollution. While I was writing this chapter, I have tried to focus the measures that were taken from both sides under the international law practices. Thereby, transforming of these international law practices can be realized in each steps during the crisis. Kosovo Crisis and its

independence period contain lots of arguments and conflict inside and all of these have been approached in this study.

## CHAPTER ONE

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOSOVO

As a territory, Kosovo was ruled by several powers such as the Romans, the Serbians, the Ottomans and the Albanians before securing their independence. In order to understand Kosovo, it is very important to focus on its history from the early times until it gets its independence.

“The actual name “Kosovo” is of Turkish-Albanian origin and was used to designate the Kosovo *vilayet* which, before the Balkan War of 1912, covered the territory of Sandjak, Gornije Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, as well as northern Macedonia up to Veles, and eastern Macedonia up to the Bregalnica catchment.”<sup>1</sup> Under the light of this geographic description of Kosovo it would be helpful to further our focus on the historical background of Kosovo.

#### 1.1. Kosovo before the Ottoman Empire

As long as the ethnic conflicts have occurred between Albanians and Serbs over Kosovo, there are varied theories of both sides and they both strive to substantiate their own theories for Kosovo's history. Both academic theories and political assertions were broached in these historiographies. Therefore it is so hard to separate the academic ones from the political ones.

A common claim of a continuity of descent from the ancient Illyrian is now accompanied by arguments that Kosovo and Metohija form parts of an ancient Illyrian homeland that should naturally be united with the rest of modern Albania. The people occupying an extensive tract of territory bordering on the Adriatic from Epirus in the south and Macedonia in the south-east to Istria in the north called as Illyrians.<sup>2</sup> The

---

<sup>1</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albania: A history of Kosovo*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp: xiv-xv

<sup>2</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 1

establishment of the Dardanian Kingdom, with an Illyrian origin, was about the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. Dardanian Kingdom was not a tribal society at all; they had an organized army, they had a hereditary dynasty that started with Bardylis, they had diplomatic contacts with their neighbours.<sup>3</sup>

Dardanians had faced with a number of challenges while they were building up their power. One of the biggest turmoil was about the wars of the Diadochi. These wars were about to rule the immense territory of Alexander the Great's inheritance after his death. Especially during the war between Dardanian Kingdom and one of the Alexander the Great's general Lysimachus from 284 BC to 281 BC, Dardanians were suffered heavily and deserted from Macedonian borders back the middle of the kingdom for their safety. Two years after the wars, they encountered the arrival of Celts in 279 BC. Celtic tribes wanted the treasures of the Greek temples and it brought about a major devastation in Dardanian homeland.<sup>4</sup>

After they overcame these crises and constructed their state, they had to face with the arrival of the Roman Legions to Illyricum in 200 BC. While the Romans were advancing through Macedonia, Dardanians allied with the Romans against Macedonia. After Macedonians fell under the Roman rule, they had a direct connection with the Romans and after several beleaguers, Scribonius Curio's campaign besieged the whole of Dardania from 75 to 73 BC. Dardanian Kingdom started to lose its territories piece by piece. At the end, these territories became a part of the Roman province of Upper Moesia in 28 BC.<sup>5</sup>

“Apart from military and municipal territories and private estates, Upper Moesia was divided into four major units named after the local tribes: Dardani (Dardania) in the entire south of province, and the areas of

---

<sup>3</sup> Edi Shukriu, “Prehistory and antique history of Kosovo,” University of Pristina, *unpublished phd dissertation*, Pristina 2008, p:11, [http://www.universitetiaab.com/repository/docs/03-Edi\\_Shukriu-anglisht.pdf](http://www.universitetiaab.com/repository/docs/03-Edi_Shukriu-anglisht.pdf), (06.01.2015)

<sup>4</sup> Vladimir P. Petrovic, “Pre-Roman and Roman Dardania Historical and Geographical Considerations,” in *Balkanica XXXVII*, Dusan T. Batakovic (edt), Institute for Balcan Studies Press, Belgrade 2007, p:8

<sup>5</sup> Vladimir P. Petrovic, pp: 9-10

Tricornienses (Tricornenses), Pincenses (Picenses) and Moesi in the north.’<sup>6</sup>

As a province, Upper Moesia survived about 200 years and Dardania had been its integral part during those years. One of the Roman ethnic folk, Dacians (also known as Dacia Aureliani), was getting expanded the north side of Danube on those years also. During this expansion, The Dacian Kingdom seized Upper Moesia in A.D. 284 and reorganized the territory. After Dacians arrival Dardania became a Dacian province and Naissus (today’s Nis) came into being the capital of Dardania.<sup>7</sup>

During 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> centuries Christianity started to penetrate into the Balkan Peninsula as well. The first ecumenical meeting, Council of Nicaea, was gathered by calling of the Roman Emperor in A.D. 325. A number of bishops from Dardania also attended this council. Furthermore, 18 years later, another group of bishops took part at the next council, Council of Sardica in A.D. 343.<sup>8</sup> As we conceived from these examples, Dardanian territory was one of early centres of Christianity in the Balkan Peninsula.

From the early 5<sup>th</sup> century A.D. on, a new people from the East, Huns started to appear in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula. Huns immediately posed a threat for the Roman Empire and its provinces. From 406 A.D. until the first defeat of the Huns by the Romans in 427 in Pannonia, the Huns actively remained within the Balkan Peninsula.<sup>9</sup> After their defeat at Pannonia, it would not be possible to see them as a efficient power in the Balkans again. They lived as scattered tribal groups throughout the region.

The arrival of the Slavs was embraced in the 6<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>10</sup> There are varying theories about where these Slavs originally came from. One of the most popular theory

---

<sup>6</sup> Vladimir P. Petrovic, p: 12

<sup>7</sup> J.J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992, p:120

<sup>8</sup> Robert Elsie, *Historical Dictionary of Kosovo*, Toronto: Scarecrow Press, 2011, p:61

<sup>9</sup> Peter Heather, “The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe”, *The English Historical Review*, Oxford University Press, Vol:110, No:435, February 1995, pp:16-17, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/573374?origin=JSTOR-pdf> (16.01.2015)

<sup>10</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 2

says that 10,000 people came to Illyricum and Thrace in 558 and 559 from the Eastern parts of the Balkan territory. These people were called as *Sclavenes* and these *Sclavenes'* lands were also called as *Sclaveni*. They were speaking a Slavic tongue.<sup>11</sup>

Slavs seized Thessaloniki in 586, in an effort to capture it from Byzantium.<sup>12</sup> The constant arrival of Slavs from the east to the peninsula made them a dominant group by the beginning of the 7<sup>th</sup> century. Throughout the centuries, Slavic migration to the Balkan Peninsula started to reflect itself also in Upper Moesia, today's Kosovo. This region had been governed by Byzantium until the Emperor Manuel Komnenos died in 1180. During the decade of 1180-1190, three incursions struck the Byzantium; Hungarian attack in 1183, Norman invasion in 1185 and Third Crusade in 1189. These were resulted with disastrous consequences. Stefan Nemanja, the first known king of the Slavic dynasty, was the ally of these three incursions into the Byzantium. He was able to get Upper Moesia and Metohija, including Prizren, and continued to the northern Macedonia, taking Skopje and the upper Vardar with the assistance of these incursions.<sup>13</sup>

Nemanja's kingdom was turned into a modest "empire" in the Balkan sense within a century and a half. It has achieved a *de-facto* independence from Byzantium and other neighbours. This has also accompanied with a rapid expansion of the Orthodoxy in the Balkans under the patronage of this now "Serbian" empire.

This dynasty survived until the death of Stefan Dusan in 1355. Even he could extend his Empire, it was hard to keep this empire integrated. According to Miranda Vickers, Stefan Dusan couldn't keep this empire intact. He divided his lands into provinces to hold his empire strong against the invasions. He has given these provinces to powerful chieftains. But after his death, these chieftains strived to get empire's throne themselves and that strife disintegrated this powerful Serbian empire into small

---

<sup>11</sup> Florin Curta, *The Making of the Slavs, History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region, c. 500-700*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p: 44

<sup>12</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 5

<sup>13</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 6-7

vulnerable principalities. Therefore, the Serbian provinces couldn't keep their unity against Ottoman expansion.<sup>14</sup>

## 1.2. Kosovo during Ottoman Empire

By 1370, there was still a Serbian state but at much weaker and smaller scale. "Thessaly, Epirus and Albania had seceded entirely, and internal feuds between the various autonomous Slavic and Albanian lords had allowed the Ottomans, throughout the 1360s, to penetrate deep into Thrace with little opposition. They were unable to form a sufficiently strong and united coalition to fight the Ottomans when the latter confronted them on 26 September 1371 at the Battle of Marica, near Crnomen, where the Ottomans scored their greatest success up to that time."<sup>15</sup> This fragmentation in the Serbian regions created a power-vacuum in Balkan Peninsula and paved the path for the arrival of Ottoman armies. With the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Ottomans brought an end to Serbian rule over Kosovo and the Balkans.<sup>16</sup>

### 1.2.1. The arrival of Ottoman Empire to Kosovo

The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 was the first war that gave a chance to the Ottoman Empire to rule over Kosovo. While they got that chance, on the other hand, there was an approaching threat from the east to the Anatolia; Timurid Empire. That was the significant reason of creating a trustworthy vassal to rule over the territory which was acquired the Battle of Kosovo. Hence Stefan Lazarevich, the son of Prince Lazar, who was killed in Battle of Kosovo, was appointed by the Ottomans to organise a Serbian Despotate in 1402.<sup>17</sup> He was the first despot of the Serbian Despotate and furthermore he was the brother-in-law of the Turkish Sultan Yıldırım Beyazıt. This

---

<sup>14</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 10-11

<sup>15</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 12

<sup>16</sup> Carole Rogel, "Kosovo: where it all began", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol:17, no:1, p:169, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020202> (27.12.2014)

<sup>17</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, Beograd: PLATO Press, 1992, p:29, [http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/JUGOSLAVIA/kosovo\\_engl.txt\\_with-big-pictures.html](http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/JUGOSLAVIA/kosovo_engl.txt_with-big-pictures.html), (19.12.2014)

appointment could have been the cause of Lazarevich's service in the Battle of Ankara against Timurid Empire as an ally of the Ottomans in 1402.<sup>18</sup>

On the perspective of military activities, years following the Battle of Kosovo were very fervent. Suzerainty obtained by the tribes in Kosovo advanced the military power of the Ottomans. They extended their conquests through the Balkan Peninsula with these new local fresh troops. Also new fiefs, which Ottoman land-administration system, were available and about 335 new fiefdoms were established. With this new system, Slavic population of Kosovo started to migrate northward towards where is now Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>19</sup>

Stefan Lazarevich, the despot, made Novo Brdo, which is a municipality of Pristine now, as the economic capital of Serbia. Novo Brdo became a shining city of the Balkan Peninsula because of its location. It was at the intersection of the trade roads. But through the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the battle between Ottoman army under the command of Sultan Murad II and Christian army under the command of a Hungarian nobleman Janos Hunyadi prepared the end of this Serbian Despotate in 1448. And after the fall of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror, advanced to Serbian Despotate and with lengthy sieges, Novo Brdo fell in 1455. After this victory, Ottoman Empire captured other towns of Kosovo and Metohija. As a result, migrations throughout the northern increased and exact the Ottoman control over Kosovo started with this victory.<sup>20</sup>

### **1.2.2. Ottoman Rule over Kosovo at its peak**

The Ottoman rule over the Balkans resulted with a drastic change in traditional administration. As Ottoman policy, different kinds of folk were brought from other Ottoman territories to be settled in the Balkans and Kosovo as well. These migrations further increased the cosmopolitan demography of Kosovo.

---

<sup>18</sup> Erik Hildinger, *Warriors of the Steppe: a military history of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.*, Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2001, pp:193-195

<sup>19</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 16-17

<sup>20</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, (1992), pp:37-38,

On the other hand, when we looked at the religious life in Kosovo, converting to Islam was not the primary concern for Ottoman Empire in early years. There was still a fragmentation in the society. The discord between Orthodoxy and Catholicism has now faced with a new challenge. Islam has started to become a third major religion in the region. It is hard to say that converting to Islam in early years of the conquest of Balkans was a forced policy of the Empire. When we take a look at the records of *jizya* books, in the year of 1489, there were only 94 households converted to Islam and during the following three years, only 255 households were converted.<sup>21</sup> Also according to Dusan T. Batakovic, in Vucitrn Sanjak, a town in Kosovo, there were only 700 muslim households of the total number of 19.614 between the years of 1520 to 1535, and this was the %3,5 of the total population.<sup>22</sup> Even there weren't pressures on Christian population to convert them into Islam, *jizya* tax, was considered as a heavy burden for some Christians. In Ottoman Rumelia, in the year of 1528, all taxes that were collected from non-Muslims were about 48 million *akces* and taxes that were collected from Muslims were about 3,76 million *akces*. Furthermore the *jizya* tax rates increased year by year. Also a high amount of the tax called *avariz* tax that was collected just during the war times, started to be collected every year after 1590.<sup>23</sup> It is easy to explain the converting to Islam for Christians during the following years under these highly rated taxation system and this also caused a discomfort among Balkan peoples. Not only highly rated taxation policy but also consecutive migrations from Anatolia as an Ottoman policy brought an increasing rate of Muslim population. With all of these after the 18<sup>th</sup> century Kosovo and of course Balkan Peninsula faced with a striking Muslim population.

With the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), control of the Ottoman Empire over Balkan Peninsula began to decrease. First years of 18<sup>th</sup> century was the period of changing balance of power in Balkan Peninsula and it effected population movements. Because of Ottoman Empire's wars with the Austrian Empire, the Russian Empire and Venice caused turmoil over these territories. The choice between converting to Islam or finding

---

<sup>21</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Türkler ve Balkanlar", *Bal-Tam Türklük Bilgisi 3*, Bal-Tam Press, Prizren: September 2005, p: 33

<sup>22</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, (1992), p:44

<sup>23</sup> Halil İnalçık, p: 31

a new protector was a popular dilemma for inhabitants of Kosovo where also was decimated by plague.<sup>24</sup>

### 1.2.3. Weakening of the Ottoman Control over Kosovo and Serbian Revolution

The Russo - Ottoman Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* (1774) changed a little in the status of Orthodox Christians in 1774. With this treaty Russia was entitled as the protector of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Church played an imported role to awake the Serbian national consciousness after this treaty and these efforts of the church paved the way for the Serbian Revolution.<sup>25</sup>

Just before the 1806-1812 Russo - Ottoman War, Serbian insurrectionists under the leadership of Karadjordje entered Belgrade in 1805 and started the Serbian revolution. They held the control of Belgrade until the signing the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). After that treaty second revolution started in 1815 under the leadership of Milos Obrenovic. These independence movements resulted with the establishment of the autonomous Principality of Serbia under Ottoman sovereignty in 1833.<sup>26</sup>

“In the aftermath of the Serbian revolution of 1804-15, Kosovo acquired a special political importance for hereditary Albanian pashas, who now feared with some justification that the flames of rebellion might spread to other Serb-inhabited areas... the growing political independence of Serbia, which by 1833 formed an autonomous principality under Ottoman sovereignty, revived the hopes of Serbs in Kosovo, many of whom, during the first reign of Prince Milos, ventured up to the principality in search of land... Prince Milos made effort to ease the position of his compatriots through ties with the family of Mahmoud Pasha Rotulovic of Prizren and the Mahmud Begovic family of Pec, and

---

<sup>24</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 29

<sup>25</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 29-30

<sup>26</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, (1992), p:103

attempted also to revive the waning spirit of the dwindling number of Orthodox clergy in Kosovo.<sup>27</sup>

This complicated situation created a power vacuum in Kosovo. It was so hard to find public safety throughout 19<sup>th</sup> century. Using the roads, which were controlled by bandits, was very dangerous and it was only possible with the protection of armed escorts. And of course it was very expensive for an ordinary peasant.

In 1839, Sultan Abdulmecid declared the famous *GülhaneHatti-sherifi* that could be also named as a charter of equality to all citizens. That *ferman*(edict) brought equal rights to all citizens of Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their religious faiths. But it also brought a regular military obligation for all and the centralization of the government. These last two articles created a big mass over Albanians and Ottoman Empire faced with a strong resistance. The Albanian insurrection to Ottoman Empire started first in Pristina in 1844 because of these concerns and spread to Prizren, Djakovica and Skoplje. But these rebellions were suppressed by the Ottoman Army same year.<sup>28</sup> These rebellions were also a sign of the uneasiness of Kosovo territory and the upcoming big crisis in the region.

With the war between the weakened Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire in 1877-1878, also called as *93 Harbi* in Turkish literature, Albanians faced with first serious conflict with Serb Montenegrins by Serbian forces entering into Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs naturally here has taken their side on the Serbian army during this war. With this situation and inadequacy of Ottoman Empire, Serbs and Montenegrins advanced easily without any serious resistance and captured the towns of Lescovac, Nis and Vranje. Retreat of the Ottoman troops revealed Albanians refugees at the mercy of Serbs and Montenegrins. After 1877-1878 war, Treaty of San Stefano (*Ayastefanos* 1878) was signed between Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire in 3<sup>rd</sup> March of 1878. With this treaty, Serbia enlarged its territories through Kosovo, including Mitrovica and large part of the Sandjak of Pristina, also Montenegro took Pec, Ulqin, Hoti, Plava and Podgorica where Albanian inhabitants were majority of the population. Under these

---

<sup>27</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 30

<sup>28</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, (1992), pp:82-83-84

circumstances Albanian nationalists called a meeting for all Albanian notables. After this convocation over 300 Albanian delegates gathered in Prizren in 10<sup>th</sup> June of 1878 and declared the League of Prizren, in other words an independent Albanian *de-facto* state.<sup>29</sup> This was a very important for Albanians also for Kosovo. 100 years later, Ramiz Alia who was the vice-chairman of the General Council of the Democratic Front of Albania in 1978 and was the 1<sup>st</sup> president of Albania, explained the importance of the League of Prizren:

“The League of Prizren was the first political organization of all Albania, set up within Albania, and which included the whole country, an organization which had not only a national ideological platform and a clearly defined political program but also a state organization on a national scale, its own army, and its own propaganda and cultural apparatus. It acted as the sole representative of the whole people, not only within the country but also in relation with the outside world, foreign governments and international organizations.”<sup>30</sup>

With the establishment of League of Prizren, Serbians controlled around Mitrovica, Montenegrins controlled around Pec, Ulqin and Plava and Albanians controlled around Prizren. This means, after 1878 there were three sovereign societies in Kosovo under the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire.

During first years of 20<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman Empire experienced an innovation which was held by Young Turks. They followed a “Turkification” over Balkan Peninsula and it brought up another turmoil that was occurred by nationalization conflicts.

Tailspin over Kosovo peaked in 8<sup>th</sup> October of 1912 with opened hostilities by Montenegrins attack to the Albanian controlled parts of Kosovo. Next step came too

---

<sup>29</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 43-44

<sup>30</sup> Ramiz Alia, “The Albanian League of Prizren-A Brilliant Page of Our History Written in Blood,” *Speech on the centenary of the Albanian League of Prizren*, Tirana: 1978, The -8 Nentori- Publishing House, p: 6 <http://michaelharrison.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Ramiz-Alia-The-Albanian-League-of-Prizren-A-brilliant-page-of-our-history-written-in-blood-1978.pdf>, (02.01.2015)

soon, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war to Ottoman Empire instantly in 1912 and outbreak of the First Balkan War that prepared the end of Ottoman hegemony over Balkans was started. The Albanians wanted to keep themselves away from the war but it was impossible. The immediate collapse of the Ottoman army and the entrance of the troops of Balkan allies through the Albanian-inhabit territories of Kosovo and north Albania has located Albanians to the very centre of the war.<sup>31</sup>

With the heavy defeat of the Ottoman Empire in First Balkan War (1911 – 1912), Treaty of London was signed at the London Peace Conference in 1912. According to this treaty, Albania became a sovereign state with a hereditary prince but lost its lands in Kosovo. Serbia and Montenegro have shared the lands in Kosovo and legitimized their central area Kosovo with this treaty.<sup>32</sup>

After a year the World War I broke out, conflicts lasted over these territories and after the war, in December 1918, The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes established and Kosovo became a part of this kingdom even still harbouring various nationalities and religions.<sup>33</sup>

### **1.3. Kosovo during Kingdom of Yugoslavia**

It was commonly defined as one nation three names, The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the kingdom seemed as a Slavic state on the international stage. Even there was a public Serbian majority in the Kingdom, it was different in the territories of today's Kosovo, apart from the whole kingdom. According to the 1921 census, in Kosovo, there were 436,929 inhabitants lived in and 280,440 were Albanians and it consisted %64,1 of total inhabitants. Also %72,6 Muslims, %26 Orthodox %1,4 Catholic among all these inhabitants in Kosovo. Correspondingly, after the 1920 elections, there were 94 seats for Serbian Democrats, 89 for Serbian Radicals, 58 for Communist Party, 50 for Croatian Peasant Party, 27 for Slovene and Croatian Clerical Parties, 24 for Bosnian Muslims and 10 for Social Democrats in assembly for the

---

<sup>31</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 76-77

<sup>32</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, p:132

<sup>33</sup> Dusan T. Batakovic, "Kosovo ana Metohija: Serbia's troublesome province", *Balkanica XXXIX*, Dusan T. Batakovic eds, Institute of Balkan Studies, Belgrade: 2009, p:248,

Yugoslav Constituent of June 1921. Moreover territorial divisions were gerrymandered by Serbs. It was divided into nine *banovinas*<sup>34</sup> which Serbs had majorities in six *banovinas*, Croats in two and Slovenes in one but there were no *banovina* that Muslims and Albanians had majority.<sup>35</sup>

This one nation three named kingdom faced with sovereignty conflicts until it had been established. While the developing of first constitution, Vidovdan Constitution, in first parliament of the kingdom, both Croat, Slovene, Bosnian and Serb Communist parties were looking forward to qualified election. Conversely, this constitution law was accepted with the general election by boycotting these parties.<sup>36</sup> This constitution, also means this kingdom, started to lose its legitimacy for those nations. It was compassed that this kingdom was a whole Serbian ruled kingdom even its name was three nations' named.

After the establishment of this constitutional law, The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes couldn't secure their national solidarity literally. When another acrimonious session of the parliament had just begun on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June in 1928, the tension reached the summit. Stjepan Radic, who was the leader of Croatian Peasant Party (*Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka*) and prime representative of the Croats, and four other backbenchers were shot by a Serbian Member of Parliament, Punisa Racic. Stjepan Radic got wounded and died after two months later.<sup>37</sup> The continuing wild disorder never ended and the King Alexander abolished the Constitution and declared the dictatorship in 6<sup>th</sup> January of 1929. It was called as a January 6 Dictatorship. After the dictatorship, the name of the kingdom was turned into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 3<sup>rd</sup> October of 1929<sup>38</sup> and Kosovo became a part of this kingdom.

---

<sup>34</sup> Banovina means territorial title which was used to describe an autonomous provinces in Balkan Peninsula between 7th and 20th century.

<sup>35</sup> Miranda Vickers, pp: 95-96-97

<sup>36</sup> Hakan Demir, "Federalizm-Üniterizm İnkileminde Sırp-Hırvat-Sloven Kralığı'nda siyasal Yaşam," *Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi*, cilt: 2, sayı: 2, Aralık 2013, pp: 101-103

<sup>37</sup> Hakan Demir, pp:110-111

<sup>38</sup> Dr. August Kussutitch, "The Croatian Problem," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931 – 1939, Vol:12, No:1, January 1933, pp:86-87,

<http://domovod.info/zzfiles/res/CroatianProblem-Kussutitch1933.pdf> (20.02.2015)

After the establishment of the dictatorship, pressure over inhabitants of Kosovo started to escalate by Serbians. The foremost point was that the Serbs perceived Kosovo as a cradle of Serbia. These pressures caused the major migrations of the Muslims to the Turkey. According to Peter Alford Andrews, 269.101 migrants immigrated to Turkey from Yugoslavia and Macedonia during 1923 to 1949.<sup>39</sup>

Following years of the dictatorship, Yugoslavia Kingdom administered an “Serbianisation” programme in Kosovo including taking its former soldiers into Kosovo to settle and changing the village names into Serbian heroic names such as Lazarevo, Obilic, etc.<sup>40</sup> This programme escalated the tension and it lasted until the start of World War II.

World War II began for Kosovo with the arrival of Italians to the territory in 1941. It was taken by Germans a year later but one of the civilian aides for the Italian troops was reported: “Slavs and Albanians had burnt down one another’s house, had killed as many as they could, and had stolen livestock goods and tools.” Also German Political Officer, Hermann Neubacher, noted that it was about 40.000 Serbian and Montenegrins residents had expelled from Kosovo during the war until by April 1944.<sup>41</sup> With the end of the World War II, a new state, Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, was established and Kosovo became a part of this new state.

#### **1.4. Kosovo during Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) got the 90 % of votes after the elections in 1945, generated the new council and established the republic. Josip Broz Tito was selected as the first president of republic. Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised by Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tito’s policy depended on not an exact communism either liberalism. It could have inferred as a sort of a national communism. To lower the discrimination and

---

<sup>39</sup> Halim Çavuşoğlu, ““Yugoslavya-Makedonya” topraklarından Türkiye’ye göçler ve nedenleri” *Bilig*, Bahar 2007, vol:41, p: 134

<sup>40</sup> Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, London: Pluto Press, 2000, p: 10

<sup>41</sup> Howard Clark, pp: 11-12

conflicts between different national movements, he used “Weak Serbia – Strong Yugoslavia” motto as a policy tool.

Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia has been defined by the 1946 constitution. According to this constitution, “Kosovo was proclaimed as an Autonomous Region with its local administrative agencies denied any independent decision-making: it had neither an independent legislature nor a supreme court.”<sup>42</sup> In addition, smaller part of Yugoslavia than Kosovo, Vojvodina, was classified as an Autonomous Province and got higher a status. Notwithstanding the objection from Kosovo, it was tied to Serbia alongside with Vojvodina.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Rankovic (1946 – 1966), was a major threat for Albanian inhabitants in Kosovo. He was a defender of centralisation of Yugoslavia, not on the same line with Tito’s opinion of decentralisation. The ultra harsh actions of the secret police of Yugoslavia, *Uprava Drazavne Bezbednosti* (UDBA)<sup>43</sup>, were in the gift of him not only because he was the former chief of this institution between 1944 and 1946 but also he was the Minister of Internal Affairs. “... Rankovic and his secret police (UDBA) to declare Albanians the most dangerous nation in Yugoslavia.”<sup>44</sup>

The pressure over the Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo during the early years of the Republic was escalating because of this policy of Rankovic. One of the worst periods for the Kosovar Albanians was the start of the policy of so-called “Turkification.” Heavy pressure was put on Kosovar Albanians to declare them as Turks by the Rankovic’s secret police, UDBA. Also they have launch a campaign for repatriation to Turkey. Socialist Yugoslavia and Turkey signed an agreement to organise these possible emigrations in 1953.<sup>45</sup> The execution of this policy has achieved the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians and yet this policy has found a space in the international press.

---

<sup>42</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 146

<sup>43</sup> Yugoslav secret police department.

<sup>44</sup> Enver Hoxhaj, “The Politics of ethnic conflict regulation of Kosovo,” *Center for the Study of Global Governance*, London: 2005, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23370/1/DP39.pdf>, (27.01.2015)

<sup>45</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 149

“*The Times* of London commented that the almost daily disclosures of brutal acts of repression murder and torture by Rankovic’s police against the Albanian minority ... are astonishingly frank.”<sup>46</sup>

The name of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia had turned into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963. After Aleksandar Rankovic lost the ministry post, Albanian Kosovars started to break loose from the restraining rope. After 16 years, Tito’s first visit to Kosovo (1967) was the sign of this wind of change. He confessed about the unequal practices: “One cannot talk about equal rights when Serbs are given preferences in factories ... and Albanians are rejected although they have the same and better qualifications.”<sup>47</sup>

These positive developments for Kosovo were resulted with a new constitutional amendment. This amendment contained more extensive rights for Kosovars; including having their own administration, assembly, judiciary, and also veto power in the Yugoslav parliament same as republics. But they still didn’t have a self-determination right.

With Tito’s death in 1980, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was on the verge of collapse. Republics stated their interests to declare their independence through the years after Tito’s death. Enver Hoxha, the First Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania and Tito’s erstwhile ally, was demanding that Kosovo should have a right to secure its independence along with other republics. But according to the constitution, just only Republics had a right to declare their independence and Kosovo was still an autonomous province within Serbia.

A student from the Pristine University protested just for the university’s meals in 1981. But, unexpectedly, this protest spread over the province of Kosovo, and it turned into a massive movement of Kosovar Albanian riots for independence. During these riots, the Federal Administration of Serbia intervened to demonstrations and declared

---

<sup>46</sup> Howard Clark, p: 38

<sup>47</sup> Howard Clark, p: 12

astate of emergency on April of 1981. At the end of these riots, about 2000 Albanians were arrested, 10 demonstrators and one policeman had lost their lives.<sup>48</sup>

Slobodan Milosevic, former head of Beobanka and new president of the Belgrade City Committee in 1984, started to gain power in the Serbian Communist Party with his policy against Kosovo. He cited Kosovo as a Serbian cradle of birth and momentous province for Serbs. In one of his speeches in Belgrade in 1987, he said “No one can beat these people” after the intervention of Albanian Police to Serbian citizens in Kosovo.<sup>49</sup>

Another important sign of Milosevic’s Kosovo policy was the Gazimestan Speech on *St. Vitus Day* in 1989. It was the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo.

“... how are we going to face Milos (Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo). Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its states and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.”<sup>50</sup>

A year after this speech, Republic of Serbia made a constitutional amendment in 28<sup>th</sup> September of 1990. With this amendment autonomous position of Kosovo was repealed.<sup>51</sup> This annulment triggered the dichotomy that had already existed between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.

Nearly same time with this new constitutional amendment, Kosovar Albanian representatives gathered secretly in Kacanicka and declared a Constitution of Kacanicka.<sup>52</sup> According to this constitution, they have established the “Parliament of

<sup>48</sup> Doğan Tılıç, *Milliyetçiliğin Pençesindeki Kartal*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1999, pp:95-97

<sup>49</sup> Shqipran Kadriaj, *Kosova Sorunu*, (unpublished MA thesis), Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara: 2007, p:19

<sup>50</sup> Slobodan Milosevic’s speech in Gazimestan, 1989, [http://cmes.arizona.edu/sites/cmes.arizona.edu/files/SLOBODAN%20MILOSEVIC\\_speech\\_6\\_28\\_89.pdf](http://cmes.arizona.edu/sites/cmes.arizona.edu/files/SLOBODAN%20MILOSEVIC_speech_6_28_89.pdf), (01.03.2015)

<sup>51</sup> 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019071.pdf>, (26.02.2015)

<sup>52</sup> Hüseyin Savaş, “Dünü ve Bugünüyle Kosova Sorunu-II,” *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Mayıs 2001, Cilt: 25, No: 1, pp: 104-105

Kosovo Republic". After a year, in 1991, Kosovar Parliament applied a referendum for independence and with %99,8 of the votes, it was accepted. Republic of Kosovo was declared after this referendum on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1991.<sup>53</sup> The only state that recognised the Republic of Kosovo immediately was Albania.

Slovenia (25<sup>th</sup> May 1991) and Croatia (25<sup>th</sup> June 1991) respectively revolted from Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, Bosnian declaration of independence turned into an international crisis and at the end, it secure its independence from FRY in 1<sup>st</sup> March of 1992.<sup>54</sup> After the securing their independences of the republics, there were nothing remains from the Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There were new independence states such as Croatia, Slovenia and new Serbian State; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

### **1.5. Kosovo during Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-1999)**

After the establishment of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, they first faced with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Crisis (1992 – 1995). It declared its independence from Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Milosevic, the President of Serbia, ignored this declaration and started to put pressure over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis was the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's prime concern and their willing to keep out of new conflict zone, Yugoslavian government showed political levelheadedness to Kosovo problem. Towards to mid-1990s tension was escalated between Kosovar Albanians and Serbians. An armed para-military organization called *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves* (UÇK), Kosovo Liberation Army was founded by Kosovar Albanians. The first action that was assumed by UÇK was a bomb attack to Serbian Police in several parts in Kosovo at the same time in 1996.<sup>55</sup> This organization was the Kosovar Albanian Army which was resisting to Serbian Police and other Serbian units until the NATO took charge of the conflict in 1999.

<sup>53</sup> Aydın Babuna, "Kosova Sorunu Üzerine", *Dış Politika*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Cilt 7, Sayı: 1-2, 1997, [http://www.dispolitika.org.tr/dosyalar/ababuna\\_p.htm](http://www.dispolitika.org.tr/dosyalar/ababuna_p.htm), (20.02.2015)

<sup>54</sup> Amra Dedeic-Kırbaç, "Boşnakların Türkiye'ye Göçleri," *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, Mart-Nisan 2013, Sayı 35, pp: 6-7, <http://www.akademikbakis.org/eskisine/35/36.pdf>, (23.03.2015)

<sup>55</sup> Hüseyin Savaş, p:107

With escalation of the conflict, NATO called for the meeting in Rambouillet on 19<sup>th</sup> February of 1999. After discordance between parties, NATO, as a result, has launched a 78-day-bombing campaign to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the end of the air strike, NATO and United Nations were fully integrated to Kosovo territory.

At the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter, detailed information will be given about the Kosovo War and the integration of the international agencies to Kosovo.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN USA AND RUSSIA

In this chapter, I'll give some basic information about the history and the evolution of the relations between these two superpowers, Russia and United States (US) until the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

#### 2.1. Relations between the Tsarist Russia and the USA

With the establishment of United States Declaration of Independence in 4<sup>th</sup> July of 1776, United States was officially declared his independence according to the declaratorily. After it secured its declaration, US worked on diplomatic labours for recognition. As to perform that mission, Francis Dana was appointed to St. Petersburg. He arrived there in August 1781 and tried to gain recognition from Tsarist Russia. He stayed there for 2 years but he couldn't gain recognition from Tsarist Russia.

According to the U.S. Department of State, Francis Dana was appointed not only for recognition but also dispelling Russian concerns for trading contest.<sup>56</sup> But did Tsarist Russia have such kind of concerns? We should analyse both sides to clarify this contention if it was so. When we looked at the American side, there was new born state and there was an unworldly actor who tried to set up a diplomatic contact with other states on the international area. On the other hand, there was a gigantic Russian Empire ruled by 2<sup>nd</sup> Catherine, called Catherine the Great. Even just under these circumstances, Dana's arrive to Tsarist Russia for relieving Russians for trading concerns was just a little bit fanciful. Moreover, when we compared these two states on those years, there was a new born US and had a nascent trade practice while Tsarist Russia had very amount of agricultural products circulating in all over the world's trade companies.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup>“United States relations with Russia,” *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (26.05.2014)

<sup>57</sup> Ian Blanchard, “Economic decline in the early nineteenth century,” Central European University, Budapest: 2000, Lecture, p: 19, [http://www.ianblanchard.com/IMPERIAL\\_RUSSIA\\_1700-1917/Handout-2.pdf](http://www.ianblanchard.com/IMPERIAL_RUSSIA_1700-1917/Handout-2.pdf), (07.11.2014)

Russian and American trade had started before the Revolution War and continued after the war. Nevertheless, Tsarist Russia never recognized the colonies as an independent state and also after the United States Declaration of Independence. They did not take up the diplomatic relation until the year 1807. Four years before that year, United States' President Thomas Jefferson appointed Levett Harris as a consul general for the US representative to Russia in 1803.<sup>58</sup> However, Tsarist Russia didn't reciprocate any representative to US even they accept the presence of Levett Harris. In August 1807, US Minister in London James Monroe and Russian Special Envoy at London Maksim Alopous had agreed with the official diplomatic ties between these two countries. Depending on this agreement, Tsarist Russia's first envoy Aleksander Dashkov arrived in Washington in 1808 and John Quincy Adams travelled in St. Petersburg as US minister to Tsarist Russia as a reciprocal.<sup>59</sup>

Trade was still the foremost point of these two states' relations. Their first treaty arrangements among them, Russo-American Treaty of 1824, designed the trade rights and trade regulation. Moreover Tsar Nicholas I commented pertinently with these good relations: "Not only our interests alike, but, our enemies are the same."<sup>60</sup> But these plentiful relations between these states under the trade aspect started to get acrimonious with one of the political tension, The Kossuth Craze.

1848 revolutions in Austro-Hungarian Empire showed us that the USA and Tsarist Russia was not a political ally at all, even they connected a top level trade practice. "The Kossuth Craze began over succession attempt of Hungary under the leadership of Governor Louis Kossuth from the Austrian Empire."<sup>61</sup> When the tension uprose and the conflicts started to escalate, Austria Emperor Franz Josef I fell back on Tsar Nicholas I to intervene the Russian troops with Austrian Army through the Kossuth legion. Tsarist Russia responded favourably and sent its troops to Austria. With the

---

<sup>58</sup>"United States relations with Russia," *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (26.05.2014)

<sup>59</sup>"US-Russian relations: A Statement," *Carnegie Endowment for Peace*, [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador\\_statement.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador_statement.pdf), (11.11.2014)

<sup>60</sup> Robert R. Franklin, "Tsar Alexander II and President Abraham Lincoln: Unlikely Bedfellows?", *Hohonu*, Hawaii: University of Hawaii at Hilo Press, 2012, vol.10, p:76, <http://hilo.hawaii.edu/academics/hohonu/documents/Vol10x19TsarAlexanderIIandPresidentAbrahamLincoln.pdf>, (28.08.2014)

<sup>61</sup>Robert R. Franklin, p:76

pretense of the Russian existence in that region, Tsarist Russia, as an ally, entered the war with 200.000 Russian troops on the side of Austria Empire.<sup>62</sup> Correspondingly, dissident voices ascended against Russian intervention in United States. “On September 6, 1849 in Springfield, Illinois, lawyer Abraham Lincoln (future US President) was appointed with 5 other citizens to draft resolutions condemning the Russian action to the US Secretary of State.”<sup>63</sup> This political discrimination between these two States was in full swing with the acceptance of Kossuth to United States as an exile. While Tsarist Russia was acting as protectionist of Austrian Empire, United States led Austrian rebel to settle in its territory. Also, in addition, Kossuth was the first exile statesman for US.

After Tsarist Russia and the USA came through this political friction, they were again busy with their flourishing trade. These trades were very important point of the relations between these two states even during the American Independence War and also during the Crimean War.<sup>64</sup> For examples, “In 1857, American shipbuilders in New York shipyards began the construction of warships for the Russian Navy. This included the construction of the General-Admiral, the largest ship ever built in United States.”<sup>65</sup>

One of the biggest economic correlations between these two countries was the purchase of the Alaska. It was not only a strategic movement of selling a land but also it was about economic operation.

“The Russian-American Company was on the verge of bankruptcy by the middle of the 1860s. The value of the company share on the Russian stock market fell from 500 silver *ruble* in 1854 to 75 in 1866.”<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Pal Fodor, “Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında Macar reform hareketleri ve 1848-1849 Devrimi”, *Doğumunun 200. Yıl dönümünde Lajos Kossuth 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, Celal İnal-Naciye Güngörmüş (eds), Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, March 2002, pp:49-50, <http://www.turkmacar.org.tr/index.php/ondokuzuncu-yuzyilin-ilk-yarisinda-macar-reform-hareketleri-ve-1848-49-devrimi>, (12.11.2014)

<sup>63</sup> Robert R. Franklin, p:77

<sup>64</sup> Robert R. Franklin, p:76

<sup>65</sup> “United States relations with Russia,” *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (27.05.2014)

<sup>66</sup> James R. Gibson, “The sale of Russian American to the United States, 1983,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, p:18, <http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/7925/1/KJ00000033979.pdf>, (12.11.2014)

With these problems including the expenditures of the Crimean War triggered that purchase if we focused on the economic concerns. However, on the political point of view, “Russia feared that Britain might soon go to war with her again and, in the event, seek to extend British rule over all the Russian lands in North America.”<sup>67</sup> With both economic and political reasons, Tsarist Russia sold the land of Alaska to US at \$7.200.000.<sup>68</sup>

In politically, after the war between Tsarist Russia and Japan, US President Theodor Roosevelt undertook conciliator role for the peace talk between Russia and Japan in Portsmouth.<sup>69</sup> Just after the war and Portsmouth Agreement, Tsarist Russia faced with the Revaluation and starting with the Bolshevik Revaluation, it laboured its own domestic regime problems.

## **2.2. Relations between USSR and US**

It can be easier to understand the relations between these two superpowers with putting in three chapters; interwar period, during the World War II and during the cold war.

### **2.2.1. Relations between USSR and US during interwar period (1917-1939)**

While all of us know lots of conflicts and crisis between USA and USSR, modicum amount of us know about the Polar Bear Mission that planned against Bolsheviks in North Russia in 1918 during the establishment of USSR. If we accepted the establishment of USSR as in 1917 after revolution from the perspective of declaratory thesis, this was the first conflict that these two states had been faced each other. According to Austin Lee from Minnesota State University, there are lots of theories for the reason of that intervention. While George Kennan and Betty

---

<sup>67</sup>Herbert H. Rasche, “Alaska purchase centennial: 1867-1967,” *Arctic*, Vol: 20, No:2, January 1967, pp:64-68, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40507692?sid=21106243714333&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4>, (17.01.2015)

<sup>68</sup> “United States relations with Russia,” *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009 <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (27.05.2014)

<sup>69</sup> “United States relations with Russia,” *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009 <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (27.05.2014)

Unterbergen think that aspect of this intervention was fuzzy and Woodrow Wilson, the president of USA, only agreed to send troops to North Russia as a way to appease coalition diplomacy, the revisionists such as William Appleman and George Schild think otherwise and they describe that policy with considerations of real politics.<sup>70</sup>

Starting with the John Quincy Adams as a minister in Petrograd, United States was represented by embassy position until the November of 1918. After the left of US Ambassador David Francis, United States didn't assign anyone to replace for him and quitted their represent as an embassy, also the consulate.<sup>71</sup> According to a report which was written by vice consul Robert Withney Imbrie, killed in 1924 in Teheran, the consulate in Petrograd had closed on account of continuing advanced of the German Troops through Petrograd.<sup>72</sup> After the closure of the United States' Embassy in Russia, it was never assigned until the year of 1933.

“President Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that non-recognition had not stopped communism from taking hold in the USSR and that the US faced international economic and diplomatic challenges that required Soviet cooperation, invited Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to Washington in November 1933 for negotiations.”<sup>73</sup>

With this statement, representative of United States of America in USSR officially began. Thereby, diplomatic ties between these states turned into a major importance for the rest of the world.

---

<sup>70</sup> Austin Lee, “US Intervention in Russia 1918-1920: the Forgotten Mutiny,” *U.S. Foreign Relations* 945, April 29, 2011, pp:2-3 <http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol11/iss1/4/>, (08.01.2015)

<sup>71</sup> Robert Chadwell Williams, “Russia in transition: The diplomatic papers of David R. Francis, US Ambassador to Russia, 1916-1918”, *A Microfilm Project*, in Robert Lester (eds), Missouri Historical Society: 1986, p:vii, [http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc\\_assets/catalog/11272.pdf](http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc_assets/catalog/11272.pdf), (11.03.2014)

<sup>72</sup> Robert Withney Imbrie, “Document I Department of States, Washington Report on the Petrograd Consulate April 5 to September 1 1918”, *Studies in Intelligence*, in David A. Langbert (eds), Vol. 52, No:1, December 2007, p: 4, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-1/pdf-files/\(U\)%20Langbart-Petrograd-Web%20Supplement.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-1/pdf-files/(U)%20Langbart-Petrograd-Web%20Supplement.pdf), (11.03.2014)

<sup>73</sup> “United States relations with Russia,” *Office of historian Washington DC*, January 2009, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>, (27.05.2014)

While the world was going through the World War II, USSR was designing its own provisions. Nazi expansion treated the USSR and it was up on the Soviets borders. Stalin was looking forward to an agreement with Hitler and applied for a meeting with Germany. At least, Soviet foreign minister Molotov and German foreign minister Ribbentrop agreed a non-aggression pact in 1939.<sup>74</sup> With this non-aggression pact Russia thought that secured their western borders against German invasion.

### **2.2.2. Relations between USSR and US during the World War II (1939-1945)**

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the US President, had just been elected to third term, the race he won at least in part by pledging to an American public worried about war with Germany: “Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”<sup>75</sup> After 4 months later of this speech, maybe he hadn’t sent anyone into the war yet, but, on 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1941 he drafted an aid plan to foreign countries which involved the war with Germans.<sup>76</sup> On 24<sup>th</sup> of June 1941, just 2 days after the Operation Barbarossa that had been enforced by Germans for occupation through the USSR despite the non-aggression pact, Franklin D. Roosevelt drafted an aid plan to Russia under the Lend-Lease Act Programme.

While Operation Barbarossa going on successfully and German forces were penetrating through the Russian Steppes, in 1941, Japans’ direct military attack started and declared war to USA. Unaccountably, Hitler declared war to USA too in 8<sup>th</sup> December of 1941 and this movement changed the fate of the World War II also the relations between the USA and USSR. After that time, USA was not only responsible for aid but also they became an ally also on battlefield.<sup>77</sup>

From that time to the end of the war, USA and USSR became allies for common enemy, Germany. While Russia was repulsing the German invasion and German was

---

<sup>74</sup> Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2013, p: 65

<sup>75</sup> James M. Lindsay, “TWE Remembers: The Lend-Lease Act,” *Council of Foreign Relations*: March 2011, <http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2011/03/11/twe-remembers-the-lend-lease-act/>, (26.11.2014)

<sup>76</sup> John M. Barr, “Lend-Lease to Russia,” *World at War Magazine*, October-November 2013, p:27

<sup>77</sup> Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed, “Declaration of war and authorization for the Use of Military Force; Historical Background and Legal Implication,” *Congressional Research Service*: April 18, 2014, p: 4, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf>, (08.12.2014)

falling back, Russia and USA started to design a new world system by conferences including with the United Kingdom. They were both on the same sides of the table during conferences. But it ought to be easy to understand the perspective of the US President Harry Truman if we checked one of his discourses when he was a senator from Missouri in 1941.

“If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstance.”<sup>78</sup>

This statement shows us how USSR and USA were deeply clashing among themselves especially when we looked under the American point of view. According to Todd D. Baty from Southern Methodist University, “Many Washington officials believed the path to lasting world peace was rooted in to principles: open markets and self-determination... The future of markets in Europe, the Middle East and Asia were therefore vital to US domestic concerns, but Moscow’s influence in these regions threatened to stifle world trade.”<sup>79</sup>

As a result of all these political dissociations, the Big Three Alliance (USSR, USA and the Great Britain) couldn’t have worked as a creator of the new peaceful world and the relations between USSR and USA turned into a very different conditions. It’ll have been very difficult to see that these two states’ relations will have been status quo ante.

### **2.2.3 Relations between USSR and US during the Cold War (1945-1991)**

On 5<sup>th</sup> March of 1946, “During a speech at Fulton, Missouri, visiting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an “Iron

---

<sup>78</sup> Alden Whitman, “Harry S. Truman: Decisive President,” *NY Times*, 6<sup>th</sup> August, 1945, <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0508.html>, (15.12.2014)

<sup>79</sup> Todd D. Baty, “En-route to Containment: Domestic Roots of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1947”, *Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership*, in Julie E. Manus (eds), Washington: February 2009, pp: 319-320, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Baty.pdf>, (30.05.2014)

Curtain” as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control.”<sup>80</sup> It became a strict discrimination between USSR and the western side and it showed us that decoupling between former allies USSR and USA turned into a competition to create the hegemony over whole of the world.

This discrimination over their own policies compelled them to create their own lebensraum. One of the Russian historian George Vernadsky explained Soviet’s policy clearly:

“Politics of Soviets were the same for the former enemy states, Romania - Hungary – Bulgaria. First step of their strategy was creating peasant, socialist and communist parties and constituting an effective control over police, army and important people in each states. Second step was closing down the other parties except for communist party. The last step was occupying the realm with communist party.”<sup>81</sup>

To handling this strategy over Soviets, US declared their own, Marshall Plan in 5<sup>th</sup> June of 1947.<sup>82</sup> After the declaration of the Truman Doctrine that incapability of Great Britain to go on for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and so US took charge for these aids against Soviets’ expansionist communist policy in 12<sup>th</sup> March of 1947 and signed by The Congress in 22<sup>nd</sup> May of 1947, financial assistances to these countries were established.<sup>83</sup> Not go for long, The Marshall Plan, a major aid programme for Western Europe, followed against the Soviets. According to Nicholas Crafts from Chatham House, “Without the Cold War, the further supports of Congress for such a massive aid programme would have been inconceivable, but it is important to recognize that the provision of aid through in-kind transfers had solid support from exporters and agricultural interests, and that the trade unions were placated by

---

<sup>80</sup> Amy C. Garrett, “Highlights in the history of U.S. Relations with Russia, 1780 – June 2006,” *Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs*, U.S. Department of States: May 11, 2007, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#reykjavik>, (14.12.2014)

<sup>81</sup> George Vernadsky, *Rusya Tarihi*, İstanbul: Selenge Yayinevi, 2011, Volume 2, p:526

<sup>82</sup> Alan Kirman et Lucrezia Reichlin, “L’aide aux peys de l’Est: les leçons du plan Marshall,” *Revue de l’OFCE*: 1990, Vol:34, No: 1, p: 298, <http://www.ofce.fr/pdf/revue/17-034.pdf>, (20.12.2014)

<sup>83</sup> Joseph C. Sattertheaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Sage Publications: 1972, Vol: 401, pp: 74-75, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1039114?sid=21106055287003&uid=4&uid=2>, (16.12.2014)

provisions stipulating.”<sup>84</sup>This showed us these counter-policies against Soviets were not only for military aspects but also included economic concerns.

Such preparations turned into a crisis first time in Berlin. USSR announced that they cut off the access to Western sectors of Berlin in summer of 1948.<sup>85</sup> Against this administration USA and Western powers overcame this non-accessing with the airlift and USSR lifted their blockade on 12<sup>th</sup> May of 1949.

While the separation between Soviets and the west was ascending, the Great Britain, France, Nederland, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty in 17<sup>th</sup> March of 1948. According to 4<sup>th</sup> article of this agreement, if one of the members were under attack in European zone the other members had to help with all his equipments to under-attacked member. This treaty opened the way of NATO. In addition with Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 4<sup>th</sup> April of 1949 as a military cooperation against Soviets’ threat.<sup>86</sup>

After the defeat of Japans, USSR sent their troop to the North Korea and the USA sent its own to the South Korea. The 38<sup>th</sup> parallel was the border of these occupied areas. In 1948 USSR retracted their forces by leaving a communist regime behind and fulfilled with the Soviets’ equipped army. A year after the USA followed the same policy to the South Korea. With the North Korean advancing to the South Korea in 1950, a new conflict zone occurred for these two super powers. US president Truman called United Nations for a meeting immediately against this military operation set by North Korea. USSR were boycotting UN for non-recognizing Mao’s China hence they couldn’t use their veto right and that caused a declaration to commit the joint forces against North

---

<sup>84</sup> Nicholas Crafts, “Saving the Eurozone: Is a “real” Marshall Plan the answer?”, *The CAGE-Chatham House Series*, June 2012, No:1, p:6, [http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/chh1669\\_eurozone\\_bp\\_v6.pdf](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/chh1669_eurozone_bp_v6.pdf), (20.12.2014)

<sup>85</sup> Amy C. Garrett, “Highlights in the history of U.S. relations with Russia, 1780 – June 2006”, *U.S. Department of State*, May 11- 2007, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#reykjavik>, (14.12.2014)

<sup>86</sup> Oral Sander, p: 264-265

Korean advancing. The war was longing almost 3 years and at the end in 27<sup>th</sup> July of 1953, the armistice signed and the conflict was over.<sup>87</sup>

With the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) west organized their own defence alliance. “In response to NATO actions in the west, including the rearming of the West Germany and the expansion of the treaty organization, the Soviet Union concluded a military defensive alliance with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.”<sup>88</sup> Consequently the Warsaw Pact was established in 14<sup>th</sup> May of 1955 with these states.

While they were two parts of the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Hungary faced with the riots against repressive Soviet rule in 1956. With using NATO alliance, US tried to put pressure on USSR by intimidation. Correspondingly, USSR responded them with the military movements as a treatment.<sup>89</sup>

Although these strict decoupling existed also were longing the cold war, USSR and USA made an agreement territorial demilitarization, Antarctic Treaty. USSR and USA signed the agreement to demilitarize the Antarctic Continent with ten other nations in 1959. “The treaty created the conditions for Antarctica to become a continent for peaceful international scientific cooperation.”<sup>90</sup>

With starting in 1960, world will have faced with consecutive crisis between these two superpowers.

### 2.2.3.1. U-2 Crisis

U-2, Dragon Lady, was a reconnaissance plane that was used by US Air Force. “U-2 can loiter at 70000ft. (21336m.) over the area of operations for several hours and

---

<sup>87</sup> George Vernadsky, p:529

<sup>88</sup> Amy C. Garrett, Highlights in the history of U.S. relations with Russia, 1780 – June 2006, *U.S. Department of State*, May 11- 2007, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#reykjavik>, (14.12.2014)

<sup>89</sup> Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence of Soviet decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crisis,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, p:358-359, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9\\_p6.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_p6.pdf), (21.12.2014)

<sup>90</sup> Johannes Huber, “The Antarctic Treaty: Towards a new partnership,” *Science Diplomacy*, p:90, <http://www.atsumit50.org/media/book-14.pdf>, (22.12.2014)

is often described as a gilder due to its flight characteristics.”<sup>91</sup>US thought that distance couldn't have been caught by Soviets but with the realizing the plane, USSR shot it and pilot of that U-2, jumped from plane and survived from the accident. After his survival from accident he was captured by Soviets. USSR announced that they caught an American spy. But the USA denied it immediately. After that denial USSR took him to live scene on the television and all around the world saw that USSR had land the pilot. With this situation United States confessed that he was their spy and this caused the cancellation of the scheduled meeting between US President Eisenhower and Soviet President Khrushchev.

#### **2.2.3.2. 2<sup>nd</sup> Berlin Crisis**

The Berlin Crisis was occurred with comment perception about a possible Soviet attack to the Western block. “Kennedy warned that the United States would not tolerated any changes in Berlin’s status and activated 150,000 reservists and advised the American people of the danger of an attack, possibly even a nuclear attack. Both leaders announced an increase in their defence expenditures. East Germans fled in large numbers to West Germany.”<sup>92</sup> Khrushchev gave order to Walter Ulbricht who was the communist leader of East Germany to construct a wall to separate two sides of Berlin. Even there was back lash from west to construct the wall, nothing could be done against that movement of East Germany under the protection of the USSR.<sup>93</sup>

#### **2.2.3.3. Cuban Missile Crisis**

This was one of the biggest crises during the cold war between these two superpowers. USSR set their missiles up to Cuba by way of requital for Jupiter Missiles that was set up in Turkey by USA. It could be informative to look on words of Douglas Dillon who was former employee under Eisenhower presidential and new Treasury Secretary on those days:

---

<sup>91</sup>“U-2 High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, United States of America”, *Air-Force Technology*, <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/u2/> (18.12.2014)

<sup>92</sup> Amy C. Garrett, “Highlights in the history of U.S. relations with Russia, 1780 – June 2006”, *U.S. Department of State*, May 11- 2007, Office of the historian Bureau of Public Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#reykjavik>, (14.12.2014)

<sup>93</sup> George Vernadsky, p:540

“Well, everyone knows that those Jupiter missiles aren’t much good anyway. We only put them in there during the previous administration because we didn’t know what else to do with them, and we really made the Turks and Italians take them.”<sup>94</sup>

These Jupiter Missiles, even they weren’t much convenient, and missiles were put by USSR in Cuba as a reciprocal, this crisis put world’s head into lion’s mouth. After learning that USSR started to set up missiles in Cuba, Kennedy declared that they put the naval blockage in Cuba. While they announced the blockage, the Soviets’ naval forces were approaching to the Cuba. Khrushchev demanded from US to dismount the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in consideration of dismounting missiles from Cuba. With direct connection between Khrushchev and Kennedy, they came through this crisis with both dismounting their own missiles from Cuba and Turkey.<sup>95</sup>

“The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 produced sharp reactions around the world. The western nations, led by United States, were quick to denounce the event, which was so reminiscent of the Hungarian invasion of the mid-1950s. The Brezhnev Doctrine, which was used to justify the invasion, also constituted a threat to other Communist countries seeking greater independence from Moscow.”<sup>96</sup> This joint combat, leading by USSR, among the Warsaw Pact countries was another crisis between USSR and USA.

Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in December of 1979 was another big crisis between these superpowers. This was the last big crisis during cold war. Downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983, boycotting the Olympic games in 1984 by USSR were following crisis but Soviet engaging to the west and political thaw between these

---

<sup>94</sup> Carl Keyesen, “Transcript of oral history interview with Theodore Sorensen-JFK #6, 05/20/1964”, *John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection*, John F. Kennedy Library: March 26, 1964, p:64, <http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/JFKOH/Sorensen,%20Theodore%20C/JFKOH-TCS-06/JFKOH-TCS-06-TR.pdf>, (26.12.2014)

<sup>95</sup> Oral Sander, p:325-327

<sup>96</sup> Kenneth W. Rea, “Peking and The Brezhnev Doctrine,” *Asian Affairs*, Sep.-Oct. 1975, Vol.3, no:1, p:22

superpowers, even TIME selected Mikhail Gorbachev as the man of the year,<sup>97</sup> prepared the end of the cold war and the collapse of USSR.

Varieties of debates have argued for the disintegration of the USSR. According to Prof. Geoffrey Hosking from University Collage of London, it can be limited with two inducements.

“On a one hand, the dominant schools of thought are firstly an American-centric perception that Ronald Reagan bankrupted the Communists economically and ideologically through his moral clarity and massive defense spending. On the other hand, the deterministic view explains that the Soviet Union was inevitably going to collapse because of the intrinsic contradictions of the Soviet planned economy.”<sup>98</sup>

The collapse of the USSR paved the way for a new epoch and construction of this new world system has begun.

---

<sup>97</sup> Donald Morrison, “Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union,” *TIME*, Jan. 4, 1988

<sup>98</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, “Why did the Soviet Union Collapse?” *Russian History*, London: February 2003, <http://diplomovka.sme.sk/zdroj/3448.pdf>, (01.06.2015)

## CHAPTER THREE

### KOSOVO CRISIS AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

Kosovo Crisis is still blurred contentious question in the field of international relations. Russian boycotting policy in United Nations Security Council during the Bosnian Crisis (1992-1995) was a mistake for Russia itself. This policy engendered to legitimize The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to take action in Bosnia even Russian resisting to that operation. For Kosovo Crisis Russian Federation pursued a different policy. Russia attended to Security Council meetings and used its veto right. This caused the obstruction of the United Nations to organise an operation.

On the other side, United States of America were desirous to deal with the Balkan crisis. After the collapse of the USSR (1991), NATO, Western defence organisation against the enemy behind the iron curtain, was merged into dysfunctional organization. The main question of those days was what the NATO does charge for. The leading shareholder of the NATO, USA, was looking forward to create operational zones for NATO. Balkan Crises were suitable work zone. It started working in Bosnia with the UN Security Council Resolution (1993). But situation in Kosovo was a little bit different. They could not draft a resolution to step in Kosovo and they were looking forward to legitimise their intervention scheme.

Under these crucial policies, Kosovo Crisis became like a chessboard and attitudes of international actors during the Kosovo Crisis showed us that designing the international era required rigorous movements.

#### **3.1. Kosovo War**

In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords (1995) which was drafted after the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), there became a huge disillusionment for Kosovars. There was no straight statement to solve the turmoil in Kosovo where there were still hell brook loose between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs and also it was declared that no changing of Yugoslavian borders according to the Dayton Accord. Milosevic's policy

was succeeded and Kosovo was still standing an internal concern for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the Dayton Accords.

“The disillusionment felt by the Kosovars after Dayton was heightened the following April when the European Union officially recognised the Yugoslav state (Serbia and Montenegro) and especially when, in June 1996, the head of the newly established U.S. Information Office in Pristine lectured Ibrahim Rugova to the effect that Kosovo was regarded as a part of Yugoslavia and it should continue to remain so.”<sup>99</sup>

Another prospect from Dayton Accords for Milosevic was the economic statements. According to the Dayton Accords, lifting of Western economic sanctions was depended to resolve the conflicts in Kosovo peacefully. It was vital condition for Milosevic to lift of these sanctions to secure their economy.

On the other hand, for the Kosovar side, Dayton Accord caused to switch Kosovar policy from avarice into the violent ones. Common consensus was that the passive resistance is inadequate policy and strong resistance even featured with violence, could be more enforceable to resolve the conflicts. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Democratic League of Kosovo, was held prime responsible for this passive policy by Kosovar Albanians. For changing ongoing *status quo*, Kosovar Albanians believed that *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves* (UÇK), Kosovo Liberation Army, ought to take more responsibility, whereupon, the UÇK bore the responsibility of bomb attack to Serbian Police in 1996.<sup>100</sup>

The dilemma between *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves* (LDK), Kosovar political party, a peaceful resistance and UÇK, the armed struggle was the dispute about priority for Kosovar Albanians. With a huge support of Kosovar Albanians, the UÇK organization stepped up its assaults through the Serbian officials during the following year. Correspondingly, Milosevic took more harsh counter measures to Kosovar

---

<sup>99</sup> Carole Rogel, “Kosovo: Where It All Began,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol: 1, No: 1, Fall: 2003, p:175, [www.jstor.org/stable/20020202](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020202), (21.09.2014)

<sup>100</sup> Hüseyin Savaş, p:107

Albanians. In November 1997, two local schoolteachers killed by Serbs. Their funeral turned into a mess protest which about 20,000 mourners attended.<sup>101</sup> In the funeral, one of the UÇK founding members, Rexhep Selimi, declared a proclamation of their intentions for the conflict. He claimed: "... the only serious force for the realisation of ideals and aspirations of our people national unification."<sup>102</sup> This first message in the funeral in Drenica excited to Kosovar Albanians who were willing UÇK to take more responsibility.

While UÇK were rising, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic was mounting a counter policy. Serbian politicians and also Serbian press have claimed that terrorist attacks of UÇK were all organised by diplomats from Albanian Embassy in Belgrade.<sup>103</sup> This policy was organised by Milosevic to receive support from Serbian nationalists and to secure advantage for future Kosovo negotiations over Albanian side.

This escalating violence in Kosovo was seen as wanton cruelty by the west and alarmed them. In February 1998, US President Clinton's Special Envoy, Robert Gelbart, condemned any terrorist actions in Kosovo and identified that the "KLA is, without any question, a terrorist group."<sup>104</sup> Sustaining from that statement, Milosevic were claiming that there were "terrorists" in their "province" and he started to clamp down strict measures. To bring down the high tension, British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, went to Belgrade to recommend Milosevic to negotiate with representatives of Kosovar Albanian for possible conciliatory solutions. But he was brushed off by Milosevic. Then Richard Holbrook, US Ambassador of United Nations, tried to take him to the negotiation table. At the same time, UN Security Council drafted the Solution 1160, which was about to put down a comprehensive arms embargo on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Carole Rogel, p: 175

<sup>102</sup> Armend R. Bekaj, "The KLA and the Kosovo War: From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country," *Berghof Conflict Research*, Berlin: 2010, p: 20, [http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions\\_Series/transitions8\\_kosovo.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions8_kosovo.pdf), (23.10.2014)

<sup>103</sup> Miranda Vickers, p: 293

<sup>104</sup> Armend R. Bekaj, p: 21

<sup>105</sup> *UNSC Resolution 1160*, 31 March 1998, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES1160.pdf>, (15.02.2015)

“In July, Holbrook got Milosevic to agree to a monitoring force for Kosovo, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM). This was one month after NATO, attempted to rattle Milosevic with aerial exercises, called Determined Falcon.”<sup>106</sup>

A few months later, UN Security Council drafted a new resolution, Resolution 1199, in 23<sup>rd</sup> September of 1998 upon the irrepressible escalating violence in Kosovo. It was decided to concentrate measures demanded in the previous resolution not to be taken and treated both sides with military intervention.<sup>107</sup> It was the second alert for both sides of Kosovo Crisis.

Anticipating that parties would ignore warnings coming from west, contact group began to discuss possibilities of using force. However during the contact group foreign ministers meeting at London’s Heathrow Airport in 8<sup>th</sup> October of 1998, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told that they were sharply against such a military operation to Kosovo and threatened the other Contact Group members to impede UN Security Council conservations by using their veto right, alongside with China.<sup>108</sup> It seemed that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was under the auspices of Russia according to the historical correlation.

On the other hand, Milosevic’s exertion to keep Kosovo problem out from the international observers and policy to launch the Kosovo Crisis as an internal issue was failed and he signed contiguous agreements with NATO and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> October in 1998.<sup>109</sup> These agreements warranted the NATO involvement to Kosovo in official. FRY guaranteed the safety of NATO operation and its members hereby.

Inherently, these agreements seemed as a political thaw but the violence between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs was continuing through a broad spectrum. UÇK militants

---

<sup>106</sup> Carole Rogel, p: 176

<sup>107</sup> *UNSC Resolution 1199*, 23 September 1998, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1199>, (15.02.2015)

<sup>108</sup> Carole Rogel, p: 176

<sup>109</sup> *Report of The Secretary General of the United Nations, S/1998/1068*, 12 November 1998, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068), (16.02.2015)

committed a terror attack to a bar in Pec and killed six youths with guns in 14<sup>th</sup> December of 1998. The reaction of this terror attack was so harsh by FRY. Serbian Army killed 45 Kosovar Albanians, including women and children, in an Albanian village, Racak, in 15<sup>th</sup> January of 1999. This was one of the crucial turning points of the Kosovo War. The chief of Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a mission of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), described this massacre as “crime against humanity.”<sup>110</sup> In addition, after the U.S. Foreign Minister, Madeleine Albright, was heard this massacre, called the National Security Adviser of Bill Clinton, Samuel Richard Berger, and said “spring has come early to Kosovo.”<sup>111</sup> The western policy stance for Kosovo was acutely changing and started to discuss a possible military action.

After the Racak massacre, contact group agreed on a peace plan for parties of Kosovo and invited them to Rambouillet, near Paris, to negotiate that plan in 29<sup>th</sup> January of 1999.<sup>112</sup> A day after that invitation, NATO drafted a press release that was intimidating both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. It was stated that possible air strike will be authorised by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana. Furthermore, it was declared that if there will not be an agreement in Rambouillet, NATO will take whatever measures are necessary to both side.<sup>113</sup> It was a clear threat before the Rambouillet Meeting.

Contact group invited young UÇK leader, Hashim Thaçi, as a representative of Kosovar Albanians instead of Ibrahim Rugova. The Western wanted to take advantage of Thaçi’s lack of experience in international area. The peace plan submitted for three year interim settlement that provides the autonomy of Kosovo and NATO-led international mission during those three years. Also at the end of these three-years, it

---

<sup>110</sup> David T. Buckwalter, “Madeleine’s War: Operation Allied Force,” *Case studies in policy making*, Newport: Naval War College, 2002, pp: 103-104 <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/oaf.pdf>, (26.02.2015)

<sup>111</sup> Barton Gellman, “The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War,” *The Washington Post*, April 18, 1999, p:7

<sup>112</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, “Kosovo and U.S. Policy: Background to Independence,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Report Service: June 20, 2008, p:3, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31053.pdf>, (24.04.2014)

<sup>113</sup> *Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo NATO Press Release (99)12*, 30 January, 1999, <http://www.nato.int/DOCU/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm>, (11.09.2014)

provided a free referendum for independence of Kosovo.<sup>114</sup>The planned deadline of meeting was 20<sup>th</sup> of February but they extended it to 23<sup>rd</sup> of February by reason of both delegates rejected the plan. The draft peace plan was grossly insulting and could not be acceptable for FRY. The former United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, explicated this plan with this statement:

“The Rambouillet Text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.”<sup>115</sup>

After high-tensioned deliberations, Kosovo delegation agreed the peace plan in 18<sup>th</sup> March of 1999 conversely Parliament of Kosovo declined in 22<sup>nd</sup> of March. This meant that there consisted a suitable opportunity to intervention as declared in NATO Press Release 99(12).

With Serbs were acknowledged as an intransigent on the international era for peace plan, the war was begun without the UN Security Council resolution and no consisting of self-defence right in 24<sup>th</sup> March of 1999. Serbs were not a turkey shoot. When air bombing was begun, Milosevic was still giving national statements and trying Serbs to stand up against bombing. On the other hand, Kosovar Albanians welcomed the NATO air strike. Just during first week, about 300,000 fled crossed the borders to Albania and Macedonia from Kosovo.<sup>116</sup>

While bombs were flying over Yugoslavia, meeting to celebrate NATO's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary was gathered in Washington D.C. in 23<sup>rd</sup> April of 1999. They released a statement for Kosovo. According to that statement, NATO proclaimed Milosevic as a perpetrator of genocide. They defended the opinion which air strike was for Milosevic's

---

<sup>114</sup> Jülide Karakoç, “ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Hegemonya Çabaları Etkisinde NATO'nun Kosova Müdahalesi”, *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara, 8/1: 2006, pp: 232-233

<sup>115</sup> Rein Müllerson, *Regime Change: From Democratic Peace Theories to Forcible Regime Change*, Leiden: Brill Press, 2013, p:190

<sup>116</sup> Carole Rogel, p: 178

policies and for peaceful Kosovo. One of the most important decisions was to intensify the air strike to put pressure over Serbia.<sup>117</sup> 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary meeting emphasised that NATO's tenacity to solve Kosovo crisis strictly by annihilating Milosevic and his policies.

One of the most extensive air strike in the history lasted for 78 days. After the air strike, even through the Serbian Government House and through civilian targets, Milosevic agreed on the ceasefire and called for armistice in 3<sup>rd</sup> June of 1999. It paved the way for deployment the NATO and other international agencies in Kosovo, still was a part of Yugoslavia juristically. On 9<sup>th</sup> June, NATO and Yugoslavian representatives signed the Military Technical Agreement. A day after the agreement, UN Security Council drafted the Resolution 1244. KFOR, which was constituted for intervening Kosovo by NATO, entered to Kosovo territory on 11<sup>th</sup> June and finally agreement to demilitarization of UÇK was signed on 20<sup>th</sup> June.<sup>118</sup> With these agreements, the war was over and construction of Kosovo was begun.

### **3.2. United Nations during Kosovo Crisis**

With the defeating of the Nazi's and ending of the World War II, for to constitute a peaceful international cooperation system and to prevent destructive wars, United Nations (UN) was established in 24<sup>th</sup> October of 1945 with five permanent members (USA, SSCB, United Kingdom, France and Republic of China) of Security Council and 46 signatories. After the establishment of UN, using force has been adjudicated by Security Council, except for the states' self-defence right with the article 2 of the Charter of United Nations. Also to secure the international peace, according to the article 33, peaceful security measures, firstly, should be provided by the parties to any dispute. These peaceful security measures were described in the same article (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements). With the failure of these measures between parties, then UN Security council has taken charge to settle their dispute by these

---

<sup>117</sup> *Statement on Kosovo NATO Press Release S-1 99(62)*, 23 April, 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm>, (02.03.2015)

<sup>118</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, p:4

means.<sup>119</sup> Although, moreover, implementations of these articles has been all depended on consent. Just because of their sovereignty, as a general acceptance for international law, states could not be forced to any action, including peaceful debates, for seeking any solution to any dispute without consent.<sup>120</sup>

### 3.2.1. UN Before the Operation Allied Force

After the Bosnian Crisis, United Nations reacted to violence in Kosovo much faster and drafted its first resolution, Resolution 1160 in 31<sup>st</sup> March of 1998. It was stated that to monitor the implementations of security measures, OSCE should act in Kosovo and emphasised the territorial integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it was stated to cease actions that were aimed to civilian population by Serbian security forces with this solution. At least, comprehensive arms embargo was put on to FRY to de-escalate the violence.<sup>121</sup>

This warning resolution (1160) and even diplomatic contacts with Milosevic such as with Richard Holbrook to defuse the intense violence in Kosovo, the turmoil lasted increasingly. UN was trying to find out a peaceful solution against this violence. Based on this, after the 3918<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Security Council, the “The Statement by The President of the Security Council” was released in 24<sup>th</sup> August of 1998. According to this press release, numbers of displaced people reached horrendous rate and called again for peaceful agreement between parties. The most distinctive point of the press release was to appreciate Ibrahim Rugova for his willing to solve this crisis by dialogue. This was an alert for Milosevic and his following policy over Kosovo.<sup>122</sup>

After this press release, in 23<sup>rd</sup> September in 1998, UN Security council drafted its second resolution for Kosovo, Resolution 1199. Increasing numbers of displacement

---

<sup>119</sup> *Charter of The United Nations and Statute of The International Court of Justice, Article 33*, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>, (22.02.2015)

<sup>120</sup> L.C. Green, *International Law Through the Cases*, London: 1959, Stevens and Sons Limited, Vol. 2, pp:81-83

<sup>121</sup> *UNSC Resolution 1160*, 31 March, 1998, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES1160.pdf>, (11.03.2015)

<sup>122</sup> *UNSC Statement by The President of The Security Council S/PRST/1998/25*, 24 August 1998, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPRST%201998%2025.pdf>, (09.03.2015)

of people was gravely concerned and in this resolution, it was estimated 230,000 persons displaced from their homes. It was also stated that this humanitarian catastrophe was caused by Serbian security forces' indiscriminate use of force. FRY was affirmed as a threat to peace for the region. Also it was demanded to secure a possible and impeded working zone for international monitoring from FRY.<sup>123</sup>

Pressure over Milosevic was raised by UN Security Council. Dependence of Serbian policy was to Russian veto right in Security Council. It was clearly stated from Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov that they were sharply against military operation to Kosovo in Contact Group meeting at London's Heathrow Airport in 8<sup>th</sup> October of 1998. Without any UN Security Council resolution nor self-defence right, Milosevic did not believe a possible military operation from NATO or any other international co-operation.

For the maintenance of international peace and security, there should be taken measurements against violence in Kosovo. Therefore, OSCE agreed on Verification Mission in Kosovo with FRY in 16 October of 1998.<sup>124</sup> With this agreement, United Nations started to monitor for a peaceful solution. Border controls or roadblocks by Serbian Government could be observed by the mission according to agreement so that it could be prevented the violence and displacement of people. It seemed as a peaceful movement for the Kosovo Crisis but ongoing violence did not end and this continuous violence brought about UN Security Council Resolution 1203 in 24<sup>th</sup> October of 1998.

Resolution 1203 was one of the most severe notifications from UN to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia relative to Kosovo. It was emphasised that UN Security Council's responsibilities to maintaining peace and security according to the Article 33. The intensity of the warning against the increasing violence in Kosovo was escalated and it was accepted to FRY as a threat. Likewise it was declared clearly that FRY was a menace for peace and security for the region in same resolution. Also it was mentioned

---

<sup>123</sup>UNSC Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES1199.pdf>, (09.03.2015)

<sup>124</sup>UNSC Report of The Secretary General of the United Nations S/1998/1068, 12 November, 1998, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068), (16.02.2015)

that humanitarian communities monitoring missions were stranded by Serbian government.<sup>125</sup>

This severe caution worked for peace in the region. UN Secretary General drafted a press release, Report of The Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of The Security Council, for upturn situation in 12<sup>th</sup> November of 1998. According to this release, military activities came to a halt recently and there hasn't been any major military action since 1<sup>st</sup> October to 12<sup>th</sup> November. More favourable conditions were created in Kosovo to monitoring communities. But the Serbian Ministry of Interior reported that between 28<sup>th</sup> September and 19<sup>th</sup> October, there have been 117 attacks totally from UÇK against Serbian authorities and 10 policemen and seven Serbian army members were killed as a result of these attacks.

“The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expressed concern that members of those units might try to provoke the police and military in Kosovo and trigger a reaction from the Government ... thus giving the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a pretext for violent reaction.”<sup>126</sup>

This release showed that UN perspective for FRY moderated and taken measurements from FRY was seemed as a light. There were still humanitarian catastrophe and there were still displaced persons problem but statements from FRY promoted its relations with UN.

UÇK members committed an attack to a bar in Pec and killed six youths with guns in 14<sup>th</sup> December of 1998. This was a major turning point of the crisis. This was caused also Serbs to take excessive measurement, sometimes could be called atrocity.

---

<sup>125</sup>UNSC Resolution 1199, 12 November, 1998, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES1203.pdf>, (10.03.2015)

<sup>126</sup>UNSC Report of The Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of The Security Council, S/1998/1068, 12 November, 1998, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068), (06.03.2015)

Milosevic's interview with Elizabeth Weymouth for Washington Post in 16<sup>th</sup> December was the portent of the potential escalated violence.

“Albania is undoubtedly a factor of instability of the entire region, because there is not a single terrorist organisation which does not have its base in Albania.”<sup>127</sup>

Milosevic publicly proclaimed Albanians as threat for the region and furthermore, a month later from this interview, Serbian Army killed 45 Kosovar Albanians, including women and children, in an Albanian village, Racak, in 15<sup>th</sup> January of 1999. This brutal atrocity compelled UN to take effective measurements to maintain the peace in Kosovo. After announcement of KVM Head of Mission William Walker *persona non grata*, and shooting of personnel of the KVM by FRY, UN drafted a Presidential Statement, Statement by the President of Security Council in 19<sup>th</sup> January of 1999. By this statement, UN blamed FRY for these atrocities.<sup>128</sup>

In the 3974<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UN Security Council in 29<sup>th</sup> January of 1999, it was declared that UN stood by the Contact Group's measurements for escalating violence in Kosovo. Rambouillet Meeting, had been decided by Contact Group, was affirmed by UN.<sup>129</sup>

During the Rambouillet Meeting, United Nations drafted several warning publications. At the end of the Albanian acceptance of the agreement and decline from FRY authorities, Milosevic wrote a very strongly worded letter to Co-Chairmen of the Rambouillet Meeting in 23<sup>rd</sup> March of 1999.

“Regarding your threats NATO military intervention, your people should be ashamed of them, for you prepare yourselves to use force against a

---

<sup>127</sup> Elizabeth Weymouth, “Interview of Slobodan Milosevic to the Washinton Post”, *Washinton Post*, 1998, December 16, <http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/int-WP98.htm>, (03.03.2015)

<sup>128</sup> *UNSC Statement by the President of Security Council, S/PRST/1999/2*, 19 January 1999, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPRST%201999%202.pdf>, (14.03.2015)

<sup>129</sup> *UNSC Statement by the President of Security Council, S/PRST/1999/5*, 29 January 1999, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPRST%201999%205.pdf>, (14.03.2015)

small European nation, just because it protects its territory from separatism, protects its citizens from terrorism, and its historical dignity against thugs.”<sup>130</sup>

Milosevic described NATO as an ally of the separatists and terrorists at his reply for the Rambouillet Meeting’s conclusion. After decline of the Rambouillet Agreement and the draft of Milosevic statements, NATO started the Operation Allied Forces in 24<sup>th</sup> March of 1999. Immediately, representative of Russia to United Nations, Sergei Lavrov, called UN Security Council for meeting consequential of NATO’s unilateral military operation to Kosovo.<sup>131</sup> Against the strong resistance of Russia in Security Council for such an operation, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, informed Security Council in 25<sup>th</sup> March with the letter that had sent by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, before the operation start. This letter was included the tenets of previous resolutions and related activities.<sup>132</sup>

UN Security Council met in New York in 26<sup>th</sup> March of 1999 as response to the letter from Sergei Lavrov. The resolution that was prepared by Belarus, India and Russian Federation, was submitted in that meeting. It was briefly demanded that cessation of use of force against FRY. Their thesis depended on the United Nations Charter.<sup>133</sup> But only China, Namibia and Russia were in favour against 12 votes so that this resolution was rejected.<sup>134</sup> UN was informed neatly by NATO for the military action in Kosovo during the Operation Allied Forces. Even UN took charge only for humanitarian catastrophe, they co-operated with NATO by staying away from cessation of operation.

---

<sup>130</sup>Letter dated 23 March 1999 from the Charge D’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/314, 23 March 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/081/94/PDF/N9908194.pdf?OpenElement>, (16.03.2015)

<sup>131</sup>Letter dated 24 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, S/1999/320, 24 March 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/084/06/PDF/N9908406.pdf?OpenElement>, (14.03.2015)

<sup>132</sup>Letter dated 25 March 1999 from the Secretary General, S/1999/338, 25 March 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/086/20/PDF/N9908620.pdf?OpenElement>, (14.03.2015)

<sup>133</sup>Belarus, India and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, S/1999/328, 26 March, 1999, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/328](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/328), (14.11.2014)

<sup>134</sup>UN Security Council 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting, S/PV.3989, 26 March, 1999, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989), (14.11.2014)

UN have been representing with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) during the NATO's operation. Finally, UN Security drafted a resolution, Resolution 1239, against ongoing air attack to FRY in 14<sup>th</sup> May of 1999. The most important point of that resolution was that the UN was tried to legitimise the Operation Air Force. UN Security Council's arguments were the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention of 1949, the Conventions and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977. Additionally, the major difference of this resolution from the other related resolutions for Kosovo was that it has been affirming "the territorial integrity of all states in the region" instead "integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" like the other resolutions.<sup>135</sup>

### **3.2.2. UN After the Operation Allied Forces**

After the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and FRY, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was approved to withdraw of all forces from Kosovo.<sup>136</sup> A day after the agreement, UN Security Council drafted a resolution, Resolution 1244, in 10<sup>th</sup> June of 1999. It was reapproved that the peace plan, had agreed between Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin, and G-8 Foreign Ministers Meeting conclusion in 6<sup>th</sup> May in that resolution. Furthermore, with this resolution, UN Security Council paved the way for United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR). It was also stated that these organisations will have worked for substantial autonomy of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>137</sup> After 78 days of an intense air strike, UN decided to constitute stability in Kosovo with an international organisation without using force. UNMIK, established with the Resolution 1244, divided within four sections which called as "pillar". Pillar I one was Humanitarian Assistance led by UNHCR. Pillar II was Civil Administration led by United Nations. Pillar III was Democratisation and Institution Building led by OSCE

---

<sup>135</sup> *UNSC Resolution 1239*, 14 May, 1999, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1239\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1239(1999)), (10.03.2015)

<sup>136</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, p:4

<sup>137</sup> *UNSC Resolution 1239*, 14 May, 1999, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244(1999)), (10.03.2015)

and Pillar IV was Reconstruction and Economic Development led by European Union.<sup>138</sup>

“UNMIK’s duties included performing basic civil administration of the province, maintaining law and order, including setting up an international police force; supporting humanitarian aid efforts; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes ... preparing the way for elections and the creation of self-government intuitions; and facilitating a political process to address Kosovo’s final status.”<sup>139</sup>

To constitute a self-govern status for Kosovo, UNMIK established the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo in 15<sup>th</sup> May of 2001.<sup>140</sup> This constitution provided the establishment of 120-seated legislature but under the oversight of UNMIK. This constitution did not address the exit strategy for international communities from Kosovo. First election for Kosovo after the war was held in 17<sup>th</sup> November of 2001<sup>141</sup>

After the elections, it began to be discussed that how the exit strategy should be. UNMIK chief Michael Steiner wrote a proposal to exit strategy. He described the strategy under the eight benchmarks.<sup>142</sup>

UN adopted the “standards before status” policy to secure a reliable status in Kosovo. But the selected government of Kosovo, Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG), caused the inter-ethnic violence for minorities. With the Statement by the President of the Security Council in 30<sup>th</sup> April of 2004, PISG was warned with

---

<sup>138</sup> “UNMIK Background” *UNMIK*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/background.shtml>, (16.03.2015)

<sup>139</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, p:9

<sup>140</sup> *Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9*, 15 May, 2011, <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm>, (16.03.2015)

<sup>141</sup> *Letter dated 27 Novaember 2001 from the Secratery General addressed to the President of Security Council, S/2001/1131*, 27 Novaember 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/669/58/PDF/N0166958.pdf?OpenElement>, (09.03.2015)

<sup>142</sup> *Address to the Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Secratery General, 24 April, 2002, UNMIK/PR/719*, 24 April, 2002, <http://www.unmikonline.org/PR/PR719%20-%20Address%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20By%20Michael%20Steiner%20Special%20Representative%20of%20the%20Secretary-General.doc>, (15.03.2015)

two major issues to be reviewed and revised; “Sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members” and “Freedom of movement”.<sup>143</sup> UN and other international institutions’ administration to Kosovo after the military operation could not resolve the catastrophe, furthermore, departure from there became more conundrums.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Kai Eide as his special envoy to draw up a comprehensive review of Kosovo. Kai Eide submitted his report to Annan on early October. Afterwards, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was charged with observing the emerging developments for Kosovo in 1<sup>st</sup> November of 2005. Ahtisaari concluded his report in late 2006. It proposed the independent Kosovo. Unsurprisingly, the Ahtisaari Proposal faced with intensely objections by Serbs, also in UN, Russia was the primary encounter against that proposal.<sup>144</sup>

Ahtisaari how should Kosovo will be like in his proposal as; “... a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law, through its legislative, executive and judicial institution.”<sup>145</sup>

The Ahtisaari Proposal brought up huge demonstrations in Kosovo. Policies over the demonstrators could have been draconian. Not only rule of PISG but also UNMIK policy through Kosovostarted to get more interrogated. The unsolved catastrophe in Kosovo harmed the United Nations reputation. After two demonstrators’ death in Pristine by international police in 10<sup>th</sup> February of 2007, UNMIK reached the zenith of the bed reputation. A week later, a bomb attack was committed to UN convoy in return.<sup>146</sup> Deployment of the “exit plan” was not sufficient to maintain the security and stability.

---

<sup>143</sup> *UNSC Statement by the President of Security Council*, 30 April, 2004, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20SPRST%202004%2013.pdf>, (15.03.2015)

<sup>144</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, p:14-16

<sup>145</sup> *The Ahtisaari Proposal*, February 2, 2007, <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf>, (16.03.2015)

<sup>146</sup> Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, pp: 11-12

Russian resistance for the Ahtisaari Proposal stonewalled to draft a resolution for the sovereignty of Kosovo. The USA, the UK, France and Germany endorsed the proposal and they showed that their willingness for the stability in Kosovo. International expectation was nothing more from *de facto* independence for Kosovo. The expected declaration of Kosovo accrued in 17<sup>th</sup> November of 2007. The Prime Minister Haşim Thaci submitted the Kosovo declaration of independence in Kosovo Parliament, and Kosovo became an independent state.<sup>147</sup>

### 3.3. NATO during Kosovo Crisis

After the World War II, for the reconstruction of the world peace and security, there organised a considerable amount of meetings and signed oodles of treaties. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been one of these organisations. The signature of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949, bringing into being common security system based on a partnership among 12 countries, including United States. It was against Soviet threat for the western civilization.<sup>148</sup>

With the collapse of the USSR and disappearance of the Soviet threat, it started to dispute what the NATO did charge for. Simultaneously, Balkan Crises paved the way for the field of application to NATO. While it could seem as just a threat for Yugoslavia first years of the crises, it interfered to Bosnia by operating a military intervention via UN Security Council in 16<sup>th</sup> July of 1992.

For the Kosovo Crisis Russian Federation pursued a different policy. Russia attended to Security Council meetings and used its veto right. This caused the obstruction of the United Nations to organise an operation. It also shackled NATO to operate through Kosovo. There was not any self-defence right nor any UN Security Council resolution to legitimize such an operation by NATO.

---

<sup>147</sup> Shqipran Kadriaj, pp:92-93

<sup>148</sup> Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," *International Organisations*, Vol:46, No:3, Summer: 1992, p:636,  
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706991?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706991?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents), (16.05.2015)

NATO, described as the defence alliance for the Soviet threat, had started to argue what the alliance for after the collapse of the USSR. Somehow, NATO assumed an important role in the Balkan Crises under these discussions. With the Dayton Accords, finally, it was thought that the peace in Balkan territory was maintained. The Kosovo Crisis revealed that his observation was failed. The European continent felt the lack of joint military power after the endless discussion with Slobodan Milosevic. But how could they use the NATO forces legitimately without the UN Security Council resolution and in what circumstances? Joshua Muravchik from Wall Street Journal described these arguments as the “hoopla” for the members of the NATO.

“The war in the Kosovo could prove to be NATO’s salvation. Before the bombs begun to fly last month, the hoopla leading up to the grand 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit was making a souring atmosphere within the alliance. At the heart of the problem was a festering wound to European pride caused by America’s undiminished dominance of the alliance.”<sup>149</sup>

NATO’s integration to Kosovo by its substantial units, firstly, was with the agreement of Air Verification Mission in 15<sup>th</sup> October 1998. While the turmoil in Kosovo was stepping up, international institutions such as UN, OSCE, and NATO were pursuing both sides to maintain the peace by negotiations. But this participation of NATO in Kosovo was the beacon of their desire to act themselves without under any organization’s mandate. General Rappourteur Mr. Jan Hoekema emphasized this will and insufficiency of the United Nations to intervene the crises in his report in November 1998:

“In the case of Rwanda, in 90 days, as many as one million people were killed. Given the capabilities of international organizations it would from a military point of view be no real problem to prevent such slaughters and to punish those responsible for violence, destruction and murder ... Political will, however, is often lacking to embark upon high-risk missions outside the direct national interests of the main powers. This is

---

<sup>149</sup> Joshua Muavchik, “How Milosevic may save NATO?”, *Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 1999

also the exact reason why a NATO-action under UN mandate is hard to be agreed upon within the UN Security Council. Kosovo here serves as a good example.”<sup>150</sup>

NATO had started to transform itself for a modern military command structure which could be suitable to cope with for modern time's reality and, Bosnia Crisis was the first working zone for this transformation. Furthermore, with the Kosovo Crisis, because of the non-operated status of the UN Security Council, NATO was trying to legitimize its possible military operation and this was not just only its transformation but also general international practice's conversion. It was clearly stated by General Rapporteur Mr. Arthur Paecht in his report: “... In fact NATO's unilateral use of force without a United Nations mandate contravenes classic international legality as defined by Charter.”<sup>151</sup> NATO's role in the international zone started to be shaped after the collapse of the USSR.

These courageous movements were resulted with the total 38.004 sorties and 78 day-bombing to FRY by NATO's air strike campaign.<sup>152</sup> From 24<sup>th</sup> March to 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1999, NATO's air intervention to FRY was resulted with large-scale destruction and affluently death but in the end, finally, Slobodan Milosevic agreed to armistice terms in 3<sup>rd</sup> June of 1999.

Not just at the beginning of this air strike but also at the end of it, it was still discussing for its legitimacy to the international law practices. After the Operation Allied Forces, the consensus of NATO members agreed about that the existent international articles in force were able to conform to the cold war times, but in practice, it should be re-disposed according to this new world system and the prime concern was generally thought as the human rights. NATO's Civilian Affairs Committee General

---

<sup>150</sup> Jan Hoekema, “The new NATO: Security for an undivided Europe”, *NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defence and Security Committee Report*, November 1998, p:6, <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1998/ar266dsc-e.asp>, (02.06.2015)

<sup>151</sup> Arthur Paecht, “Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a reform of the Security Council? International Law and Humanitarian Intervention”, *NATO Parliamentary Assembly Civilian Affairs Committee Report*, September 16, 1999, p:1, <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1999/as244cc-e.asp>, (02.06.2015)

<sup>152</sup> Michael W. Lamb, “Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns”, *Maxwell Paper*, No:27, August 2002, p:2, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/maxwell/mp27.pdf>, (01.06.2015)

Rappporteur Mr. Arthur Paecht plainly clarified this incapacity, according to members' speeches in his report:

“If the Security Council is incapable of acting, are the subjective rights of victims, refugees, displaced persons and the injured less than when “fair weather conditions” prevail and enable the five “Great Powers” to agree? Of course not, and that’s why your Rappporteur welcomes the emergence of a right of humanitarian intervention, though it is still in its infancy.”<sup>153</sup>

Nonetheless, United States of America, the biggest member of the NATO, were still pioneering the air campaign under the Clinton Doctrine that can be explained by his own word in simple: “We are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace.”<sup>154</sup> Under this doctrine, while Secretary of States Madeline Albright was sustaining the operation, furthermore, she was trying to legitimize the air bombing campaign: “up until the start of the conflict, the military served to back up our diplomacy. Now, our diplomacy serves to back up our military.”<sup>155</sup> Merely this statement itself of Mrs. Albright captured the tenacity of the USA to operate such a humanitarian intervention. She tried to explain the responsibilities of the “enlightened states” for this turmoil and tried to legitimize this operation with diplomatic contacts as she had told.

On the other hand, Russia, the biggest supporter of the FRY, was trying to bring the air operation to an end. Russia had been against such a military operation since the year dot. On 25<sup>th</sup> April, Russian President Boris Yeltsin telephoned Bill Clinton and expressed his concern about Operation Allied Force bombing during 75 minutes. He offered to send former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to find a solution by negotiation.<sup>156</sup> But even this movement could not end the NATO bombing until Slobodan Milosevic accepted the conditions of the west.

---

<sup>153</sup> Arthur Paecht, p:8

<sup>154</sup> Noam Chomsky, *The new Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, London: Pluto Press, 1999, p:13

<sup>155</sup> Walter Isaacson, “Madeline’s War”, *TIME*, May 09, 1999, p:9

<sup>156</sup> Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: a Strategic and Operational Assessment*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001, pp:68-70

### 3.4. Russian Theses and Putin's Speeches for the Kosovo Crisis

Russia could prevent a possible military operation which was called for by UN Security Council with using his veto right as a walnut. This weighty right was the succession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Russia and it used this card successfully against the west, especially against the USA. But with the Operation Allied Force, this strategy was failed. Simultaneously with the bombs flying, Russian Federation applied for an UN Security Meeting as soon as possible in 24<sup>th</sup> March of 1999. In that meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the Russian contradiction of the operation and the possible future consequences:

“The Russian Federation is profoundly outraged at the use by the NATO of military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... The Russian Government strongly proclaimed its categorical rejection of the use of force in contravention of decisions of the Security Council and issued repeated warning about the long-term harmful consequences of this action not only for the prospects of a settlement of the Kosovo situation and for safeguarding security in the Balkans, but also for the stability of the entire modern multi-polar system of international relations”<sup>157</sup>

Two days later, the text of a draft resolution, prepared by Belarus and Russia, was submitted to the Security Council on 26<sup>th</sup> March. Russian theses were depended on the UN Charter Article two, paragraph four which requires all UN members to refrain from the use of force in their international relations, including against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State and Article 53 which contains the inadmissibility of any enforcement action under the regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. But at the end of the voting, the resolution was rejected with three in favour (Russian Federation, China

---

<sup>157</sup> *UN Security Council 3988<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report*, 1999, 24 March p:2, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/1999.shtml>, (26.07.2015)

and Namibia) to 12 against.<sup>158</sup> This voting was an example of the loosing international support to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.

During the air strike, Russia was sticking up for the solution which was held by United Nations where it had stronger position than the other international communities. At the 4011<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UN Security Council in 10<sup>th</sup> June 1999, finally, the Resolution 1244 was drafted and United Nations took the charge for the crisis in Kosovo. At that meeting, Mr. Lavrov again blamed the NATO operation:

“The humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was transformed by the NATO bombing into the most serious humanitarian catastrophe, encompassing not only in Kosovo, but all Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole. The irreparable harm done to the social and economic development of all Balkan States and to the environment is enormous.”<sup>159</sup>

Starting with the Resolution 1244, United Nations deployed in Kosovo till the declaration of the independence of Kosovo. In addition, after the Boris Yeltsin resign from the Russian presidency, on the first day of the new millennium, Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation and the new epoch begun. Putin has been strongly against the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. (Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) He has tried to tell about the unlawfulness of the NATO invasion to FRY and the double standards for the recognition of the independence of Kosovo. He expressed this idea on the annual press conference in Kremlin in 2008 just before the declaration of the independence of Kosovo:

“I don’t want to say anything that would offend anyone, but for 40 years northern Cyprus has practically had independence. Why aren’t you

---

<sup>158</sup> *UN Security Council 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report*, 1999, 26 March, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3989), (26.07.2015)

<sup>159</sup> *UN Security Council 4011<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report*, 1999, 10 June, p:7, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4011](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4011), (26.07.2015)

recognising yet? Aren't you ashamed, Europeans, for having these double standards?"<sup>160</sup>

On the press conference, he also added that Russian Federation will not recognize the independence of Kosovo and complaining about the unlawfulness of the *de facto* status according to the international law.<sup>161</sup>

After the declaration of the independence of Kosovo, Putin clearly underlined the possible future consequences about the recognition of the *de facto* states:

“The leaders of the countries that supported Kosovo's independence, will bear all the responsibility for the inevitable intensification of existent territorial conflicts and the appearance of new ones, as well as the destructive consequences for the whole world system of international law and international stability ... Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an international precedent, the existing territorial conflicts have to be dealt with by the Russian Federation considering the situation in Kosovo and the practical steps undertaken by certain countries regarding the status of Kosovo.”<sup>162</sup>

Putin stressed the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which had similar status of Kosovo in his thought. Just after a couple weeks, Russia lifted the economic sanctions against Abkhazia that valid since 1996.<sup>163</sup>

The Kosovo Crisis and the recognition the independence of Kosovo status was put in the appearance to international problem after the annexation of Crimea by

---

<sup>160</sup> Luke Harding, “Kosovo Breakaway illegal, says Putin”, *The Guardian*, 2008, 15 February, p:8, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/15/russia.kosovo>, (29.07.2015)

<sup>161</sup> I.b.i.d. p:9

<sup>162</sup> Giorgio Comai, “Moscow's approach towards de facto states after Kosovo's recognition”, *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*, 2013, 8 August, <http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Russia/Moscow-s-approach-towards-de-facto-states-after-Kosovo-s-recognition-140382>, (02.08.2015)

<sup>163</sup> Giorgio Comai, “Moscow's approach towards de facto states after Kosovo's recognition”, *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*, 2013, 8 August, <http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Russia/Moscow-s-approach-towards-de-facto-states-after-Kosovo-s-recognition-140382>, (02.08.2015)

Russian Federation. After the intervention of the Russian troop to Crimea, Putin was backing his theses to Kosovo against the reaction of the west. He thought the circumstances to intervene were occurred just like in Kosovo and he strongly censured the western communities for their demurs:

“That’s what they wrote, that what they trumpeted all over the world, coerced everyone into it-and now they are complaining. Why is that? ... It’s beyond doubled standards.It’s a kind of baffling, primitive and blatant cynicism. One can’t just twist things to fit his interests, to call something white on one day and black on the next day ... Well’ it’s good that they at least recalled that there is international law. Thank you very much. Better late than never...”<sup>164</sup>

As we see the statements of Putin, he has never and ever accepted the conditions of Kosovo. He has tried to show the illegitimate parts of the operation. He also holds Kosovo card in his pocket against the unlawful interferences. As I mentioned above, Putin never forget the failure of Russian dissertations on the Kosovo Crisis against the west.

---

<sup>164</sup>Maxim Shemetov, “Putin: Crimea similar to Kosovo, West is rewriting its own rule book”, *Russia Today*, 2014, 13 March, <http://www.rt.com/news/putin-address-parliament-crimea-562/>, (03.08.2015)

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSION

Demographic construction of Kosovo may seem the main reason of this turmoil in the territory. Starting with the Dardanians, settlements of this territory have changed easily and the destabilization reigned so many years. With the Ottoman arrival to the Balkan Peninsula, a new religion, Islam, was brought to this province. The cosmopolitan feature, which had already existed, started to become more and more complicated. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, Ottoman retreat from Balkan Peninsula through Anatolia created a power-vacuum in the region. Even it seemed that Serbian authority was ruling the Kosovar territory, there was broadly an uneasiness among the folk. After the world wars, Joseph Tito could secure the stabilization partly on the territory. But this permanence was ended by the death of Tito. Serbian pressure over Kosovar Albanians that was increased especially with Slobodan Milosevic, entailed the settlements of Kosovo into the big crisis.

Besides that, transformation and non-functionality of NATO after the collapse of the USSR could seem another reason of this crisis. The defence alliance against the Soviet threat had no more a threat to protect its members after 1989. Therefore, a new threat should have been identified in order to keep NATO system working or the ways to dissolve it should have been explored. Humanitarian catastrophe could fill this gap, thence, NATO assumed the conduction of this on going crisis in Kosovo. Naturally, Russian veto policy on the UN Security Council caused the deadlock for the military measures in the Security Council but, this policy also paved the way a bilateral profit for both NATO and people who suffered from this massacre. However, planning NATO's operation should have been in legal boundaries. In practice, it seemed impossible to actualize but NATO was not transforming only itself but also was transforming the international law practices. Even this transform saved many lives in Kosovo, it also caused the future military operations without any UN Security Council Resolution nor any self-defence right. I am going to mention this dilemma at the end of this chapter.

With the Roosevelt Corollary, the USA had announced the Latin America as its backyard. Notwithstanding, according to the Brejnev Doctrine, an attack to any socialist state was not only this state's concern but also all socialist world's response. Even the USSR collapsed and even FRY was not a socialist country, there were some government practices coming from the past. It was ineluctable that NATO intervention to Kosovo led by the USA was perceived as interference to Russian incidence. Before the air campaign begins, Russian theses were depended on the territorial sovereignty of the FRY. On the other hand, the USA seemed the Serbian actions against Kosovor Albanians as a threat to human rights and its possible consequences such as Humanitarian catastrophe. As a repercussion of the historical rivalry between Americans and Russians, NATO intervention encountered with Russian reaction as the countenancer of the FRY and these uncompromising attitudes of both sides caused the crisis to grow.

In addition, the Clinton Doctrine, the interventionist doctrine, might have been count as another reason of this crisis. Clinton's response to Kosovo Crisis explained the American point of view clearly: "We are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace ... When ethnic conflict turns into ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and this is clearly the case in Kosovo."<sup>165</sup> Secretary of State Madeline Albright's diplomatic contacts have been for to implement this policy and this caused to be called this operation as the Madeline's war among press.

The American persistence to a military operation could be understood from the enforcement of the peace plan, Rambouillet, just before the air campaign. Conditions of this plan were unacceptable for any sovereign country. It was also stated by the former Secretary of States, Henry Kissinger:

"The Rambouillet Text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted.

---

<sup>165</sup> Noam Chomsky, *The new Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, London: Pluto Press, 1999, p:13

It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.”<sup>166</sup>

This peace plan was the preparer of the war. Rejection from the Serbian side of Rambouillet was the leading motive of the Operation Allied Force.

Also we can check the academic observers of this case. Law professor Michael Glennon from the University of California emphasized the measures of the USA for this crisis: “The crisis in Kosovo illustrates ... America’s new willingness to do what it thinks is right/emdash international law notwithstanding.”<sup>167</sup>

On the other hand, even the intervention was unlawful or not, Operation Allied Forces ended the Milosevic’s brutal actions. Just only in Racak massacre, total 45 persons died, including women and children. According to the former international system, only obstacle against the military precaution was the Russian policy in the UN Security Council. In that manner this operation prevented the possible civilian casualties. And also, it provided that the displaced people got a new chance to live. With the help of the United Nations after the Operation Allied Forces, NATO became the organization for maintaining the peace. It was easily to be stated about this operation was unlawful for the former international practices but it was strongly legitimate for the settlers of the Kosovo territory.

While it was necessity to such an operation in legitimate borders, it also paved the way for such kind of intervention as I mentioned above. 15 year later of the Operation Allied Force that caused Russian eyebrows to rise, Russian Federation intervened Crimea by using same pretexts which was used by the USA during the Kosovo Crisis. The independence process of Kosovo after the air campaign, started with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and finalized with the declaration of independence by their central government. Vladimir Putin’s key argument justifying Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and annexation by Russia was the western acceptance

---

<sup>166</sup> Rein Müllerson, *Regime Change: From Democratic Peace Theories to Forcible Regime Change*, Leiden: Brill Press, 2013, p:190

<sup>167</sup> Noam Chomsky, p:18

of Kosovo's declaration of statehood in 2008. He had blamed the west with double standards and gave an example for the acceptance of that statehood with northern Cyprus issue after the declaration of Kosovar independence and with annexation of Crimea to Russia Federation, he used same arguments what was implemented in Kosovo.<sup>168</sup>

Crimea can be seemed as like Kosovo. There has been a military intervention without any UN Security Council resolution for both sides and both the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and ethnic Russians in Crimea voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession. But there were also big differences between them.

Very firstly, NATO intervened in Kosovo after the significant evidences of ethnic cleansing by Serbs to Albanian Kosovars while there was not any verified abuse to Russian community in Crimea. Rumours cannot be enough to such a military operation in such a condition. Besides that, it took nine years that Kosovo declared its independence after Milosevic loosing the effective control of Kosovo while Crimea voted to secession just after a few weeks from the fleeing of pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovic. In addition, during this nine year in Kosovo, there were lots of workouts of United Nations and dispassionate non-governmental organizations and their reports. But when we turn our eyes to Crimea, we could not discuss about such employments in there. And also, Kosovo declared its independence but did not join its ethnic brethren Albania in one state. On the other hand, Crimea, which has a majority of Russian population, signed a deal to join Russian Federation just two days after the election.

Taking into account all of these, Kosovo Crisis bore two significant consequences. First, it was the precedent that could have avoided following the international law practices. There can be taken proportioned unlawful precautions in force majeure. But there must be punctilious against misinterpretations for future consequences. And the second, Kosovo was the igniter between Russian Federation and

---

<sup>168</sup> Luke Harding, "Kosovo Breakaway illegal, says Putin", *The Guardian*, 2008, 15 February, p:8, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/15/russia.kosovo>, (29.07.2015)

the USA after the end of bipolarization. During the 16 year, starting with the crisis, disintegration between Russian Federation and the USA has sharpened. Consequently, Kosovo could be assumed the turning point of both international law practices and the relations between the USA and Russian Federation.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books/Magazines/Articles

Alia, Ramiz. "The Albanian League of Prizren-A Brilliant Page of Our History Written in Blood" *Speech on the centenary of the Albanian League of Prizren*. Tirana: The -8 Nentori- Publishing House. 1978.

Babuna, Aydın. "Kosova Sorunu Üzerine", *Dış Politika*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi. Cilt 7. Sayı: 1-2. 1997.  
[http://www.dispolitika.org.tr/dosyalar/ababuna\\_p.htm](http://www.dispolitika.org.tr/dosyalar/ababuna_p.htm)

Barr, John M. "Lend-Lease to Russia" *World at War Magazine*. October-November 2013

Batakovic, Dusan T. "Kosovo ana Metohija: Serbia's troublesome province" *Balkanica XXXIX*. Dusan T. Batakovic (eds). Beograd: Institute of Balkan Studies. 2009

Batakovic, Dusan T. *The Kosovo Chronicles*, Beograd: PLATO Press. 1992

Baty, Todd D. "En-route to Containment: Domestic Roots of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1947" *Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership*, Julie E. Manus (eds). Washington: February 2009.

Bekaj, Armend R. "The KLA and the Kosovo War: From Intra-State Conflict to Independent Country" *Berghof Conflict Research*. Berlin: 2010

Blanchard, Ian. "Economic decline in the early nineteenth century" Central European University. Budapest: 2000. Lecture

Buckwalter, David T. "Madeleine's War: Operation Allied Force" *Case studies in policy making*. Newport: Naval War College. 2002

Çavuşoğlu, Halim. "Yugoslavya-Makedonya" topraklarından Türkiye'ye göçler ve nedenleri" *Bilig*. Bahar 2007. vol:41

Chomsky, Noam. *The new Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press. 1999

Clark, Howard. *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, London: Pluto Press. 2000

Comai, Giorgio. "Moscow's approach towards de facto states after Kosovo's recognition". *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*. 8 August 2013

Crafts, Nicholas. "Saving the Eurozone: Is a "real" Marshall Plan the answer?" *The CAGE-Chatham House Series*. June 2012. No:1

Curta, Florin. *The Making of the Slavs, History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region, c. 500-700*, New York: Cambridge University Press. 2001

Dedeic-Kırbaç, Amra “Boşnakların Türkiye’ye Göçleri” *Akademik Bakış Dergi*. Mart-Nisan 2013. Sayı 35

Demir, Hakan. “Federalizm-Üniterizm İkileminde Sırp-Hırvat-Sloven Kralığı’nda siyasi Yaşam” *Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi*, cilt: 2. sayı: 2. Aralık 2013

Elsea, Jennifer K. and Weed, Matthew C. “Declaration of war and authorization for the Use of Military Force; Historical Background and Legal Implication” *Congressional Research Service*: April 18. 2014 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf>

Elsie, Robert. *Historical Dictionary of Kosovo*. Toronto: Scarecrow Press. 2011

Fodor, Pal. “Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında Macar reform hareketleri ve 1848-1849 Devrimi” *Doğumunun 200. Yıl dönümünde Lajos Kossuth 1848-49 Macar Özgürlük Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı-Macar İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, Celal İnal-Naciye Güngörmüş (eds). Kütahya: Dumlupınar Üniversitesi. March 2002. <http://www.turkmacar.org.tr/index.php/ondokuzuncu-yuzyilin-ilk-yarisinda-macar-reform-hareketleri-ve-1848-49-devrimi>

Franklin, Robert R. “Tsar Alexander II and President Abraham Lincoln: Unlikley Bedfellows?” *Hohonu*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii at Hilo Press. 2012

Gellman, Barton. “The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War” *The Washington Post*. April 18. 1999

Gibson, James R. “The sale of Russian American to the United States, 1983,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica*

Green, L.C. *International Law Through the Cases*, London: 1959. Stevens and Sons Limited. Vol. 2

Harding, Luke. “Kosovo Breakaway illegal, says Putin” *The Guardian*. 2008. 15 February

Heather, Peter . “The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe” *The English Historical Review*. Oxford University Press. Vol:110. No:435. February 1995

Hildinger, Erik. *Warriors of the Steppe: a military history of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.*, Cambridge. Mass.: Da Capo Press. 2001

Hosking, Geoffrey. “Why did the Soviet Union Collapse?” *Russian History*, London: February 2003

Hoxhaj, Enver. “The Politics of ethnic conflict regulation of Kosovo,” *Centre for the Study of Global Governance*, London: 2005

Imbrie, Robert Withney. "Document I Department of States, Washington Report on the Petrograd Consulate April 5 to September 1, 1918". *Studies in Intelligence*. David A. Langbert (eds). Vol. 52. No:1. December 2007

İnalçık, Halil. "Türkler ve Balkanlar". *Bal-Tam Türklük Bilgisi 3*, Bal-Tam Press. Prizren: September 2005

Isaacson, Walter. "Madeline's War" *TIME*. May 09. 1999

Karakoç, Jülide. "ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Hegemonya Çabaları Etkisinde NATO'nun Kosova Müdahalesi", *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara. 8/1: 2006

Kim, Julie. and Woehrel, Steven. "Kosovo and U.S. Policy: Background to Independence," *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Report Service: June 20. 2008

Kirman, Alan et Reichlin, Lucrezia. "L'aide aux peys de l'Est: les leçons du plan Marshall," *Revue de l'OFCE*: 1990. Vol:34. No: 1.

Kramer, Mark. "Special Feature: New Evidence of Soviet decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crisis" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*. [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9\\_p6.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_p6.pdf)

Kussutitch, Dr. August. "The Croatian Problem," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931 – 1939, Vol:12. No:1. January 1933. <http://domovod.info/zzfiles/res/CroatianProblem-Kussutitch1933.pdf>

Lamb, Michael W. "Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns", *Maxwell Paper*, No:27, August 2002

Lambeth, Benjamin S. *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: a Strategic and Operational Assessment*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2001

Lee, Austin. "US Intervention in Russia 1918-1920: the Forgotten Mutiny," *U.S. Foreign Relations 945*. April 29. 2011.

Lindsay, James M. "TWE Remembers: The Lend-Lease Act," *Council of Foreign Relations*: March 2011

Morrison, Donald. "Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union," *TIME*, Jan. 4. 1988

Muavchik, Joshua. "How Milosevic may save NATO?" *Wall Street Journal*. April 23. 1999

Müllerson, Rein. *Regime Change: From Democratic Peace Theories to Forcible Regime Change*. Leiden: Brill Press. 2013

Paecht, Arthur “Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a reform of the Security Council? International Law and Humanitarian Intervention”.*NATO Parliamentary Assembly Civilian Affairs Committee Report*. September 16. 1999

Petrovic, Vladimir P. “Pre-Roman and Roman Dardania Historical and Geographical Considerations” *Balcanica XXXVII*. Dusan T. Batakovic(ed). Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies Press. 2007

Rasche, Herbert H. “Alaska purchase centennial: 1867-1967,” *Arctic*. Vol: 20. No:2. January 1967

Rea, Kenneth W. “Peking and The Brezhnev Doctrine,” *Assian Affairs*, Sep.-Oct. 1975. Vol.3. no:1

Rogel, Carole. “Kosovo: Where It All Began,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol: 1. No: 1. Fall: 2003.

Sander, Oral.*Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*. Ankara: İmge Yayınevi. 2013

Sattertheaite, Joseph C. “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Sage Publications: 1972. Vol: 401

Shemetov, Maxim. “Putin: Crimea similar to Kosovo, West is rewriting its own rule book”, *Russia Today*, 2014. 13 March

Shukriu, Edi. “Prehistory and antique history of Kosovo,” University of Pristina, *unpublished phd dissertation*. Pristina 2008

Tılıç, Doğan. *Milliyetçiliğin Pençesindeki Kartal*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1999

Vernadsky, George. *Rusya Tarihi*. İstanbul: Selenge Yayınevi. 2011. Volume 2

Vickers, Miranda.*Between Serb and Albania: A history of Kosovo*, New York: Columbia University Press. 1998

Weber, Steve. “Shaping the Post-war Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO” *International Organisations*. Vol:46. No:3. Summer: 1992

Weymouth, Elizabeth. “Interview of Slobodan Milosevic to the Washinton Post”.*Washinton Post*. 1998. December 16.<http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/int-WP98.htm>

Whitman, Alden. “Harry S. Truman: Decisive President,”*NY Times*.6<sup>th</sup> August, 1945

Wilkes,J.J. *The Illyrians*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1992

## Official documents

*Address to the Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary General, 24 April, 2002, UNMIK/PR/719. 24 April. 2002*

*Charter of The United Nations and Statute of The International Court of Justice*

*Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 1990*

*Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9. 15 May. 2011*

Hoekema, Jan. "The new NATO: Security for an undivided Europe", *NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defence and Security Committee Report*. November 1998

*Letter dated 27 November 2001 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of Security Council, S/2001/1131*

Paecht, Arthur. "Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a reform of the Security Council? International Law and Humanitarian Intervention" *NATO Parliamentary Assembly Civilian Affairs Committee Report*. September 16. 1999

*Report of The Secretary General of the United Nations, S/1998/1068*

*Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo NATO Press Release (99)12*

*The Ahtissari Proposal*

*UN Security Council Report of The Secretary General of the United Nations S/1998/1068. 12 November.1998*

*UN Security Council Report of The Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of The Security Council, S/1998/1068. 12 November. 1998*

*UN Security Council Resolution 1160*

*UN Security Council Resolution 1199*

*UN Security Council Resolution 1239*

*UN Security Council Statement by The President of The Security Council S/PRST/1998/25. 24 August 1998*

*UN Security Council Statement by the President of Security Council. 30 April. 2004,*

*UN Security Council Statement by the President of Security Council. S/PRST/1999/2.19 January 1999*

*UN Security Council Statement by the President of Security Council, S/PRST/1999/5. 29 January 1999*

*Statement on Kosovo NATO Press Release S-1 99(62)*

*Belarus, India and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, S/1999/328. 26 March, 1999*

*Letter dated 23 March 1999 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/314*

*Letter dated 24 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, S/1999/320*

*Letter dated 25 March 1999 from the Secretary General, S/1999/338*

*UN Security Council 3988<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report. 1999. 24 March*

*UN Security Council 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting, S/PV.3989. 1999. 26 March*

*UN Security Council 3989<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report. 1999. 26 March*

*UN Security Council 4011<sup>th</sup> Meeting Report. 1999. 10 June*

## **Electronic Sources**

Garrett, Amy C. "Highlights in the history of U.S. Relations with Russia, 1780 – June 2006," *Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs*. May 11. 2007. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm#reykjavik>

Keyesen, Carl. "Transcript of oral history interview with Theodore Sorensen-JFK #6, 05/20/1964", *John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection*, John F. Kennedy Library: March 26. 1964. <http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/JFKOH/Sorensen,%20Theodore%20C/JFKOH-TCS-06/JFKOH-TCS-06-TR.pdf>

Williams, Robert Chadwell. "Russia in transition: The diplomatic papers of David R. Francis, US Ambassador to Russia, 1916-1918" *Microfilm Project*. in Robert Lester (eds). Missouri Historical Society: 1986. [http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc\\_assets/catalog/11272.pdf](http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc_assets/catalog/11272.pdf)

"U-2 High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, United States of America" *Air-Force Technology*. <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/u2/>

“United States relations with Russia” *Office of historian Washington DC.*  
January 2009. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm>

“US-Russian relations: A Statement” *Carnegie Endowment for  
Peace.* [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador\\_statement.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ambassador_statement.pdf)

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name and Surname : Hasan Mert Cankara

Place and Date of Birth : Turkey 16.05.1986

Education:

Degree	Field	University	Year
Undergraduate	System Engineering	Turkish Military Academy	2005-2009
Graduate	International Relations	Atilim University	2013-2015

Work Experience:

Work Place	Position	Year
Gendarmerie General Command	Second Lieutenant	2009-2012
Gendarmerie General Command	First Lieutenant	2012-Current

Foreign Languages: English (Advance), French (Intermediate)

E-mail: hasanmertcankara@gmail.com

Phone: 05445667755

Date : 15.08.2015

Turnitin Orijinallik Raporu

Tez Hasan Mert Cankara tarafından

ÖDEV 2 (SBE TEZ 1) den

- 20-Oca-2016 14:10 EET' de işleme konu
- NUMARA: 622161667
- Kelime Sayısı: 16806

Benzerlik Endeksi: %18

Kaynağa göre Benzerlik

Internet Sources: %17

Yayınlar: %6

Öğrenci Ödevleri:%7